

Distant Neighbours

Perceptions of Self and Other in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia

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Paper presented at the 6th Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN), Columbia University, 5-7 April 2001

**Preliminary version
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Introduction

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina shocked and mobilised world opinion. What happened seemed hard to understand, and explanations were often based on simplified views of nationalism or ideas about a specific, violent-prone Balkan culture (Cigar 1995, Kennan 1993, Meštrović 1993). At the same time, serious scholarship tended to provide a more complex account of the war (Woodward 1995, Calic 1995, Bougarel 1996, Burg and Shoup 1999), especially when studying the experience of ordinary Bosnians (Maček 2000).

The conflict led to a renewed interest in characteristic features of Balkan history and society, as well as a critical examination of Western understanding of the Balkans as a form of “orientalism” or “balkanism” (Bakić-Hayden 1995, Todorova 1997).

Closely related to an “orientalist” discourse on the Balkans is the dichotomy of Eastern and Western Nationalism (Kohn 1944, Francies 1976, Plamenatz 1973). The distinction between a civic, “liberal” nationalism and its ethnic, “authoritarian” counterpart is easily harmonised with an attitude which classifies cultural and social differences in moral terms and takes Western civilisational supremacy for granted.

Interpretations of recent conflicts in the Balkans have given ample evidence of such tendencies. Even those who have distanced themselves from a simplified paradigm of perennial ethnic divisions have often inadvertently accepted certain aspects of the “orientalist” perspective. One example is the idea, which seems to have originated with the Belgrade politician and intellectual Bogdan Bogdanović, that the rage displayed during the war is to be understood as the expression of an irrational hatred of the city typical of (backward) Balkan peasants.

It is, of course, perfectly possible to describe the differences between the Balkans and other parts of Europe without making value judgements (see e.g. Gellner’s discussion on Eastern and Western nationalism (Gellner 1983). The cultural reactions provoked by the encounter

between Balkan society and a powerful West are real enough and deserve an unprejudiced sociological and social psychological analysis.

The peoples of Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia belong to a common Balkan (and partly Central European) cultural space, but at the same time represent unique features in terms of identity construction and nation-building, largely due to a complex interplay of cultural similarities and differences arising in a specific historical context. Although sharing a common language, they developed distinct cultural and national identities, ultimately related to religious tradition. As a result of the war, the precarious balance between Yugoslav and national dimensions has been replaced by an emphasis on cultural boundaries and dissimilarities, e.g. the formation of new literary languages, or reinterpretations of national histories. On the other hand, Muslims, Croats, and Serbs are still neighbours, and will have to reach some kind of accommodation, notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is, therefore, of considerable interest to understand the extent to which inter-ethnic relations are influenced by stereotypes and traditional cultural models. In particular, are there characteristic types of Serb, Croat, and Bosniak self-other perceptions, or is it possible to find common patterns, regardless of ethnic affiliation?

Based on data from a sociological survey carried out in 1999¹, this paper will address topics such as self-concept, attitudes towards the other, and the idea of a multi-ethnic society. The main purpose of the survey was to study the relationship between religion and nationalism and the possibility of reconciliation after the wars in the Balkans. Apart from measures of religion and ethnicity, there were several attitudinal questions mapping patriarchalism, authoritarianism, political orientations, experience of war, and the prospect of ethnic coexistence. In this context we will concentrate on a few variables which illustrate the degree

¹ The survey was conducted within the research project *Ethnic and Religious Mobilization in former Yugoslavia*, being carried out at the Centre for Multiethnic Research, Uppsala University, and financed by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation.

of social distance, attitudes towards the West, views on one's own group and its history, as well as the ideology of national exclusiveness.

Data

The sociological survey was undertaken in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia in the autumn of 1999.

Data were collected during three weeks in October/November by the public opinion agencies Puls (Split/Zagreb) and Medium (Belgrade).² Altogether 7 000 respondents were interviewed, 2000 each in Croatia and Serbia, and 3000 in Bosnia.³

The surveys in Croatia and Serbia are based on statistically representative samples of the adult population. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, where, due to the lack of reliable population statistics, it is impossible to obtain a strictly representative sample, a multi-stage sampling procedure was used, based on the 1991 census, estimates of population transfers, and, if available, preliminary census figures. In the final stages random selection of towns/villages and respondents was employed. This method has been used for several years in public opinion research in Bosnia and is regarded as satisfactory in the circumstances.

Data were collected by qualified and experienced interviewers employed by the field organisations of Medium and Puls in Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The interviews were conducted without disturbances and nonresponse rates are generally low. It should be added, though, that, as in all surveys in former Yugoslavia, poorly educated people tend to refuse participation and are, consequently, underrepresented. In Croatia and Serbia it is possible to compensate for this by using weighting procedures, which is not an option in Bosnia, for reasons just mentioned.

During the period of data collection the president of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, was terminally ill, and his death occurred shortly after the survey was completed. It is hard to say to what

² I would like to express my gratitude to Nenad Bulat and Damir Štrelov of Puls, and Srbobran Branković and Jasna Milošević of Medium.

³ The Bosnian sample consists of three subsamples of 1000 respondents each in the areas dominated by Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. A telling fact is that the percentage of minorities was very low: 6%, 4% and 3 %.

extent this influenced the respondents, but it probably made some of the issues more salient. Otherwise, there were no dramatic events in the area, but it should be remembered that only four months had passed since the end of NATO's war on Yugoslavia, and the situation in Kosovo was still very tense.

The questionnaire consisted of 98 questions, or approximately 200 variables. It was printed in three versions: Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian, in order to facilitate the data collection. The material was transferred to SPSS data files by the staff at Medium and Puls and is at present being analysed by researchers in Uppsala, Split, and Belgrade.

Social Distance

As a measure of social distance a modified version of the well-known Bogardus-scale was used. The respondents were asked whether they were ready to live in the same town or village as a member of a given ethnic group, and whether they would accept him or her as a workmate, friend, or spouse.

Table 1 shows that there is a high degree of distance between ethnic groups, in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This might, at first sight, be interpreted as a result of the war, which is not necessarily the case. Inter-marriage rates in former Yugoslavia were consistently low, notably in Bosnia (Petrović 1985, Botev 1994), and it is therefore not surprising that only a minority of the respondents is prepared to marry across ethnic and religious lines. Thus, the pattern of intermarriage does not, by itself, have to be an indicator of a highly divided and conflictual society.

Of greater importance is the fact that a large part of the respondents is not prepared to share workplace with, or even live in the same town as members of other groups. About half of the Croats and around 60 percent of the Serbs in Bosnia would not accept Serbs or Bosniaks, respectively Croats or Bosniaks, as fellow citizens in this sense.

The degree of social distance is associated with rural-urban background and education, but not with age or sex. The most salient social factor seems to be education. In all groups there is a more or less clear difference between those with primary education or less, and those who have a university degree, while respondents with secondary education fall in between.

What is most remarkable are the sometimes-profound differences between ethnic groups. When education is held constant, there is still an apparent difference between, on the one hand, Muslims, and, on the other hand, Croats and Serbs (Table 2). According to this investigation Muslims are definitely more inclined to accept other ethnic groups. It should be noted, though, that those who are sympathising with the major Muslim political party, SDA, are more intolerant. The effect of political affiliation is also noticeable among Bosnian Serbs, but less so among the Croats, as HDZ is a mass party with no real competition.

That the situation in Bosnia is specific is revealed by the fact that there is an obvious difference between the attitudes of Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and those living in Serbia and Croatia. Actually, the feasibility of the (Croat-Muslim) Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina might be questioned, when as many as 50 percent of the Croats would rather not live in the same town or village as Muslims. On the other hand, it could be argued that the distance towards Serbs in Croatia is still surprisingly high, when 40 percent of those with primary education and 20 percent of those with a University degree would not accept Serbs in their hometown. This is reciprocated by Serbian attitudes towards Croats (35 and 20 percent).

Another significant factor is church or mosque attendance, which is closely correlated with education, however. The effects of war experience are somewhat contradictory. While those who have participated in combat or been wounded during the war do not express a higher degree of social distance, refugee status does result in less tolerance. In this case, however, there are evident contrasts between ethnic groups in Bosnia. Among Muslims there is no

difference in social distance between refugees and others. Bosnian Croat refugees are slightly more tolerant than non-refugees (!), whereas Bosnian Serb refugees are clearly less prepared than non-refugees to interact with members of other groups.

For example, 58 percent of the Croat refugees would accept a Muslim living in the same town, against 48 percent of the non-refugees. Similarly, the degree to which they would accept Serbs is 70 percent and 57 percent. (Bosnian Croats are, thus, more positive towards Serbs than towards Muslims). On the other hand, among Bosnian Serb refugees, 44 percent would accept a Croat, and 35 percent a Muslim living in the same town, against 64 percent respectively 54 percent among non-refugees. It should be added that non-refugees in Serbia have a more positive view of Croats than vice versa.

These differences, which are hard to explain and require further analysis, have important effects, since the refugee contingent in our survey is considerably higher among Serbs than among Muslims or Croats from Bosnia. In other words, one reason for the distinct response pattern among Serbs in Bosnia seems to be the number of refugees and the way they experience their forced migration.

A differently phrased question concerned the general attitude towards Croats, Serbs and Muslims, varying from respect to hatred. A similar pattern is repeated, with Muslims less intolerant than Croats and Serbs. Outright hatred of other groups is comparatively rare, though, as is respect. Most respondents either “have nothing against them”, or “do not like them”. Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs are, again, less tolerant than Croats and Serbs in Croatia or Serbia, and the highest degree of hatred is to be found among Bosnian Serbs vis-à-vis Muslims (25 percent).

Returning to the issue of whether social distance might be an effect of the war, it is interesting to compare this study with an earlier survey conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the summer of 1996, immediately before the elections (Branković, Magnusson & Milanović

1996; Bulat, Magnusson, & Štrelov 1996; Magnusson 1996). In fact, it turns out that five years later the degree of social distance is, on the whole, lower. Croats and, in particular, Muslim attitudes have undergone substantial changes in that direction. As for the Bosnian Serbs, the degree of social distance towards Croats is, in lower educational strata, somewhat higher than before, while the attitude towards Muslims is more relaxed. Common to all groups, however, is that the views on intermarriage have not changed.⁴

Self-Image

Three statements were used to measure attitudes towards self and history: *my people has only conducted defensive wars, my people has suffered more throughout history than other peoples, my people is not perfect, but its cultural tradition is superior to others.*

The response pattern (Table 3) is remarkably similar among the ethnic groups. Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, all believe they have only defended themselves against outside aggression and have suffered more throughout history than others. At the same time they perceive their own culture as superior. Again, there are differences according to education, but even among those with a university degree, the dominant tendency is the same, especially as far as defensive wars are concerned. On this item between 60 and 78 percent chose the alternative *strongly agree*. The conviction that one's own people has a unique experience of suffering is not as widespread, but only slightly less, and a more differentiated response is primarily noticeable among those with higher education. Here Croats in Croatia differ significantly from the rest.

The idea of cultural superiority is less accepted, especially among those with secondary and higher education. Still, 40 percent of university educated Muslims and Bosnian Croats, 42 percent Croats, 48 percent Serbs, and 67 percent Bosnian Serbs subscribe to this idea. The general picture is clear: All groups feel they belong to a peace-loving and suffering people, which is, nevertheless, bearer of an exceptional cultural tradition.

⁴ The results should be interpreted with caution, since the comparison is not based on longitudinal data.

Attitude towards the West

There is a common feeling among the respondents that the Western world has not understood what is going on in the Balkans, that the West has been unfair to their own nation, and that it tends to look upon the peoples in the region as uncivilised and backward (Table 4). There are some differences, which might be understood according to the political context in the autumn of 1999. It is, e.g., no surprise that Serbs, whether in Serbia or Bosnia, are of the opinion that the

West is acting against their interests a few months after the war in Kosovo ended. Similarly, it would perhaps be logical for Croats and Muslims, but not for Croats in Bosnia, to differ on this point. However, the tendency to distrust the West is strong among all ethnic groups. In particular, the feeling that the West has not understood the real conditions in the Balkans is more or less shared, regardless of ethnic background. As for the statement that the West tends to perceive people in the region as backward, there are three response patterns, from comparatively low to very high confirmation of the statement: Croats and Bosnian Muslims; Serbs (and Bosnian Croats); (Bosnian Croats and) Bosnian Serbs.

A Multi-Ethnic Bosnia

The three ethnic groups have very different views on the Bosnian state (Table 6). Croats and Serbs in Bosnia are generally in favour of an incorporation of Republika Srpska and Herceg Bosna with the “Motherland”, while the Bosniaks are almost unanimous in their quest for a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Both views being contrary to the Dayton Accords). It is interesting to note that whereas Serbs in Serbia largely support their compatriots in Bosnia, this is not true of Croats in Croatia. A majority of Bosnian Croats want to be part of Croatia, but a majority of Croats is against this solution.

The division between the nationalities of Bosnia is also illustrated by their views on language. The name given to the earlier common language is Bosnian, Croatian, or Serbian, and the label is almost perfectly correlated with ethnic affiliation. An interesting point is that whereas

Serbs and Muslims tend to stress linguistic similarities and believe they speak a common language, the Croats to a large extent regard the languages as partially or completely different. Similarly, the investigation carried out before the elections in 1996 (Magnusson 1996) revealed that, while Serbs and Croats wanted the right to use the Serbian and Croatian standard languages, and have instruction in their mother tongue, the Muslims were generally against such policies and were of the opinion that Bosnian should be the official language of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In view of recent developments, one could only say that popular perceptions of the political future of Bosnia correspond to proposals made by Bosnian politicians, and that ideas which are criticised as nationalist by the West are generally supported by the respective constituencies.

The international community has officially tried to foster the idea of a multi-ethnic Bosnia, although it is not quite clear what is meant by the term. In order to study views on this matter the respondents were asked how they would define an ideal multi-ethnic society. They were given three alternatives:

A society where several peoples live together in harmony, but do not mix. Each preserves its own culture, and individuals do not generally intermarry.

A society where several peoples live together, each preserving its own culture, but where intermarriage is common.

A society where national identity is becoming unimportant. Individuals mix freely and intermarriage is common.

Considering much of the writing on the Bosnian war, it might be argued that the Western view is similar to the third alternative, i.e. a genuine multi-ethnic society is, in fact, a society, where ethnicity is more or less unimportant. In contrast, the first alternative actually amounts to a brief description of the Ottoman *millet* system, which for so long dominated Bosnia

What is striking about the response pattern (Table 5) is that a majority of the respondents in Bosnia and Herzegovina are in favour of the millet model, i.e. a society where members of

different ethnic groups are living in peace, side by side, but do not interact closely, and are certainly not marrying each other. This view is strongest among Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs (80 percent) and dominant among Muslims (53 percent). Only 19 percent of the Muslims and 6-8 percent of Croats and Serbs are in favour of the “Western model”. It is characteristic that among Croats in Croatia and Serbs in Serbia, less than a third chose the segregated alternative. Perhaps unexpectedly, the least “nationalist” category is Serbs in Serbia, of which more than 40 percent see the third alternative as an ideal. The more “cosmopolitan” attitude in Serbia is apparent even when education is held constant. The “Western” model is preferred by almost 50 percent of Serbs with a university degree, compared to 27 percent (Muslims), 9 percent (Bosnian Croats), 11 percent (Bosnian Serbs), or 34 percent (Croats).

This pattern is interesting when compared to data on ethnic distance. It seems that for many Muslims it is less important whether you live in the same town as others, as long as the cultural distance is kept. Incidentally, this has been the view of major ideologues of the SDA, which have in effect, explicitly put forward the religiously divided Ottoman society as an ideal. Moreover, such an understanding corresponds to the traditional Islamic view of society, religion, and culture.

The more tolerant attitudes of Bosnian Muslims expressed on several issues, might also be interpreted as a reflection of Ottoman culture, and, perhaps, as a typical orientation of a people forming a minority during most of the turbulent process of modernisation and nation-building in Bosnia.

A Syndrome of Nationalism?

To what extent are these attitudes related? Is it possible to speak about a syndrome of “nationalism” characterised by a high degree of social distance, as well as an ambivalent attitude towards one’s own culture and the outside world? In order to answer this question an

analysis using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was undertaken.⁵ The analysis was performed with the software EQS.⁶ (Technical details are given in the appendix).

The idea behind SEM is that theoretical constructs, like nationalism or social distance, could be understood as *latent variables* which cannot be measured directly, but are accessible through analysis of relationships between manifest or measured variables. For example, in this case items in a questionnaire are seen as *indicators* of a latent construct which is believed to affect attitudes and language behaviour. It is presumed that utterances of a certain kind reflect, or are caused by, the latent, theoretical variable. This, in many ways, is an advance compared to traditional social science research which habitually has concentrated on “operationalisation”. For one thing, such a view is easier to relate to recent developments in the study of language within psychology, linguistics, and textual analysis. It also has the potential of bridging the gap between qualitative and quantitative research, since an important goal of SEM is to account for complex structural and causal relations.

What distinguishes SEM from other multivariate statistical methods is that a theoretical model is postulated in advance and tested on the data. For example, in contrast to classical factor analysis, where one tries to interpret a solution which is, in a sense, arbitrary, in the confirmatory factor analysis of SEM one has to specify relationships between variables and factors before the analysis. If relations in the data set are such that the theoretical model can be reproduced according to certain standards, the model is said to fit the data. SEM, thus, rests on a comparison of the proposed model with the covariation existing in the data matrix. To decide whether the difference between a theoretical model and empirical data is sufficiently small, several measures of goodness of fit are used. While certain distributional characteristics of the variables are assumed, some of the measures try to account for cases when these assumptions are not met.

⁵ For an introduction to SEM see e.g. (Raykov and Marcoulides 2000) or (Maruyama 1998)

⁶ For EQS see (Bentler 1995), (Bentler and Wu 1995) and (Byrne 1994)

On the basis of literature on Balkan nationalism, as well as readings of post-Yugoslav press, it was hypothesised that there is a relationship between the attitudes we have referred to, caused by four theoretical constructs: *social distance*, *distrust of the West*, *nationalism* (understood as an exclusive national ideology), and *self-image* (or view of history). It is suggested that they form a syndrome, i.e. should be understood as distinct but interrelated concepts, rather than as dimensions in a unitary structure.

Consequently, a confirmative factor analytical model was formulated, consisting of four factors. Four variables (see Table 2) were chosen as indicators of social distance: the willingness to live in the same town and to work together with members of external groups (Croats/Muslims, Croats/Serbs etc.). Distrust of the West (Table 4) was measured by two statements: The West is acting against us, and the West is treating us as backward. As indicators of Exclusive Nationalism three items were used (Table 7): All members of a nation should live in the same state; One can feel secure only if one lives in a state where one's own people is a majority; One should be careful with members of other nations. Finally, Self-Image comprised three variables: My people has only conducted defensive wars; My people has suffered more than others throughout history; and Our culture is superior. (For a graphic representation of the model, see Figure 1).

The original test was made using a sample consisting of Serbs from Serbia. What emerges is a clear four factor model (see the simplified summary in Tables 8 and 9, and the printout from EQS). At first, social distance towards Croats and Muslims is accounted for by one factor with high loadings. The same is true of the variables measuring Distrust of the West. In the third factor, Nationalism, the item "all should live in the same state" has a somewhat lower but significant loading. The loadings of the fourth factor, Self-Image, are all high.

Second, the correlations between factors are moderate or moderately high, which validates our general hypothesis of a nationalist syndrome. It is interesting to note that Nationalism is

closely related to both Social Distance and Self-Image, but slightly less to Distrust of the West. The attitude towards the West has a comparatively low correlation with Social Distance, and is more strongly associated with Self-Image, which in turn is most highly correlated with Nationalism. These relationships make sense, and it might be argued that a similar structure would probably arise as a result of analyses of textual data (such as Croat, Bosniak or Serbs press) or deep interviews.

According to usual goodness of fit indexes the model cannot be rejected. Chi-square with 35 degrees of freedom is 47.880, the three indexes employed are 0.995, 0.997, and 0.999, respectively, which is very high. Assumption-free measures yield the same result.

The model was subsequently tested on other samples: Croats from Croatia, Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs. In all cases, the same general pattern emerged.

The sample from Croatia revealed an almost identical structure, both in terms of factor loadings and factor correlations. In the data from Bosnia and Herzegovina there are certain differences as to the degree of relationship between the factors, but the same pattern appears. Among Bosniaks there is a weaker relation between Self Image and Distrust of the West, which is still weaker among Bosnian Croats, whereas the association between Social Distance and Self Image is weak among Bosnian Serbs. It should also be noted that the general fit was not as good in the Bosnian Serb sample as in the others. On the whole, though, there is a remarkable similarity between the five groups.

Discussion

The exercise undertaken here should be considered as preliminary and exploratory. It would be desirable to include additional factors or investigate more complex structures. Above all, however, the model should preferably account for causal relationships, which have been left out in this context. It is, naturally, of great interest to explore what factors are decisively

influencing the syndrome we have been studying. Some hints have been given, but it is important to examine the relative effects of variables like urban-rural background, education, refugee status, or religion. In addition, nothing has been said about how pervasive the “nationalist syndrome” is within a given group.

It should also be remembered that survey data constitute a snapshot taken at a specific moment, and, therefore, strictly speaking, lack a historical dimension. Nevertheless, in our view, the data presented here reveal a pattern which should be taken seriously, and which will have consequences for an understanding of post-Yugoslav society, and, especially, for any outside intervention in Balkan politics.

It might be argued that the outcome of the analysis is not surprising. After all, the findings correspond to historical knowledge and cultural studies, as well as fiction. However, the result is at variance with many recent explanations of the conflicts in the Balkans, both in scholarly works and the media. It has generally been assumed that this syndrome is typical of Serbian nationalism, that Serbian culture and political life exhibits a characteristic obsession with history, suffering and defeat, connected to low self-esteem and a virulent nationalism (Lauer 1995, Anzulovic 1999, Cigar 1995, Meštrović 1993). In fact, according to this study, the same basic pattern is to be found among Croats and Bosnian Muslims as well. From a theoretical point of view this is to be expected and might be discussed within the framework of sociology of knowledge and social identity theory.

It is tempting to regard the attitudinal constructs we have found as permanent features of Balkan society. This would be a misleading simplification. It is true that there do exist earlier identified cognitive patterns and modes of behaviour which are part of Balkan cultural traditions. However, although present as attitudes and role models available in the “social stock of knowledge” these patterns are modified throughout history, unevenly distributed in society, and not always salient. Rather, they exist as latent possibilities on various societal

levels, both in “high” and “low” culture, which might be activated in a given social and political context. The general ambivalence towards one’s own and Western culture has probably been more or less constantly reinforced since the onset of modernisation, but its relation to a conscious nationalist ideology and a high degree of ethnic distance seems to be confined to specific situations or temporal contexts.

According to Tajfel’s social identity theory (Tajfel 1974), identity and group cohesion is influenced by certain cognitive mechanisms, playing a fundamental role for orientation in social reality. In Tajfel’s view, categorisation of the social world, without with human society would be inconceivable, always implies a comparison and evaluation of one’s own and external groups. Ultimately the individual strives to preserve a positive self-image, which results in a tendency to minimise differences within one’s own group, and to maximise differences between one’s own and other groups. Thus, social stereotypes are more or less constantly generated in normal social interaction and constitute a basis for identity maintenance. In other words, prejudice and conflict are, as it were, “negative” by-products of otherwise “positive” mechanisms.

Tajfel has proposed a general social psychological and cognitive theory of identity and social interaction, valid in all social contexts, but it will have specific and sometimes dramatic consequences in a multi-ethnic setting, especially in modern society.

On the one hand, the theory explains the ambivalent reactions of 19th century Balkan intellectuals when confronted with West European culture and society and gives a theoretical underpinning to Plamenatz’ (1973) observations on the character of “Eastern” nationalism.

On the other hand, if the theory is integrated with sociology of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann 1967), it is possible to explain how such attitudes might be sedimented in tradition, and in a given context may again become salient. The mechanisms Tajfel is referring to would be pertinent in any multi-cultural situation, e.g. in an immigrant country like Sweden. The

same processes are at work in the Balkans, the difference being that here there exists a ready-made (historically established) system of discourse and symbols that can be evoked.

That certain cultural patterns were able to play a devastating role during the conflicts of the 1990s has less to do with Balkan culture as such, with characteristic (supposedly violent) properties of its traditions, but with the fact that the region has been the arena of a complex and never completely finished process of nation-building, which today seems impossible to resolve in a fair manner, and for this very reason became an acute issue during the break-up of Yugoslavia.

Therefore, even though there undoubtedly exist frames of reference such as those we have been discussing, they cannot automatically be regarded as the major cause of conflict and violence, which, in a comparative perspective is hardly unique (Mazower 2000). Furthermore, it seems pointless to concentrate on changing the minds of people, which has been an axiom in the efforts of the international community to restore peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Chandler 1999). The governors of Bosnia have been more concerned with oral or written objections to the “Spirit of Dayton”, than with creating institutional prerequisites for economic growth and a secure social environment, which eventually might lead to normal social interaction between members of different ethnic groups. Instead, ordinary people have been exposed to the arbitrary rule of politicians installed by the international community itself, while the same community is furthering “democracy” on the surface with rather doubtful means, to say the least. In their frustration, international representatives are even beginning to use “orientalist” discourse to describe Bosnian society.⁷

⁷ See, for example, the speech made by the Austrian diplomat Wolfgang Petritsch (Petritsch 2000), High Representative in Sarajevo, at Chatham House a year ago. His main argument is that a culturally determined “Balkan mindset” cannot be accepted in a “multi-ethnic” European society characterized by “civic” values.

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Appendix

		Bosniak /Bosnia	Croat/ Bosnia	Serb/ Bosnia	Croat/ Croatia	Serb/ Serbia
Croat living in my village or town	I would accept	94,6%		52,6%		74,3%
	I would not accept	5,4%		47,4%		25,7%
Croat as a workmate	I would accept	92,5%		46,9%		71,3%
	I would not accept	7,5%		53,1%		28,7%
Croat as a friend	I would accept	78,5%		27,7%		58,1%
	I would not accept	21,5%		72,3%		41,9%
Croat as husband or wife of someone from my family	I would accept	33,3%		11,1%		41,2%
	I would not accept	66,7%		88,9%		58,8%
Muslim living in my village or town	I would accept		49,7%	43,0%	76,7%	68,1%
	I would not accept		50,3%	57,0%	23,3%	31,9%
Muslim as a workmate	I would accept		50,5%	36,9%	75,1%	64,4%
	I would not accept		49,5%	63,1%	24,9%	35,6%
Muslim as a friend	I would accept		32,4%	18,7%	68,6%	48,9%
	I would not accept		67,6%	81,3%	31,4%	51,1%
Muslim as husband or wife of someone from my family	I would accept		8,7%	6,1%	39,4%	26,6%
	I would not accept		91,3%	93,9%	60,6%	73,4%
Serb living in my village or town	I would accept	88,0%	57,9%		69,1%	
	I would not accept	12,0%	42,1%		30,9%	
Serb as a workmate	I would accept	82,8%	60,8%		64,6%	
	I would not accept	17,2%	39,2%		35,4%	
Serb as a friend	I would accept	60,2%	42,4%		57,1%	
	I would not accept	39,8%	57,6%		42,9%	
Serb as husband or wife of someone from my family	I would accept	25,6%	13,0%		37,4%	
	I would not accept	74,4%	87,0%		62,6%	

Table 1b Ethnic Affiliation and Social Distance				Col % Count		
		Bosniac Bosnia	Croat Bosnia	Serb Bosnia	Croat Croatia	Serb Serbia
Croat living in my village or town	I would accept	877		471		1117
		94,6%		52,6%		74,3%
	I would not accept	50		424		387
		5,4%		47,4%		25,7%
Croat as a workmate	I would accept	834		417		1056
		92,5%		46,9%		71,3%
	I would not accept	68		473		425
		7,5%		53,1%		28,7%
Croat as a friend	I would accept	681		242		818
		78,5%		27,7%		58,1%
	I would not accept	186		632		590
		21,5%		72,3%		41,9%
Croat as husband or wife of someone from my family	I would accept	284		98		563
		33,3%		11,1%		41,2%
	I would not accept	569		786		805
		66,7%		88,9%		58,8%
Muslim living in my village or town	I would accept		457	393	1379	1014
			49,7%	43,0%	76,7%	68,1%
	I would not accept		462	521	418	476
			50,3%	57,0%	23,3%	31,9%
Muslim as a workmate	I would accept		453	332	1345	948
			50,5%	36,9%	75,1%	64,4%
	I would not accept		444	567	445	523
			49,5%	63,1%	24,9%	35,6%
Muslim as a friend	I would accept		287	166	1210	696
			32,4%	18,7%	68,6%	48,9%
	I would not accept		599	721	553	726
			67,6%	81,3%	31,4%	51,1%
Muslim as husband or wife of someone from my family	I would accept		76	55	669	359
			8,7%	6,1%	39,4%	26,6%
	I would not accept		802	850	1030	992
			91,3%	93,9%	60,6%	73,4%
Serb living in my village or town	I would accept	810	523		1248	
		88,0%	57,9%		69,1%	
	I would not accept	110	381		557	
		12,0%	42,1%		30,9%	
Serb as a workmate	I would accept	734	536		1161	
		82,8%	60,8%		64,6%	
	I would not accept	153	346		637	
		17,2%	39,2%		35,4%	
Serb as a friend	I would accept	512	364		1011	
		60,2%	42,4%		57,1%	
	I would not accept	339	494		761	
		39,8%	57,6%		42,9%	
Serb as husband or wife of someone from my family	I would accept	219	110		638	
		25,6%	13,0%		37,4%	
	I would not accept	637	738		1069	
		74,4%	87,0%		62,6%	

Table 2. Education, Ethnicity and Social Distance

Primary Education		Bosniak Bosnia	Croat Bosnia	Serb Bosnia	Croat Croatia	Serb Serbia
Croat living in my village or town	I would accept	93,9%		37,9%		64,9%
	I would not accept	6,1%		62,1%		35,1%
Croat as a workmate	I would accept	87,9%		23,4%		62,3%
	I would not accept	12,1%		76,6%		37,7%
Croat as a friend	I would accept	65,3%		13,2%		49,3%
	I would not accept	34,7%		86,8%		50,7%
Croat as husband or wife of someone From my family	I would accept	16,7%		5,9%		33,8%
	I would not accept	83,3%		94,1%		66,2%
Muslim living in my village or town	I would accept		40,3%	32,6%	69,6%	61,8%
	I would not accept		59,7%	67,4%	30,4%	38,2%
Muslim as a workmate	I would accept		40,0%	20,2%	70,0%	57,6%
	I would not accept		60,0%	79,8%	30,0%	42,4%
Muslim as a friend	I would accept		22,5%	9,2%	65,6%	41,6%
	I would not accept		77,5%	90,8%	34,4%	58,4%
Muslim as husband or wife of someone From my family	I would accept		5,1%	3,2%	32,4%	25,7%
	I would not accept		94,9%	96,8%	67,6%	74,3%
Serb living in my village or town	I would accept	81,9%	48,9%		59,8%	
	I would not accept	18,1%	51,1%		40,2%	
Serb as a workmate	I would accept	73,5%	51,4%		59,0%	
	I would not accept	26,5%	48,6%		41,0%	
Serb as a friend	I would accept	48,6%	33,2%		52,7%	
	I would not accept	51,4%	66,8%		47,3%	
Serb as husband or wife of someone From my family	I would accept	11,4%	7,0%		33,0%	
	I would not accept	88,6%	93,0%		67,0%	
Secondary Education						
Croat living in my village or town	I would accept	95,6%		55,1%		74,2%
	I would not accept	4,4%		44,9%		25,8%
Croat as a workmate	I would accept	95,0%		49,9%		71,6%
	I would not accept	5,0%		50,1%		28,4%
Croat as a friend	I would accept	84,7%		31,3%		58,3%
	I would not accept	15,3%		68,7%		41,7%
Croat as husband or wife of someone From my family	I would accept	39,3%		11,7%		41,3%
	I would not accept	60,7%		88,3%		58,7%
Muslim living in my village or town	I would accept		49,4%	44,5%	76,6%	66,4%
	I would not accept		50,6%	55,5%	23,4%	33,6%
Muslim as a workmate	I would accept		50,8%	38,9%	74,7%	63,1%
	I would not accept		49,2%	61,1%	25,3%	36,9%
Muslim as a friend	I would accept		33,6%	20,3%	68,0%	46,8%
	I would not accept		66,4%	79,7%	32,0%	53,2%
Muslim as husband or wife of From my family	I would accept		8,6%	6,1%	38,7%	25,1%
	I would not accept		91,4%	93,9%	61,3%	74,9%
Serb living in my village or town	I would accept	90,7%	58,2%		69,3%	
	I would not accept	9,3%	41,8%		30,7%	
Serb as a workmate	I would accept	86,9%	61,3%		63,6%	
	I would not accept	13,1%	38,7%		36,4%	
Serb as a friend	I would accept	64,6%	43,4%		55,9%	
	I would not accept	35,4%	56,6%		44,1%	
Serb as husband or wife of someone From my family	I would accept	31,5%	14,2%		35,8%	
	I would not accept	68,5%	85,8%		64,2%	

University Degree		Nationality				
		Bosniac/ Bosnia	Croat/ Bosnia	Serb/ Bosnia	Croat/ Croatia	Serb/ Serbia
Croat living in my village or town	I would accept	91,2%		60,2%		80,8%
	I would not accept	8,8%		39,8%		19,2%
Croat as a workmate	I would accept	92,3%		60,7%		76,8%
	I would not accept	7,7%		39,3%		23,2%
Croat as a friend	I would accept	87,1%		32,3%		64,0%
	I would not accept	12,9%		67,7%		36,0%
Croat as husband or wife of someone from my family	I would accept	59,8%		14,7%		45,6%
	I would not accept	40,2%		85,3%		54,4%
Muslim living in my village or town	I would accept		69,4%	49,2%	85,5%	76,4%
	I would not accept		30,6%	50,8%	14,5%	23,6%
Muslim as a workmate	I would accept		68,3%	48,1%	82,4%	72,4%
	I would not accept		31,7%	51,9%	17,6%	27,6%
Muslim as a friend	I would accept		45,5%	24,3%	74,3%	60,0%
	I would not accept		54,5%	75,7%	25,7%	40,0%
Muslim as husband or wife of someone from my family	I would accept		16,2%	8,8%	50,0%	30,6%
	I would not accept		83,8%	91,2%	50,0%	69,4%
Serb living in my village or town	I would accept	94,4%	72,8%		79,6%	
	I would not accept	5,6%	27,2%		20,4%	
Serb as a workmate	I would accept	89,9%	75,0%		74,3%	
	I would not accept	10,1%	25,0%		25,7%	
Serb as a friend	I would accept	75,0%	56,0%		66,0%	
	I would not accept	25,0%	44,0%		34,0%	
Serb as husband or wife of someone from my family	I would accept	45,6%	19,8%		47,8%	
	I would not accept	54,4%	80,2%		52,2%	

Table 3 Education, Ethnicity and Self Image

Primary Education		Bosniak Bosnia	Croat Bosnia	Serb Bosnia	Croat Croatia	Serb Serbia
My people has only conducted defensive wars	Strongly agree	84,9%	87,7%	84,9%	75,5%	73,5%
	Somewhat agree	13,8%	9,4%	10,9%	17,9%	20,6%
	Somewhat disagree	,6%	2,5%	2,6%	4,0%	4,3%
	Strongly disagree	,6%	,4%	1,6%	2,5%	1,6%
My people have suffered more throughout history than other peoples	Strongly agree	74,3%	73,0%	79,9%	61,0%	72,6%
	Somewhat agree	22,5%	22,5%	17,0%	24,4%	23,4%
	Somewhat disagree	2,3%	4,5%	2,6%	9,7%	2,0%
	Strongly disagree	1,0%	,0%	,5%	4,9%	2,0%
My people is not perfect, but its cultural tradition is superior to others	Strongly agree	58,9%	63,1%	74,5%	62,1%	64,9%
	Somewhat agree	28,5%	31,1%	20,8%	30,0%	27,8%
	Somewhat disagree	8,3%	5,4%	3,1%	5,4%	5,6%
	Strongly disagree	4,3%	,4%	1,6%	2,6%	1,6%
Secondary Education						
My people has only conducted defensive wars	Strongly agree	80,0%	76,2%	72,4%	63,4%	67,9%
	Somewhat agree	17,0%	19,1%	21,1%	26,8%	22,7%
	Somewhat disagree	1,3%	4,1%	5,1%	5,6%	4,6%
	Strongly disagree	1,7%	,5%	1,4%	4,2%	4,7%
My people have suffered more throughout history than other peoples	Strongly agree	61,9%	68,8%	72,6%	41,5%	58,7%
	Somewhat agree	27,9%	23,1%	21,4%	36,5%	30,8%
	Somewhat disagree	5,6%	6,4%	5,1%	12,1%	6,6%
	Strongly disagree	4,6%	1,7%	,9%	9,9%	4,0%
My people is not perfect, but its cultural tradition is superior to others	Strongly agree	45,5%	56,6%	68,8%	48,2%	53,6%
	Somewhat agree	31,7%	32,0%	24,9%	36,3%	32,3%
	Somewhat disagree	14,0%	8,4%	4,7%	9,5%	9,5%
	Strongly disagree	8,8%	3,0%	1,6%	6,0%	4,6%
University						
My people has only conducted defensive wars	Strongly agree	73,3%	72,4%	78,0%	59,6%	59,9%
	Somewhat agree	19,8%	25,2%	19,0%	28,1%	25,1%
	Somewhat disagree	4,7%	1,6%	2,5%	6,6%	5,4%
	Strongly disagree	2,3%	,8%	,5%	5,7%	9,5%
My people have suffered more throughout history than other peoples	Strongly agree	57,6%	53,2%	73,4%	33,1%	57,6%
	Somewhat agree	25,9%	31,5%	23,1%	37,1%	28,9%
	Somewhat disagree	10,6%	11,3%	2,5%	14,0%	5,9%
	Strongly disagree	5,9%	4,0%	1,0%	15,8%	7,6%
My people is not perfect, but its cultural tradition is superior to others	Strongly agree	40,7%	39,5%	67,7%	42,2%	48,7%
	Somewhat agree	34,6%	42,7%	27,8%	36,4%	33,5%
	Somewhat disagree	12,3%	12,9%	3,0%	11,4%	8,5%
	Strongly disagree	12,3%	4,8%	1,5%	9,9%	9,3%

Table 4 Education, Ethnicity and Attitude towards the West						
		Bosniak Bosnia	Croat Bosnia	Serb Bosnia	Croat Croatia	Serb Serbia
Primary Education						
The West has not understood the real conditions in our country	Strongly agree	46,9%	64,2%	65,6%	60,2%	55,8%
	Somewhat agree	31,0%	29,7%	21,5%	33,2%	14,7%
	Somewhat disagree	12,8%	3,1%	9,1%	3,7%	10,0%
	Strongly disagree	9,3%	3,1%	3,8%	2,9%	19,5%
The West is acting against the interests of our people	Strongly agree	16,0%	54,3%	70,1%	29,1%	61,5%
	Somewhat agree	38,1%	29,6%	19,8%	40,7%	22,6%
	Somewhat disagree	23,5%	13,5%	10,2%	16,5%	9,2%
	Strongly disagree	22,4%	2,6%	,0%	13,7%	6,7%
The West is treating us as a backward people	Strongly agree	31,9%	56,9%	74,1%	44,5%	68,6%
	Somewhat agree	38,3%	27,6%	18,9%	34,7%	22,7%
	Somewhat disagree	19,7%	11,2%	7,0%	12,3%	5,4%
	Strongly disagree	10,2%	4,3%	,0%	8,5%	3,3%
Secondary Education						
The West has not understood the real conditions in our country	Strongly agree	46,0%	58,2%	69,9%	51,3%	48,4%
	Somewhat agree	32,9%	32,4%	22,3%	36,7%	19,0%
	Somewhat disagree	10,3%	5,2%	4,9%	5,8%	11,4%
	Strongly disagree	10,8%	4,2%	2,8%	6,2%	21,1%
The West is acting against the interests of our people	Strongly agree	19,0%	46,3%	64,5%	17,6%	53,6%
	Somewhat agree	30,9%	35,5%	24,6%	39,5%	27,9%
	Somewhat disagree	27,1%	14,4%	8,9%	21,2%	10,4%
	Strongly disagree	23,0%	3,8%	2,0%	21,7%	8,2%
The West is treating us as a backward people	Strongly agree	34,7%	58,9%	74,9%	37,3%	60,7%
	Somewhat agree	34,5%	27,5%	19,4%	38,6%	25,5%
	Somewhat disagree	19,0%	11,1%	4,5%	11,8%	6,6%
	Strongly disagree	11,9%	2,5%	1,2%	12,3%	7,2%
University						
The West has not understood the real conditions in our country	Strongly agree	43,8%	64,7%	75,0%	47,8%	45,1%
	Somewhat agree	28,1%	29,3%	15,5%	39,4%	21,1%
	Somewhat disagree	12,4%	1,5%	5,5%	6,1%	9,2%
	Strongly disagree	15,7%	4,5%	4,0%	6,7%	24,6%
The West is acting against the interests of our people	Strongly agree	19,3%	44,5%	52,6%	8,8%	49,9%
	Somewhat agree	26,1%	31,3%	32,0%	32,0%	25,9%
	Somewhat disagree	30,7%	14,8%	13,4%	27,3%	12,0%
	Strongly disagree	23,9%	9,4%	2,1%	32,0%	12,3%
The West is treating us as a backward people	Strongly agree	34,1%	57,3%	68,9%	28,9%	57,7%
	Somewhat agree	25,3%	26,0%	20,7%	44,2%	24,0%
	Somewhat disagree	18,7%	10,7%	8,8%	11,7%	9,0%
	Strongly disagree	22,0%	6,1%	1,6%	15,2%	9,3%

Table 5. Multiethnic Society					
What would, in your opinion, an ideal multicultural society look like?					
	Bosniak Bosnia	Croat Bosnia	Serb Bosnia	Croat Croatia	Serb Serbia
Primary Education					
A society where several peoples live together in harmony, but do not mix. Each preserves its own culture, and individuals do not generally intermarry.	64,7%	85,5%	82,8%	36,1%	34,6%
A society where several peoples live together, each preserving its own culture, but where intermarriage is common.	23,1%	10,2%	10,0%	40,3%	31,6%
A society where national identity is becoming unimportant. Individuals mix freely and intermarriage is common.	12,2%	4,3%	7,2%	23,7%	33,8%
Secondary Education					
A society where several peoples live together in harmony, but do not mix. Each preserves its own culture, and individuals do not generally intermarry.	48,7%	79,2%	80,0%	30,5%	28,4%
A society where several peoples live together, each preserving its own culture, but where intermarriage is common.	29,1%	15,2%	13,3%	38,9%	26,9%
A society where national identity is becoming unimportant. Individuals mix freely and intermarriage is common.	22,2%	5,6%	6,7%	30,6%	44,7%
University					
A society where several peoples live together in harmony, but do not mix. Each preserves its own culture, and individuals do not generally intermarry.	36,4%	68,5%	73,5%	25,4%	21,9%
A society where several peoples live together, each preserving its own culture, but where intermarriage is common.	36,4%	22,0%	15,5%	40,7%	29,1%
A society where national identity is becoming unimportant. Individuals mix freely and intermarriage is common.	27,3%	9,4%	11,0%	33,8%	49,0%

Table 6. The Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina						
		Bosniak Bosnia	Croat Bosnia	Serb Bosnia	Croat Croatia	Serb Serbia
Primary Education						
Republika Srpska should be a part of Serbia	Strongly agree	2,9%	49,5%	71,4%	15,2%	75,6%
	Somewhat agree	1,6%	21,0%	17,8%	10,2%	19,7%
	Somewhat disagree	1,6%	11,9%	3,8%	6,8%	1,9%
	Strongly disagree	93,9%	17,6%	7,0%	67,7%	2,8%
Herceg Bosna should be a part of Croatia	Strongly agree	1,3%	69,1%	28,7%	18,4%	30,4%
	Somewhat agree	2,2%	19,9%	29,3%	10,8%	22,4%
	Somewhat disagree	1,0%	3,8%	16,7%	11,7%	18,6%
	Strongly disagree	95,5%	7,2%	25,3%	59,2%	28,6%
Bosnia and Hercegovina should be a unitary republic, the Federation and RS should be abolished	Strongly agree	86,8%	16,2%	1,6%	61,7%	13,1%
	Somewhat agree	7,1%	12,7%	2,1%	22,3%	9,4%
	Somewhat disagree	2,4%	19,3%	13,2%	5,0%	20,6%
	Strongly disagree	3,7%	51,8%	83,2%	11,0%	56,9%
Secondary Education						
Republika Srpska should be a part of Serbia	Strongly agree	1,5%	38,4%	55,1%	12,6%	66,3%
	Somewhat agree	1,7%	25,9%	22,5%	7,9%	22,0%
	Somewhat disagree	3,7%	12,5%	9,5%	7,9%	5,3%
	Strongly disagree	93,1%	23,2%	12,8%	71,6%	6,4%
Herceg Bosna should be a part of Croatia	Strongly agree	1,0%	55,2%	24,9%	10,9%	21,1%
	Somewhat agree	1,1%	26,9%	34,4%	9,9%	26,3%
	Somewhat disagree	3,4%	6,5%	19,5%	11,0%	19,1%
	Strongly disagree	94,4%	11,5%	21,2%	68,2%	33,4%
Bosnia and Hercegovina should be a unitary republic, the Federation and RS should be abolished	Strongly agree	81,3%	13,5%	2,5%	63,8%	11,8%
	Somewhat agree	10,2%	13,9%	5,4%	17,7%	15,9%
	Somewhat disagree	2,5%	17,6%	14,1%	5,5%	18,1%
	Strongly disagree	6,0%	54,9%	78,0%	13,0%	54,1%
University						
Republika Srpska should be a part of Serbia	Strongly agree	2,3%	30,9%	49,2%	7,1%	60,4%
	Somewhat agree	,0%	21,8%	21,8%	5,2%	22,7%
	Somewhat disagree	1,1%	10,9%	8,8%	6,5%	3,3%
	Strongly disagree	96,6%	36,4%	20,2%	81,3%	13,6%
Herceg Bosna should be a part of Croatia	Strongly agree	2,3%	40,5%	25,0%	6,4%	27,7%
	Somewhat agree	,0%	29,3%	33,3%	9,6%	24,8%
	Somewhat disagree	,0%	8,6%	13,9%	8,9%	13,7%
	Strongly disagree	97,7%	21,6%	27,8%	75,1%	33,8%
Bosnia and Hercegovina should be a unitary republic, the Federation and RS should be abolished	Strongly agree	80,2%	19,4%	2,1%	61,3%	12,4%
	Somewhat agree	9,3%	16,7%	5,2%	21,0%	15,2%
	Somewhat disagree	3,5%	17,6%	13,9%	5,7%	13,5%
	Strongly disagree	7,0%	46,3%	78,9%	12,0%	58,9%

Table 7. Education, Ethnicity and Nationalism

Primary Education		Bosniac/ Bosnia	Croat/ Bosnia	Serb/ Bosnia	Croat/ Croatia	Serb/ Serbia
Every people should have its own state	Strongly agree	23,8%	61,5%	74,2%	62,3%	42,9%
	Somewhat agree	17,5%	24,6%	20,0%	19,4%	23,8%
	Somewhat disagree	24,2%	11,5%	3,7%	8,2%	15,9%
	Strongly disagree	34,4%	2,5%	2,1%	10,2%	17,5%
All members of a nation should live in the same state	Strongly agree	28,5%	46,9%	58,1%	25,4%	34,7%
	Somewhat agree	17,2%	28,4%	28,8%	19,6%	21,8%
	Somewhat disagree	19,2%	16,9%	9,9%	21,1%	23,8%
	Strongly disagree	35,1%	7,8%	3,1%	33,9%	19,8%
People can feel completely secure only if they live in a country where their own nation has a majority	Strongly agree	22,7%	58,5%	67,5%	39,9%	45,4%
	Somewhat agree	31,6%	28,5%	27,3%	25,5%	30,3%
	Somewhat disagree	23,0%	9,3%	4,6%	16,8%	12,4%
	Strongly disagree	22,7%	3,7%	5%	17,8%	12,0%
One should always be on one's guard and careful towards members of another people, even if they are neighbours or friends	Strongly agree	25,6%	52,3%	57,1%	44,0%	46,5%
	Somewhat agree	40,6%	29,0%	26,7%	27,6%	32,8%
	Somewhat disagree	21,1%	10,8%	12,6%	15,6%	11,6%
	Strongly disagree	12,7%	7,9%	3,7%	12,8%	9,1%
Secondary Education						
Every people should have its own state	Strongly agree	17,8%	55,1%	61,4%	52,6%	33,6%
	Somewhat agree	19,1%	29,7%	29,8%	25,1%	32,1%
	Somewhat disagree	22,2%	9,7%	4,1%	10,0%	14,1%
	Strongly disagree	40,9%	5,4%	4,7%	12,3%	20,2%
All members of a nation should live in the same state	Strongly agree	14,1%	34,4%	42,2%	13,6%	19,7%
	Somewhat agree	17,3%	33,7%	34,6%	22,4%	31,4%
	Somewhat disagree	19,6%	18,9%	14,1%	20,4%	22,4%
	Strongly disagree	49,0%	12,9%	9,0%	43,6%	26,6%
People can feel completely secure only if they live in a country where their own nation has a majority	Strongly agree	14,8%	41,8%	57,7%	27,4%	31,4%
	Somewhat agree	27,1%	36,5%	31,7%	24,4%	31,0%
	Somewhat disagree	23,0%	13,9%	7,1%	16,3%	19,3%
	Strongly disagree	35,1%	7,7%	3,4%	32,0%	18,3%
One should always be on one's guard and careful towards members of another people, even if they are neighbours or friends	Strongly agree	18,2%	40,0%	50,4%	29,1%	30,0%
	Somewhat agree	34,0%	31,2%	31,4%	29,3%	34,0%
	Somewhat disagree	23,0%	18,9%	13,6%	16,1%	18,5%
	Strongly disagree	24,8%	9,9%	4,5%	25,5%	17,5%
University						
Every people should have its own state	Strongly agree	16,5%	46,6%	53,5%	46,8%	32,2%
	Somewhat agree	15,3%	25,2%	30,2%	28,5%	33,8%
	Somewhat disagree	20,0%	15,3%	7,9%	10,8%	13,0%
	Strongly disagree	48,2%	13,0%	8,4%	14,0%	21,0%
All members of a nation should live in the same state	Strongly agree	15,3%	13,1%	38,3%	7,0%	15,9%
	Somewhat agree	11,8%	35,4%	27,9%	17,4%	30,2%
	Somewhat disagree	14,1%	22,3%	17,4%	20,0%	19,9%
	Strongly disagree	58,8%	29,2%	16,4%	55,7%	34,0%
People can feel completely secure only if they live in a country where their own nation has a majority	Strongly agree	10,6%	32,6%	49,0%	16,1%	22,1%
	Somewhat agree	20,0%	33,3%	33,0%	24,8%	35,6%
	Somewhat disagree	17,6%	15,2%	12,5%	15,6%	12,9%
	Strongly disagree	51,8%	18,9%	5,5%	43,5%	29,4%
One should always be on one's guard and careful towards members of another people, even if they are neighbours or friends	Strongly agree	19,0%	25,8%	44,4%	18,0%	24,5%
	Somewhat agree	27,4%	45,3%	33,3%	28,8%	34,1%
	Somewhat disagree	17,9%	17,2%	18,2%	17,2%	18,3%
	Strongly disagree	35,7%	11,7%	4,0%	36,0%	23,2%




Table 8 Syndrome of Nationalism. Factor Structure

Serbs in Serbia	Social Distance	Distrust West	Nationalism	Self-Image
Croat in same town	.836			
Croat as workmate	.873			
Muslim in same town	.834			
Muslim as workmate	.853			
West is against us		.849		
West treating us as backward		.740		
All members of a nation should live in same state			.556	
People are secure only if a majority			.770	
Always be careful towards members of other nations			.816	
We conducted only defensive wars				.687
We have suffered more than others				.829
Our culture is superior				.811

Croats in Croatia	Social Distance	Distrust West	Nationalism	Self-Image
Muslim in same town	.757			
Muslim as workmate	.774			
Serb in same town	.824			
Serb as workmate	.829			
West is against us		.938		
West treating us as backward		.552		
All members of a nation should live in same state			.467	
People are secure only if a majority			.766	
Always be careful towards members of other nations			.855	
We conducted only defensive wars				.611
We have suffered more than others				.820
Our culture is superior				.709

Muslims/Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Social Distance	Distrust West	Nationalism	Self-Image
Croat in same town	.563			
Croat as workmate	.554			
Serb in same town	.619			
Serb as workmate	.625			
West is against us		.758		
West treating us as backward		.589		
All members of a nation should live in same state			.451	
People are secure only if a majority			.731	
Always be careful towards members of other nations			.805	
We conducted only defensive wars				.503
We have suffered more than others				.717
Our culture is superior				.765

Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Social Distance	Distrust West	Nationalism	Self-Image
Muslim in same town	.591			
Muslim as workmate	.736			
Serb in same town	.706			
Serb as workmate	.806			
West is against us		.999		
West treating us as backward		.605		
All members of a nation should live in same state			.635	
People are secure only if a majority			.831	
Always be careful towards members of other nations			.720	
We conducted only defensive wars				.774
We have suffered more than others				.773
Our culture is superior				.730

Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Social Distance	Distrust West	Nationalism	Self-Image
Croat in same town	.850			
Croat as workmate	.735			
Muslim in same town	.796			
Muslim as workmate	.731			
West is against us		.938		
West treating us as backward		.446		
All members of a nation should live in same state			.542	
People are secure only if a majority			.807	
Always be careful towards members of other nations			.691	
We conducted only defensive wars				.679
We have suffered more than others				.714
Our culture is superior				.656

Table 9 Syndrome of Nationalism. Correlation between Factors

Serbs in Serbia				
	Social Distance	Distrust of West	Nationalism	Self-Image
Social Distance	1.000			
Distrust of West	-.207	1.000		
Nationalism	-.554	.355	1.000	
Self-Image	-.403	.417	.535	1.000

Croats in Croatia				
	Social Distance	Distrust of West	Nationalism	Self-Image
Social Distance	1.000			
Distrust of West	-.217	1.000		
Nationalism	-.521	.314	1.000	
Self-Image	-.312	.314	.630	1.000

Muslims/Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina				
	Social Distance	Distrust of West	Nationalism	Self-Image
Social Distance	1.000			
Distrust of West	-.355	1.000		
Nationalism	-.525	.304	1.000	
Self-Image	-.303	.196	.702	1.000

Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina				
	Social Distance	Distrust of West	Nationalism	Self-Image
Social Distance	1.000			
Distrust of West	-.081	1.000		
Nationalism	-.349	.361	1.000	
Self-Image	-.236	.348	.683	1.000

Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina				
	Social Distance	Distrust of West	Nationalism	Self-Image
Social Distance	1.000			
Distrust of West	-.419	1.000		
Nationalism	-.432	.287	1.000	
Self-Image	-.081	.131	.270	1.000

Serbs in Serbia Goodness of Fit Summary

DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS

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40-          *          !
!          * *          !
!          * *          !
!          * *          !
!          * *          !
30-          * *          !
!          * *          !
!          * *          !
!          * *          !
!          * *          !
20-          * *          !
!          * *          !
!          * *          !
!          * *          !
!          * *          !
10-          * *          !
!          * *          !
!          * *          !
!          * *          !
!          * *          !
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	RANGE	FREQ	PERCENT
1	-0.5 - --	0	0.00%
2	-0.4 - -0.5	0	0.00%
3	-0.3 - -0.4	0	0.00%
4	-0.2 - -0.3	0	0.00%
5	-0.1 - -0.2	0	0.00%
6	0.0 - -0.1	38	48.72%
7	0.1 - 0.0	40	51.28%
8	0.2 - 0.1	0	0.00%
9	0.3 - 0.2	0	0.00%
A	0.4 - 0.3	0	0.00%
B	0.5 - 0.4	0	0.00%
C	++ - 0.5	0	0.00%
TOTAL		78	100.00%

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C EACH "*" REPRESENTS 2 RESIDUALS

INDEPENDENCE MODEL CHI-SQUARE = 9619.497 ON 66 DEGREES OF FREEDOM

INDEPENDENCE AIC = 9487.49748 INDEPENDENCE CAIC = 9079.21196
 MODEL AIC = -22.11974 MODEL CAIC = -238.63480

CHI-SQUARE = 47.880 BASED ON 35 DEGREES OF FREEDOM
 PROBABILITY VALUE FOR THE CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC IS 0.07206
 THE NORMAL THEORY RLS CHI-SQUARE FOR THIS ML SOLUTION IS 47.547.

BENTLER-BONETT NORMED FIT INDEX= 0.995
 BENTLER-BONETT NONNORMED FIT INDEX= 0.997
 COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX (CFI) = 0.999

STANDARDIZED SOLUTION:

R-SQUARED

CROLIV =V50 =	.836 F1	+	.549 E50	.698
CROWORK =V51 =	.873*F1	+	.488 E51	.762
MUSLIV =V54 =	.834*F1	+	.551 E54	.696
MUSWORK =V55 =	.852*F1	+	.523 E55	.726
WAGAINST=V69 =	.849 F2	+	.529 E69	.720
WZAOST =V70 =	.740*F2	+	.673 E70	.547
SAMESTAT=V105=	.556 F3	+	.831 E105	.309
MAJORITY=V106=	.770*F3	+	.639 E106	.592
CAREFUL =V107=	.816*F3	+	.578 E107	.666
DEFENSIV=V108=	.687 F4	+	.727 E108	.471
SUFFERED=V109=	.829*F4	+	.560 E109	.687
SUPERIOR=V110=	.811*F4	+	.585 E110	.658

CORRELATIONS AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

V	F			
	I F2	-	F2	-.207*I
	I F1	-	F1	I
	I			I
	I F3	-	F3	-.554*I
	I F1	-	F1	I
	I			I
	I F4	-	F4	-.403*I
	I F1	-	F1	I
	I			I
	I F3	-	F3	.355*I
	I F2	-	F2	I
	I			I
	I F4	-	F4	.417*I
	I F2	-	F2	I
	I			I
	I F4	-	F4	.535*I
	I F3	-	F3	I

