

**Attitudes and Values in Bosnia and Herzegovina**  
**A Sociological Investigation on the Eve of the 1996 Elections**

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## Comments

In the summer of 1996, a sociological survey was undertaken in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to study attitudes of interest to the political situation of the country. The investigation was financed by the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) and led by dr Kjell Magnusson, at the time senior research fellow at CEIFO, University of Stockholm, but also affiliated with the Department for East European Studies at Uppsala University.

Data were collected by two research centres in Croatia and Serbia. The agency *Puls* in Split was responsible for the survey in the (Muslim-Croat) Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas *Medium* in Belgrade organized the data collection in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In July and August 1996 two reports were produced, one in Belgrade, the other in Split, dealing with the two federal units of Bosnia (Magnusson, Branković & Milanović 1996, and Magnusson, Bulat & Štrelov 1996). In these reports details about the investigation are found. A third report, comparing the major ethnic groups ( Muslims/Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats), was later completed in Sweden. In addition, summary tables of all variables are provided for the Croat, Bosniak, and Serb areas of Bosnia.

One specific aspect should be addressed. Aware of the fact that in 1996 *Bosniak* was the official name of the Muslim population in Bosnia, they are referred to in the reports as *Muslims* or *Bosnian Muslims*. In the survey, people had the opportunity to declare themselves as *Muslims/Bosniaks*, but according to common usage at the time, they are designated as Muslims in the texts.

The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1968 were recognized by the Communist Party as a nation, constituting one of the state-forming South Slav peoples of Yugoslavia. This was formalized in the census of 1971 and in the Bosnian and Yugoslav constitutions of 1974. Officially they were referred to as *Muslimani*, i.e. Muslims. In 1990 when the major Muslim party SDA (Party of Democratic Action) was formed, it was suggested that the Muslims should adopt Bosniak as their official name, which was rejected by a large majority. Although a meeting of Bosnian intellectuals in 1993 decided that the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be referred to as Bosniaks, president Alija Izetbegović throughout the war used the expression *Muslimanski narod*, the Muslim people or sometimes spoke about the Bosnian Muslim respectively the Muslim-Bosniak people.

The first time the term Bosniak is used in an official document is the Washington Agreement in March 1994, which ended the war between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia. The original was written in American English and the spelling used was *Bosniac*.

In the survey of 1996, the respondents could choose the option Muslim/Bosniak as their ethnic (or national) identity, and any distinction between the two terms was disregarded. However, in a survey undertaken by Uppsala University three years later, in late autumn 1999, the interviewees were simply asked to state their ethnic identity, not choosing from a list of alternatives. It turned out that of the Bosniak respondents around 43 percent identified themselves as Muslims, and 55 percent as Bosniaks. In a Bosnian survey undertaken in 2008, 55,7 percent identify as Muslims, 22,7 percent as Bosniaks, and 16,8 percent as Bosniak/Muslim. (Dino Abazović. 2012. *Bosanskohercegovački Muslimani između sekularizacije i desekularizacije*. [The Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims between Secularization and Desecularization] Synopsis. Zagreb-Sarajevo, p. 122).

In the 1999 survey about 1000 Bosniaks participated in the investigation, against 500 in 2008. It is difficult to presume any changes, due to different methodologies and sample size. However, it is obvious that a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim population intuitively identify as Muslims, rather than Bosniaks. This is natural in view of the history of nation-building among the Muslims/Bosniaks, and the Muslim identity is not a religious identity in the Western European or Christian sense. It denotes religious, cultural as well as ethnic belonging.

The Bosniak identity is not being disputed, but since the text was written in 1996, the original terminology has not been changed.

Uppsala, January 2019

Kjell Magnusson

## Contents

Tables .....	1
Figures .....	3
Introduction .....	4
Background and General Purpose .....	4
Issues .....	5
Methodological Aspects .....	6
Sample .....	7
Questionnaire .....	8
Data Collection.....	8
Analysis.....	9
The Dayton Agreement and the Future of Bosnia.....	10
Prospects for Peace.....	10
The International Involvement .....	10
Return of Refugees.....	11
The War Crimes Tribunal .....	11
The Character of the Bosnian State.....	15
Ethnicity and Culture.....	20
Identification with Bosnia .....	20
Ethnic Identity .....	21
Language .....	21
Multiethnic Society .....	27
Religion.....	34
Media.....	38
Social Distance and Ethnic Stereotypes .....	42
Politics .....	49
Elections .....	49
Party Sympathies.....	49
Political Issues.....	57
Views on Politicians.....	60
Political involvement.....	65
Political Orientations.....	65

Confidence in Institutions and Organizations .....	66
Nationalism.....	74
Concluding Remarks .....	84
Elections.....	84
Media.....	84
Party Structure.....	85
Political Values .....	85
The Peace Process .....	86
Ethnic Relations and Cultural Identity .....	86
The Future .....	88

## Tables

Table 1 Number of Interviews.....	8
Table 2 The Peace Process: Dayton and the Future of Bosnia.....	12
Table 3 The Peace Process, International Presence in Bosnia .....	13
Table 4 The Peace Process. Refugees .....	14
Table 5 The War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague .....	14
Table 6 The Bosnian State : Character .....	18
Table 7 The Bosnian State: Partition/Unification .....	19
Table 8 Identification with Bosnia .....	23
Table 9 National Affiliation and Identification .....	24
Table 10 The Language Issue.....	25
Table 11 View of History and Self Image.....	26
Table 12 Character of Bosnia as a Multiethnic Society .....	29
Table 13 Views on Multiethnic Society: Origin and Ethnic Structure of domicile .....	30
Table 14 Multiethnic Society and Ethnicity of Spouse/Intermarriage in Family.....	31
Table 15 Multiethnic Society and Importance of National Identity .....	31
Table 16 Ideal Character of Multiethnic Society and Views on Politicians.....	32
Table 17 Religious Observance and Views on Multiethnic society.....	33
Table 18 Religion and Ethnic Affiliation .....	35
Table 19 Religiosity and Confession/Religious Tradition .....	36
Table 20 Promotion of Religion in Social Life .....	37
Table 21 Favourite Newspapers and Ethnicity.....	39
Table 22 Favourite TV Channel and Ethnicity.....	40
Table 23 Favourite Radio Station and Ethnicity .....	40
Table 24 Most important Source of Information and Ethnicity .....	40
Table 25 Frequency of Reading Newspapers .....	41
Table 26 Attitudes towards Ethnic Groups.....	45
Table 27 Social Distance and Ethnicity.....	46
Table 28 Social Distance and Religious Observance – every week.....	47
Table 29 Social Distance and Religious Observance – seldom/never .....	48
Table 30 Attitude towards Elections .....	50

Table 31 Party Preferences and Ethnicity.....	51
Table 32 Views on Organization and Outcome of Elections .....	52
Table 33 Party Sympathies, Education and Ethnicity .....	53
Table 34 Party sympathies, Rural/Urban Residence, and Ethnicity .....	53
Table 35 Party Sympathies and Intermarriage in Family .....	54
Table 36 Party Sympathies and Ethnic Structure in pre-war Domicile.....	55
Table 37 Party Sympathies and Religious Observance .....	56
Table 38 Political Issues during Elections. Percentage of "Very Important" .....	57
Table 39 Importance of Political Issues: Sectors and Ethnicity .....	58
Table 40 Political Issues related to the War .....	59
Table 41 Ratings of Politicians and Ethnicity .....	61
Table 42 Views of Politicians.....	62
Table 43 Views on Politicians. Serbs .....	63
Table 44 Views on Politicians. Croats and Muslims.....	64
Table 45 Political Interest and Political Affiliation.....	67
Table 46 Character of Democracy. Most important Aspects .....	68
Table 47 Character of Democracy: Dimensions.....	69
Table 48 Confidence in Institutions and Organizations .....	70
Table 49 Religious Observance and Confidence in Institutions: Orthodox .....	71
Table 50 Religious Observance and Confidence in Institutions: Muslims .....	72
Table 51 Religious Observance and Confidence in Institutions: Catholics .....	73
Table 52 Party Sympathies and Authoritarianism.....	76
Table 53 Party Sympathies and Ethnocentrism.....	77
Table 54 Ethnocentrism/Authoritarianism and Views on Politicians: Muslims and Croats.....	78
Table 55 Ethnocentrism/Authoritarianism and Views on Politicians: Serbs .....	79
Table 56 Ethnocentrism and Confidence in Religious Institutions and Political Parties ....	80
Table 57 Authoritarianism and Confidence in Religious Institutions and Political Parties	81
Table 58 Ethnocentrism and the Character of the Bosnian State .....	82
Table 59 Authoritarianism and Views and the Character of the Bosnian State: Serbs .....	83
Table 60 Authoritarianism and the Character of the Bosnian State: Croats.....	83
Table 61 Authoritarianism and the Character of the Bosnian State: Muslims .....	84

## Figures

Figure 1 Views on the Status of Herceg Bosnia.....	16
Figure 2 Views on the Status of Republika Srpska .....	16
Figure 3 Views on Bosnia as a Unitary State .....	17
Figure 4 Creation of a Unitary Bosnia using Military Force.....	17
Figure 5 Social Distance towards Bosnian Croats .....	43
Figure 6 Social distance towards Bosnian Muslims.....	43
Figure 7 Social Distance towards Bosnian Serbs .....	44

## **Introduction**

At the International Conference on elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, held in Stockholm in January 1996, it was suggested that sociological surveys might be one way of investigating whether conditions for free and fair elections are satisfied. The idea was also mentioned in the official report of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In April a proposal concerning such an investigation was submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which forwarded it to the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). In June SIDA decided to finance the project.

The research is carried out by dr Kjell Magnusson, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations of Stockholm University.

### ***Background and General Purpose***

The investigation has a twofold purpose. On the one hand it will provide a description of views on the forthcoming elections and the future of Bosnia, related to the experience of war and present political circumstances. On the other hand, it will give a theoretically founded analysis of attitudes and values of importance for the development of a democratic and plural society.

It should be pointed out that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a very extensive experience of political democracy. During the 1980s the regime in Bosnia was one of the most conservative and authoritarian in Yugoslavia. After the elections in December 1990, like in other former Yugoslav republics, nationally oriented parties came into power. The specific feature of the Bosnian case was a government formed by a coalition of three national parties, while the election results reflected the ethnic structure of the country.

As the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite efforts to keep aside, was ultimately drawn into the conflicts associated with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the stability of the political system was never tested under normal conditions. As in other parts of Yugoslavia, except for Slovenia and, perhaps, Macedonia, in practice a one-party system developed. These tendencies were, naturally, strengthened by the war, and still prevail, although in varying degrees, all over Bosnia.

In addition, there is the traumatic experience of a devastating war, and the unresolved issues of the peace process. Besides material ruin, and loss of human lives, the war has destroyed the very fabric of society in large areas of the country.

The situation in Bosnia is, therefore, influenced both by extraordinary conditions and processes which largely resemble those in other former Yugoslav republics, or post-communist societies in general.

One important feature is the undeveloped party system. The ruling parties in former Yugoslavia are heterogeneous social movements, rather than ideologically oriented political organizations of a Western-European type. As a rule, they are organizationally weak, with

rudimentary infrastructure and passive members. The leadership is concentrated to the capital and recruited among the intelligentsia and higher levels of society. This is true of both the ruling parties and the opposition, with the difference that parties like HDZ in Croatia and Herceg Bosna, SPS in Serbia, SDS in Republika Srpska, and SDA in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, have had the opportunity to deliberately strengthen their position in civil service, economy, media and defence. In other words, political culture shows characteristics of both the former socialist system and the Balkans of the 1930s.

At the same time, it is obvious that the Dayton Agreement has led to another climate, that political activity increased during spring and especially in the summer of 1996. The enforced unity of the war years has been replaced by discussion, competition and conflict, and one could anticipate at least the possibility of political change.

To what extent do these developments affect ordinary people? We have very little knowledge of popular attitudes in Bosnia. Newspapers and weeklies have published surveys concerning political parties and views of politicians, but their reliability has been questionable.

### *Issues*

There are four main problems addressed by the present investigation:

1) How do people in Bosnia view the forthcoming elections? Are they considered legitimate and practically feasible? Do people believe that elections will be arranged in a safe manner? Will they trust the outcome of the elections? What are the views on the possibilities of political parties to inform potential voters? Do people believe in the media and an impartial presentation of news?

To what extent are the inhabitants of Bosnia prepared to vote? Are there relevant political alternatives? What issues are considered most important? Have people made up their mind on what party to support?

These are important questions in view of experience from Croatia and Serbia, characterized by relative political passivity, and a decreasing willingness to vote, and by the fact that political power rests on very specific social categories: people living in the countryside, certain groups among the workers, the elder and poorly educated, i.e. those citizens which are less informed about political developments, and most dependent on media loyal to the regime. Are there similar tendencies in Bosnia?

2) An important topic in view of the future of Bosnia is the relationship between politics and ethnicity. To what extent is it possible to find a "nationalist syndrome", an attitude characterized by social distance, ethnocentrism, and authoritarian tendencies? What social groups are bearers of such orientations? Is it true, as the Communists argued, that these attitudes are closely related to a religious world view, or, is it possible to speak about both secular and religious versions of nationalism? On the other hand, is there a "positive nationalism", an increased national awareness not necessarily chauvinist in nature?

It should be added that the investigation does not pretend to explain the origin of nationalism, but the ethnic mobilization which has taken place is, supposedly, anchored in more stable attitudinal structures, which might be available for analysis.

One of the most important issues concerns the effects of the war on inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia. How widespread are feelings of distrust, bitterness and hatred? Is it possible to recreate a multicultural and multi-ethnic society? Is cohabitation at all possible after what has happened? What is the role played by war crimes? Do people prefer to forget and go on living, or do they see the judicial process as a precondition for a genuine peace?

3) To what extent is it possible to define political preferences in Bosnia according to a usual left-right continuum? What are the views on market economy and privatization, on the influence of the state, and the idea of a welfare society? Investigations from the socialist period have shown that there was a clear divide between the patriarchal way of life of lower classes, related to egalitarian and "traditional socialist" attitudes and those of the elite, with its positive view of market economy, social differences and Marxist ideology.

In international literature, the political landscape of transitional society is often characterized by two dimensions: On the one hand liberalism-populism, on the other market economy - etatism. The voters and political parties can be placed in a multidimensional space and often there are three characteristic tendencies, or political options: a nationalist-populist, a social democratic/neocommunist, and, a liberal alternative. The question is to what extent these tendencies are influential in Bosnia. Studies in Croatia and Serbia have shown that egalitarian and populist attitudes are strong among the lower social strata supporting the regimes. In the case of Bosnia, the first dimension, the character of the state, and the position of citizens, is probably dominant in a shorter time perspective.

4) Finally, in view of the role played by religious affiliation as an ethnic marker in a society where the major ethnic groups speak the same language, it is important to study the salience of religion and its relationship with ethnicity, even more so, since there are very different ideas about the factual situation. In general, the Catholic population in Herzegovina has been understood as loyal to the Church, whereas Muslims and Orthodox are often depicted as religious in name only. Is this true? To what extent are there, also in view of the position of religious institutions during the war, more politicized forms of Islam, Orthodoxy or Catholicism?

### ***Methodological Aspects***

Anyone wanting to conduct empirical research in Bosnia and Herzegovina today is faced with several problems of a methodological and practical nature. At first, due to the political situation, it is difficult to move freely in the country. There is no legitimate central authority which is in the position of giving permission or guaranteeing the safety of data collection. Furthermore, it is practically impossible for an institution based within one entity to conduct research in another. Thus, it must be accepted that there is no single organization which is able to undertake sociological surveys in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole.

Second, as a result of the war, the capacity of local organizations to carry out research is limited. It is natural that teams which possess the necessary technical skills, organizational capabilities, and material resources, have not yet been formed, or recreated. It might be added that empirical sociological research, due to general social and political conditions, was less common in Bosnia than in other parts of former Yugoslavia.

Therefore, it was decided to cooperate with two public opinion centres outside Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Medium*, in Belgrade collected data in Republika Srpska, while *Puls*, based in Split, carried out the survey in the area of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Both agencies are highly professional institutions in terms of quality of research, organizational and methodological skills. Being leaders in the field in their own countries, with a solid academic background, they have also proven their capacity in an international context.

Both *Medium* and *Puls* have local organizations within Bosnia and Herzegovina, responsible for data collection and other practical matters. Interviewers are selected among social scientists (or students in the social sciences) from the area and possess relevant linguistic and cultural competence.

### *Sample*

The second major problem facing the social scientist in Bosnia is the lack of reliable census figures, which makes it very difficult to draw a statistically representative sample of the population. Due to extensive demographic changes as a result of the war, the census of 1991 can be used only with utmost care. The solution in this case was to start from the census, and make corrections for demographic changes, based on estimates and/or local population figures. Further, the principle of random selection was strictly adhered to.

In both the Federation and Republika Srpska, a stratified random sample was applied. (The Federation was at first divided into Muslim and Croat areas). Regions, communities, households and individuals were selected in consecutive steps.

Details about the sampling procedure will be found in the two preliminary reports. It should be noted, though, that the educational structure most probably differs from the actual situation, in the sense that individuals with lower education are underrepresented

**Table 1 Number of Interviews**

<b>Number of interviews</b>			
	<b>Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	<b>Republika Srpska</b>	<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>
<b>Croat regions</b>	1010		
<b>Muslim regions</b>	999		
<b>Serb regions</b>		1199	
<b>Total</b>	2009	1199	3 208

### *Questionnaire*

A questionnaire of 98 questions (about 200 variables) was prepared by Kjell Magnusson. The draft was written in English and translated by the collaborators in Croatia and Serbia. The translated questionnaire was then reviewed by the project leader in Stockholm and discussed with the colleagues in Belgrade and Split. Several modifications and corrections were made, before the final version was adopted. The questionnaire was printed in three versions: Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian, differing from each other in vocabulary and script. This was done in order not to jeopardize the data collection.

The same questions were used in both Republika Srpska and the Federation, except for certain items concerning media and political life. Besides, due to communication problems in the final stage of questionnaire preparation, three additional items are different.

When formulating the items, earlier research in Bosnia and other parts of former Yugoslavia was consulted, in order to facilitate comparison. Care was also taken not to offend the respondents, and there were obvious limits in terms of the possible length and complexity of the questionnaire.

### *Data Collection*

The data collection took place during the end of June and beginning of July. In Republika Srpska interviews were conducted between June 20 and 30, in the Federation between June 19 and July 4. The interviewers received special instruction before the field work.

The initial rate of refusal was higher in Republika Srpska (40 percent), than in the Federation (23 percent in the Croatian part, 30 percent in the Muslim). In both cases those who refused to participate in the survey were elder persons and those with lower education.

According to reports from controllers in the field, the questionnaire was positively received by the respondents, and, in general, the samples and data have been judged as quite satisfactory in present circumstances.

### *Analysis*

The project leader spent a month (July 9 - August 10) in Belgrade and Split, analysing data and producing two preliminary reports. The work was done together with Srbobran Branković and Mirjana Milanović at Medium, and Nenad Bulat and Damir Štrelov at Puls. The reports are focusing on issues of immediate interest for the elections. More detailed analysis of the data will be performed during the autumn of 1996.

In order to make this report less cluttered, the tables are mainly based on percentages. However, the actual values may be found in the frequency tables provided in the two accompanying reports. It should be added that only those frequencies relevant to the text are given.

## **The Dayton Agreement and the Future of Bosnia**

### ***Prospects for Peace***

According to the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a unified state, consisting of two entities, the (Muslim-Croat) *Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina* and the (Serb) *Republika Srpska*. Important provisions in the Accord are the return of refugees and the prosecution of war criminals. To what extent do the respondents endorse these principles, and expect them to be honoured?

At first, most Croats, Muslims and Serbs believe, with some qualifications, that the Dayton Agreement in the end will bring peace. The Muslims are more convinced than Croats and Serbs, and the intensity of the belief is stronger among the Muslims.

As will be seen, later on, however, the views of the respondents in important respects differ, sometimes radically, from the general provisions of the agreement.

When asked about who is to blame for the current problems concerning the implementation of the accord, the views are very clearly determined by ethnic affiliation. Croats, Muslims and Serbs largely blame each other, while their compatriots are generally perceived as being less culpable. Only 15 percent of the Croats, 10 percent of the Muslims, and 17 percent of the Serbs believe that their own politicians are highly responsible for the problems preventing the full implementation of the Dayton Accord.

Moreover, the attitudes follow a triangular pattern which reoccurs in other contexts as well. While both Muslims and Croats believe that Serb politicians in Bosnia, or Serbia proper, are the main culprits, the intensity of this belief is much stronger among Muslims, than among Croats. Above all, Muslims have a more positive view of Croats than Croats have about Muslims. A similar relationship exists between Serbs and Croats.

### ***The International Involvement***

It is characteristic that many of the respondents feel that the international community is highly or partly responsible for the lack of progress. In fact, members of all ethnic groups are extremely ambivalent towards the role of the outside world. They are convinced that Europe is acting out of self-interest and has not done all it could to solve the problem. In addition, there is a widespread feeling that the foreigners are treating the inhabitants of Bosnia as primitive and backward peoples.

This distrust of the outside world does not mean, however, that the respondents think the international community should end its engagement in Bosnia. Only a minority wants the civilian administrators to leave, while the dominant view is that the situation would be worse without them. Again, the Muslims are less negative, followed by the Croats and the Serbs, of whom more than 40 percent want the foreign civilians to leave. But even among the Serbs more than half of the respondents want the civilian presence to continue.

In this context it should be noted that about a quarter of the Muslims and Croats (but only 4 percent of the Serbs) would, in fact, welcome a very high degree of outside control, i.e. an international protectorate in Bosnia!

The views on IFOR are even more positive. A clear majority of Serbs and Croats, and a large majority of Muslims would prefer IFOR to continue its mandate after 1996.

One of the controversial issues, where the international community is known to be divided, concerns the armament/disarmament of Bosnia. It is not surprising that 85 percent of the Muslims are in favor of the American initiative to strengthen the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas only 7 percent of the Croats and 1 percent of the Serbs share this view. What is unexpected, though, is that only about 20 percent of Croats and Serbs are of the opinion that all the parties in Bosnia should be able to rearm themselves. Instead, almost 80 percent of the Serbs and 75 percent of the Croats argue that there should be a general disarmament in the region.

### ***Return of Refugees***

The differences between, on the one hand, Muslims, and, on the other, Serbs and Croats, reappear on the refugee issue. At first, a substantial majority of the Muslims support the stipulation of the Peace Accord that refugees should return to their homes, while only a minority of Serbs and Croats do so. Consequently, whereas the Muslims largely expect the refugees to return, Serbs and Croats do not. The difference in attitudes is perhaps most clearly seen on the question of personal return. More than a third of the Muslim refugees think it is highly likely that they will return home, which only 5 percent of the Croat and 1 percent of the Serb refugees anticipate. Actually, 72 percent of the Serbs believe a return is not at all likely, compared to 43 percent of the Croats and 23 percent of the Muslims.

This is a clear indication, that, in the eyes of Serbs and Croats, status quo probably will - and in principle should - continue.

### ***The War Crimes Tribunal***

The position of Serbian media and politicians on the Tribunal in The Hague are generally confirmed by the data. 80 percent of the Serbs think it is better to forget, and only 20 percent believe that the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague is a precondition for peace. The views of Muslims, and to a somewhat lesser extent, Croats, are the opposite. 97 percent of the Muslims and 73 percent of the Croats believe the Tribunal is necessary for normalization in Bosnia.

A similar pattern is found in the responses to the question whether IFOR should arrest suspected war criminals. The Serbs are against, Muslims and Croats are for. It is interesting, though, that a majority of the Croats do not believe that the trials in The Hague will be fair. These suspicions are shared by 96 percent of the Serbs, but only 17 percent of the Muslims.

**Table 2 The Peace Process: Dayton and the Future of Bosnia**

	Serb	Croat	Muslim
<b>Believe in Dayton Accord</b>			
Strongly	13,7	7,8	31,5
Partly	48,2	42,8	51,8
Hardly	19,4	32,8	10,8
Not at all	18,7	16,5	5,9
<b>Implementation of Dayton Accord:</b>			
<i>Croat politicians in Bosnia</i>			
Highly responsible	72,8	14,9	61,7
Partly responsible	22,2	39,7	33,1
Not very responsible"	4,4	26,0	3,7
Not at all responsible"	0,6	19,5	1,6
<i>Muslim politicians in Bosnia</i>			
Highly responsible	86,5	52,6	10,4
Partly responsible	12,1	38,4	37,2
Not very responsible	0,9	4,3	20,3
Not at all responsible	0,5	4,8	32,1
<i>Serb politicians in Bosnia</i>			
Highly responsible	17,2	60,3	88,5
Partly responsible	25,7	27,5	6,8
Not very responsible	25,6	6,5	1,9
Not at all responsible	31,5	5,8	2,8
<i>Croatia</i>			
Highly responsible	70,5	19,0	69,6
Partly responsible	22,6	35,1	25,4
Not very responsible	5,5	25,7	3,0
Not at all responsible	1,4	20,2	2,0
<i>Serbia</i>			
Highly responsible	22,4	55,6	89,1
Partly responsible	34,8	31,8	7,3
Not very responsible	25,4	5,6	1,7
Not at all responsible	17,4	7,1	2,0
<i>The International Community</i>			
Highly responsible	83,4	62,6	48,4
Partly responsible	14,3	30,7	45,3
Not very responsible	1,8	3,7	4,8
Not at all responsible	0,6	3,0	1,5

**Table 3 The Peace Process, International Presence in Bosnia**

	Serbs	Croats	Muslims
<b>International civilian presence in Bos-</b>			
Should leave	44,4	28,0	16,0
Worse off without them	51,4	45,6	60,3
Protectorate	4,2	26,3	23,6
<b>Should IFOR remain after 1996</b>			
Yes	58,8	65,4	86,2
No	41,2	34,6	13,8
<b>USA to strengthen Bosnian army</b>			
Agree	1,0	7,2	85,2
All parties should rearm	20,3	18,8	1,0
General disarmament	78,7	74,0	13,8
<b>Attitudes of Europe to B &amp; H</b>			
Europe furthering its own interest	51,0	57,1	62,5
Europe not done all it could to help	10,7	21,4	25,0
Treating us as backward peoples	38,4	21,4	12,5
<b>Europe furthering its own interests</b>			
Strongly agree	60,5	65,3	74,9
Mainly agree	39,5	31,6	22,1
Mainly disagree		2,2	2,1
Strongly disagree		0,9	0,8
<b>Europe not done all it could to help</b>			
Strongly agree	59,5	66,2	78,9
Mainly agree	38,1	29,9	18,8
Mainly disagree	2,4	3,1	1,9
Strongly disagree		0,7	0,3
<b>Treating us as a backward people</b>			
Strongly agree	62,5	63,3	71,6
Mainly agree	25,0	25,1	22,6
Mainly disagree	10,0	9,3	5,1
Strongly disagree	2,5	2,3	0,7

**Table 4 The Peace Process. Refugees**

	Serbs	Croats	Muslims
<b>Refugees should return</b>			
Strongly agree	5,5	16,8	60,2
Mainly agree	16,9	46,8	25,3
Mainly disagree	28,3	21,4	7,7
Strongly disagree	49,3	15,1	6,8
<b>Refugees will return</b>			
Most return	1,7	6,9	42,5
More than half	2,4	12,7	19,3
Less than half	17,5	25,8	14,0
Only some	65,6	46,2	18,9
Almost nobody	12,7	8,5	5,3
<b>I will return</b>			
Highly likely	0,8	4,8	36,3
Somewhat likely	3,0	12,5	22,1
Not very likely	24,0	39,4	18,6
Not at all likely	72,3	43,3	23,0

**Table 5 The War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague**

	Serbs	Croats	Mus-
<b>View on Tribunal</b>			
Better to forget	79,4	26,8	2,5
Precondition for peace	20,6	73,2	97,5
<b>War criminals should be arrested by IFOR</b>			
Yes	6,2	70,4	98,1
No	93,8	29,6	1,9
<b>Hague Tribunal will be fair</b>			
Yes	3,6	43,1	82,7
No	96,4	56,9	17,3

### *The Character of the Bosnian State*

On the important issue of the constitutional arrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the three constituent nations have diametrically opposite views. 90 percent of the Muslims are in favor of a unified Bosnia, in contrast to only 9 percent of the Croats and 3 percent of the Serbs. The negative attitude of the Serbs is emphasized by the fact that 85 percent *strongly* oppose a unified state. However, most Croats also disagree, strongly (38 percent) or mainly (36 percent), with the idea of a unified Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Instead, 95 percent of the Serbs want Republika Srpska to be united with Serbia, while 79 percent of the Croats want Herceg-Bosna to be part of Croatia. Moreover, they show understanding for each other's preferences, so that more than half of the Croats and 84 percent of the Serbs support the wishes of the other party.

In other words, it seems as if the Muslims are adhering to the principles of the Dayton Accord, whereas the attitudes of Croats and Serbs are in line with the familiar idea of partition. This is further illustrated by a question on the ideal constitutional arrangement of Bosnia, with five alternatives, ranging from a centralized state to partition. 85 percent of the Serbs and 51 percent of the Croats were explicitly in favor of partition, while another 35 percent of the Croats would prefer a three-entity solution. Only 6 percent of the Serbs and 7 percent of the Croats chose the alternative which corresponds to the Dayton Accord (Bosnia and Herzegovina should consist of two political entities). However, neither do the Muslims conform to the wording or the spirit of the Peace Accord. Only 13 percent are in favor of the Dayton model, whereas 66 percent would like a highly centralized state, and another 13 percent would allow for regional autonomy within a centralized framework. The Muslim position is further illustrated by the fact that 57 percent of the Muslims agree that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be unified by military force.

It is important to stress that there is a difference between a unified and a centrally ruled state. While almost all Muslims support the concept of a unified Bosnia, there are categories in the Muslim population who are less convinced about the need for a central state, although this is the dominant option. The distinction becomes even more evident when turning to those Croats who are in favor of a unified state. A majority in this category prefers either a three-entity solution, or partition. Only a minority agrees to the view of the Bosnian state which seems natural to most Muslims.

It is obvious, then, that the three peoples living in Bosnia and Herzegovina have completely different ideas about the future of the country. Especially the conflicting views of Croats and Muslims will (continue to) have negative effects on the stability of the Federation, and thereby, on the construct decided upon in Dayton.

Figure 1 Views on the Status of Herceg Bosnia







Figure 2 Views on the Status of Republika Srpska



**Figure 3 Views on Bosnia as a Unitary State**



**Figure 4 Creation of a Unitary Bosnia using Military Force**



**Table 6 The Bosnian State : Character**

	Serbs	Croats	Muslims
<b><i>Character of Bosnian state</i></b>			
Central government	1,0	2,5	66,1
Regional autonomy	1,0	3,8	16,9
Two entities	6,1	7,2	13,2
Three entities	7,2	35,3	3,1
Partition	84,6	51,2	0,7
<b><i>Bosnia unified State</i></b>			
Strongly agree	3,0	8,7	90,7
Mainly agree	3,6	17,3	8,4
Mainly disagree	7,8	36,0	0,5
Strongly disagree	85,5	38,0	0,3
<b><i>Bosnia unified with military force*</i></b>			
Strongly agree	1,1	3,5	25,1
Mainly agree		6,8	31,9
Mainly disagree		20,0	23,5
Strongly disagree	98,9	69,7	19,5

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\* In Republika Srpska this item had only two alternatives: agree - disagree

**Table 7 The Bosnian State: Partition/Unification**

	Serbs	Croats	Muslims
<b>Republika Srpska/part of Serbia*</b>			
Strongly agree	94,5	24,7	1,1
Mainly agree		27,4	0,7
Mainly disagree		18,8	2,9
Strongly disagree	5,5	29,0	95,3
<b>Herceg-Bosna/part of Croatia*</b>			
Strongly agree	84,2	53,0	1,3
Mainly agree		26,2	0,7
Mainly disagree		8,3	2,9
Strongly disagree	15,8	12,5	95,1
<b>Bosnian unity</b>			
Very important	3,3	11,8	91,4
Rather important	3,9	10,6	6,4
Not very important	10,7	36,1	1,3
Not at all important	82,1	41,5	0,9

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\* In Republika Srpska this item had only two alternatives: agree - disagree

\* In Republika Srpska this item had only two alternatives: agree - disagree

## Ethnicity and Culture

### *Identification with Bosnia*

One obvious precondition for a unified state is the presence of a common identity, or at least, a willingness to live together. In this section we will address the issue of identification with Bosnia, in the next, the problem of social distance.

A series of questions were formulated in order to measure the degree of identification with Bosnia as a cultural and social reality. The answers reveal the same division between, on the one hand, Muslims, and, on the other, Serbs and Croats. For example, 85 percent of the Muslims strongly agree with the statement "I am proud of being a Bosnian citizen", which only 9 percent of the Croats, and 7 percent of the Serbs do. Actually, 70 percent of the Serbs and 33 percent of the Croats strongly *disagree* with this proposition.

Similarly, a substantial proportion of Muslims, but a clear minority of Serbs and Croats, feels close to other ethnic groups in Bosnia. Also, a large majority of Muslims state that they could not live anywhere else than in Bosnia, a feeling that is shared by only a small percentage of Serbs and Croats.

We also used the somewhat stereotypical expression that Bosnia has "a unique spirit that must be preserved". This statement is strongly supported by 85 percent of the Muslims, but only 9 percent of the Croats and 3 percent of the Serbs. A majority within both groups strongly or mainly disagree with this idea.

The situation becomes more complex when we turn to the problem "who are the Bosnians?". A considerable part of the Muslims, and a rather large proportion of the Serbs, are of the opinion that Croats, Serbs and Muslims, are, in effect, the same people - a view which is shared by only a few Croats.

A similar picture emerges on the issue of Bosnian identity. When asked whether it would be better if people forget about their ethnic affiliation and simply identify as *Bosnians*, a majority of the Muslims strongly (36 percent) or mainly (22,1 percent) agree, compared to only 7 percent of the Serbs and 12 percent of the Croats. Although the tendency is very clear, it should be kept in mind that more than 40 percent of the Muslims disagree with the idea of a supra-ethnic Bosnian identity.

This orientation is further illustrated by the fact that 40 percent of the Muslims strongly, and 30 percent mainly, agree with the statement that they are the dominant (state) nation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a view which is, naturally, maintained by very few Croats or Serbs.

In public opinion and political discourse in Croatia and Serbia there are still reserves against the idea that the Bosnian Muslims constitute a nation on the same level as other South Slavic peoples. In our investigation 70 percent of the Serbs and 32 percent of the

Croats think that the Muslims are, in fact, members of their own people, a view which is shared by a minority of the Muslims (25 percent).

### *Ethnic Identity*

The different attitudes to Bosnia are confirmed by an item measuring geographical and sociocultural identity. While three quarters of the Muslims primarily identify with Bosnia, Croats and Serbs tend to identify either with the local community or region.

However, to a vast majority of individuals in all three groups, national identity as such is important. The proportion of those to whom it is very important, is largest among Croats, followed by Serbs, and Muslims.

When asked whether Bosnian or national identity is more important, Croats and Serbs without hesitation chose national identification. The Muslim self-understanding is more complex. More than forty percent identify as Bosnians, 12 percent choose the purely national alternative, while another forty percent regard themselves as equally Bosnian and Muslims. This reflects both the ambiguity of Muslim identity, and the complex process of nation-building among the Bosnian Muslims, which has been going on to this very day. However, it should be pointed out, that, when examining the Muslim responses, it turns out that the categories "Muslim" and "Muslim/Bosnian" are very similar and differ in several respects from the purely Bosnian alternative. In other words, being Muslim/Bosnian is a national identification, rather than an a-national identity or a category in between.

Finally, it is interesting to note, that most of the respondents, regardless of ethnic affiliation, show a distinct historical orientation and concern about the fate of their own people. Croats, Serbs and Muslims believe that their nation has suffered more than others throughout history, that their compatriots have only been conducting wars of defence, and that a nation which forgets its past is like a man without a soul. Moreover, they believe, to a large extent that their own cultural tradition is superior to others.

### *Language*

The division between Muslims and Serbs/Croats is further illustrated by the views on language. When asked about the name of their mother tongue, an overwhelming majority of the respondents chose "Bosnian", "Croatian", or "Serbian", the correlation with ethnic affiliation being, of course, very high. Only about 11 percent of the Serbs chose the now obsolete expression Serbo-Croatian.

Whereas a majority of Serbs and Muslims perceive the language spoken by the peoples of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia, as basically the same, albeit with certain differences, the Croats take the opposite position: these are different languages, although similar.

Consequently, while the Muslims regret the growing linguistic differences which are a result of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, a substantial majority of the Croats do not. The Serbs are divided on the issue.

However, despite their view of the language situation, an overwhelming majority of the Muslims think the official name of the language in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be Bosnian. This is completely unacceptable to Serbs and Croats, for whom the adjective Bosnian obviously has an ethnic connotation. They would, instead, prefer separate classes or schools for Serbian and Croat children, as well as the right to use the standard languages of Serbia and Croatia within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both demands are unacceptable to the Muslims.

**Table 8 Identification with Bosnia**

	Serbs	Croats	Muslims
<b>Pride in being citizen of Bosnia</b>			
Strongly agree	7,4	9,3	84,7
Mainly agree	12,7	27,7	13,9
Mainly disagree	9,6	30,1	0,7
Strongly disagree	70,4	32,9	0,7
<b>Feel close other peoples in Bosnia</b>			
Strongly agree	5,5	10,0	42,0
Mainly agree	22,8	23,6	43,1
Mainly disagree	13,8	38,2	10,1
Strongly disagree	57,9	28,3	4,8
<b>Couldn't live anywhere else than in Bos-</b>			
Strongly agree	7,0	10,1	68,8
Mainly agree	12,3	18,0	20,9
Mainly disagree	16,0	26,3	7,6
Strongly disagree	64,7	45,6	2,6
<b>Bosnia has a unique spirit</b>			
Strongly agree	3,4	9,0	85,3
Mainly agree	7,4	15,1	12,5
Mainly disagree	14,0	29,0	1,0
Strongly disagree	75,2	47,0	1,1
<b>Forget Ethnicity - Identify as Bosnians</b>			
Strongly agree	3,1	7,1	36,0
Mainly agree	4,2	4,8	22,1
Mainly disagree	6,9	21,8	20,9
Strongly disagree	85,8	66,3	21,0
<b>Croats, Serbs and Muslims same people</b>			
Strongly agree	9,0	3,5	26,2
Mainly agree	23,9	4,8	27,0
Mainly disagree	18,1	26,2	22,3
Strongly disagree	49,0	65,5	24,5

**Table 9 National Affiliation and Identification**

	Serbs	Croats	Muslims
<b>Muslim are Serbs, respectively Croats</b>			
Strongly agree	40,3	14,1	7,5
Mainly agree	29,3	17,4	17,5
Mainly disagree	9,5	27,0	20,0
Strongly disagree	20,9	41,5	55,0
<b>Muslims dominant nation in Bosnia</b>			
Strongly agree	3,5	6,4	39,7
Mainly agree	4,3	12,2	29,7
Mainly disagree	14,3	21,5	19,8
Strongly disagree	77,9	59,9	10,8
<b>Every nation should have its own state</b>			
Strongly agree	70,1	48,4	4,2
Mainly agree	19,2	34,9	5,6
Mainly disagree	3,4	9,5	19,4
Strongly disagree	7,3	7,1	70,7
<b>Ethnic Identity</b>			
Geographical/Sociocultural Identity			
Locality/Town	44,7	44,7	14,7
Region/Country	29,7	26,1	1,5
Bosnia-Herzegovina	2,1	3,9	75,9
Europe	4,2	17,4	3,2
World as a whole	19,3	7,9	4,7
<b>National identity important</b>			
Very important	62,8	77,6	55,8
Somewhat important	23,1	15,9	29,7
Not very important	9,4	4,4	8,6
Not at all important	4,7	2,2	6,0
<b>Importance Bosnian/National Identity</b>			
Bosnian	3,4	6,7	43,6
Croat/Muslim/Serb	74,1	83,4	11,7
Both equally	8,1	7,0	43,9
Neither	14,4	2,9	0,7

**Table 10 The Language Issue**

Name of Mother Tongue	Serbs	Croats	Muslims
<b>Bosnian</b>	0,9	3,4	97,2
Croatian	0,7	92,6	0,5
Serbian	86,3	0,6	0,4
Serbo-Croatian	11,7	2,9	1,4
Other	0,4	0,5	0,5
<b>Bosnian-Serbian-Croatian one language</b>			
Same language	46,5	4,9	21,6
Same/Certain differences	35,8	33,3	61,2
Different/similar languages	11,5	49,3	14,7
Different languages	6,2	12,5	2,6
<b>Different schools /classes for Serb/Croat</b>			
Strongly agree	32,3	27,7	1,4
Mainly agree	27,0	38,4	1,8
Mainly disagree	11,2	16,7	17,6
Strongly disagree	22,9	15,3	78,2
DK/No answer	6,6	2,0	1,0
<b>Official language should be Bosnian</b>			
Strongly agree	1,4	4,0	84,3
Mainly agree	0,9	4,8	10,5
Mainly disagree	6,1	15,8	2,2
Strongly disagree	89,6	73,5	2,0
DK/No answer	1,9	1,9	1,0
<b>Regret the differences in language</b>			
Strongly agree	25,9	8,2	37,0
Mainly agree	14,1	12,8	35,7
Mainly disagree	9,4	30,8	16,0
Strongly disagree	46,9	45,6	8,4
DK/No answer	3,7	2,6	2,9
<b>Serbs and Croats may use standard lan-</b>			
Strongly agree	65,6	58,4	9,2
Mainly agree	23,2	30,6	18,7
Mainly disagree	4,7	4,3	19,7
Strongly disagree	6,6	6,7	52,4

**Table 11 View of History and Self Image**

	Serbs	Croats	Muslims
<b>Nation forgetting past/ Like man without a soul</b>			
Strongly agree	78,1	62,4	68,2
Mainly agree	19,4	31,9	22,0
Mainly disagree	1,9	4,4	7,6
Strongly disagree	0,7	1,3	2,2
<b>My people/only defensive wars</b>			
Strongly agree	90,8	83,0	88,8
Mainly agree	8,5	14,7	8,2
Mainly disagree	0,3	1,9	2,6
Strongly disagree	0,3	0,4	0,3
<b>My people suffered more than others</b>			
Strongly agree	87,7	73,7	75,4
Mainly agree	10,2	20,9	21,1
Mainly disagree	1,4	4,3	2,6
Strongly disagree	0,7	1,1	0,8

### *Multiethnic Society*

Much has been said about Bosnia as a multi-ethnic society. In the writings of journalists and others, it has generally been taken for granted that pre-war Bosnia and Herzegovina was a sort of model society, where ethnic groups lived in harmony. The proof has been a) the secular character of Bosnian society, especially in the Muslim segments of the population, and, b) the fact that intermarriage was very common.

Both statements are dubious. Although the percentage of mixed marriages was high in Sarajevo and some other cities, the rate of intermarriage in Bosnia has always been below the Yugoslav average.

This is mirrored in our investigation. It is true that figures on social distance (see below) indicate that Muslims are more tolerant of intermarriage than Serbs and Croats, but a substantial number of Muslims are, nevertheless, against such marriages in principle. The actual rate of intermarriage in both our samples is lower than expected, most likely as a result of ethnic cleansing.

When asked about the character of Bosnia before the war, 80 percent of the Muslims describe it as a true multi-ethnic society, which only 14 percent of the Croats do. A third of the Croats maintain that it was a society which worked reasonably well, despite ethnic conflicts. Half of the Croats are, in fact, of the opinion that there were always tensions between the nationalities of Bosnia.

It should be stressed, though, that only a minority of the respondents report direct personal experience of confrontations with other ethnic groups. Incidentally, the level of conflict seems to have been higher in places which were ethnically homogeneous (!)

As to the future, a large majority of Croats and Serbs, in contrast to Muslims, do believe that what has happened during the war makes cohabitation impossible.

Perhaps the most interesting item dealt with the understanding of a multi-ethnic society. The respondents were given three alternatives. 1) A society where different groups live in harmony, side by side, but do not mix. Each group tries to preserve its culture and mixed marriages are exceptions. 2) A society where ethnic groups also try to preserve their culture, but where individuals mix freely, and intermarriage is common. 3) A society where ethnicity is unimportant. People are mixing freely, and intermarriage is very common. In the end ethnic identity will disappear.

It should be added that the alternatives correspond to existing cases or real models. The last one is similar to the predominant Western European understanding of a multi-ethnic society, which has influenced the view of Bosnia. The second is a situation which prevailed in Tito's Yugoslavia, while the first, which might be called the *millet* option, represents the social structure of Ottoman society.

Now, it is important to stress that the "western" understanding of multiculturalism is not supported by the respondents, whether they are Serbs, Muslims or Croats. The dominant choice is either the first alternative (Croats) or the second (Serbs and Muslims). Only about a fifth of Croats, Muslims and Serbs alike, think about a multicultural society as one where ethnicity is unimportant. 48 percent of the Croats, 38 percent of the Muslims, and 35 percent of the Serbs prefer the first model, that of ethnic segregation.

**Table 12 Character of Bosnia as a Multiethnic Society**

	Serbs	Croats	Muslims
<b>Ideal Character of Multiethnic Society</b>			
Live together/not mix	34,7	47,7	38,1
Live together/mixed marriages	46,3	32,8	40,3
National identity unimportant	18,9	19,6	21,6
<b>Bosnia before the war*</b>			
<b>Multiethnic society</b>		14,2	80,4
Certain tensions		35,1	12,0
Always tensions		50,7	7,7
<b>Pre-war B &amp; H –true multi-ethnic* society</b>			
Strongly agree	18,9		
Mainly agree	42,2		
Mainly disagree	11,2		
Strongly disagree	27,7		
<b>Pre-war B &amp; H – tensions but acceptable*</b>			
Strongly agree	9,9		
Mainly agree	43,1		
Mainly disagree	24,8		
Strongly disagree	22,2		
<b>Pre-war B &amp; H – always tensions*</b>			
Strongly agree	37,6		
Mainly agree	33,3		
Mainly disagree	11,4		
Strongly disagree	17,7		
<b>Direct Conflicts with other ethnic groups</b>			
Very often	6,2	3,8	1,2
Rather often	15,0	10,0	1,5
Rather seldom	24,9	13,3	3,8
Very seldom	27,4	34,3	23,5
Never	26,5	38,6	70,1
<b>Life together possible in post-war B &amp; H ?</b>			
Possible	7,0	13,8	72,5
Impossible	93,0	86,2	27,5

\* This item was formulated as one question in the Federation, as three questions in Republika Srpska

\* This item was formulated as one question in the Federation, as three questions in Republika Srpska

\* This item was formulated as one question in the Federation, as three questions in Republika Srpska

\* This item was formulated as one question in the Federation, as three questions in Republika Srpska

**Table 13 Views on Multiethnic Society: Origin and Ethnic Structure of domicile**

Domicile in 1990					
		Republika Srpska	Federation	Other	Total
<b>Multiethnic Society</b>					
Live together/not mix		52,9	33,5		34,8
Live together/mixed marriages		24,3	40,9	100,0	40,0
National identity unimportant		22,9	25,6		25,2
<b>Members of different ethnic groups in pre-war domicile</b>					
	Many	Rather many	Some	None	Total
<b>Multiethnic Society</b>					
Live together/not mix	13,2	27,8	51,5	60,5	35,2
Live together/mixed marriages	45,7	41,4	35,2	33,9	39,7
National identity unimportant	41,2	30,8	13,3	5,6	25,1

**Table 14 Multiethnic Society and Ethnicity of Spouse/Intermarriage in Family**

<b>Multiethnic Society and National Affiliation of Husband and Wife</b>	<b>Serb</b>	<b>Croat</b>	<b>Muslim</b>	<b>Monte negrin</b>	<b>Yugoslav</b>
	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %
<b>Ideal Character of Multiethnic Society</b>					
Live together/not mix	3,4	6,8	40,8		
Live together/mixed marriages	48,3	36,4	39,7	50,0	
National identity unimportant	48,3	56,8	19,5	50,0	100,0
<b>Members of Family married outside ethnic group</b>					
<b>Ideal Character of Multiethnic Society</b>					
		<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Total</b>	
Live together/not mix		15,8	42,1	35,3	
Live together/mixed marriages		41,3	38,9	39,5	
National identity unimportant		42,9	19,0	25,2	

**Table 15 Multiethnic Society and Importance of National Identity**

<b>Multiethnic Society and Importance of National Identity</b>	<b>Very</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Not very</b>	<b>Not at all</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Ideal Character of Multiethnic Society</b>					
Live together/not mix	51,5	23,2	22,4	5,3	34,8
Live together/mixed marriages	39,7	48,1	28,6	29,5	40,1
National identity unimportant	8,8	28,7	49,0	65,3	25,1

**Table 16 Ideal Character of Multiethnic Society and Views on Politicians**

	<b>Very positive</b>	<b>Mainly positive</b>	<b>Mainly negative</b>	<b>Very negative</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Opinion of Izetbegović</b>					
<b>Multiethnic Society</b>					
Live together/not mix	47,2	17,1	9,6	16,1	35,2
Live together/mixed marriages	41,2	39,0	34,6	25,8	39,7
National identity unimportant	11,6	43,9	55,8	58,1	25,1
	<b>Very positive</b>	<b>Mainly positive</b>	<b>Mainly negative</b>	<b>Very negative</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Opinion of Silajdžić</b>					
<b>Multiethnic Society</b>					
Live together/not mix	35,8	30,4	55,2	36,4	35,1
Live together/mixed marriages	41,2	36,5	34,5	36,4	39,8
National identity unimportant	23,0	33,0	10,3	27,3	25,2

**Table 17 Religious Observance and Views on Multiethnic society**

<b>SERBS</b>	<b>Every week</b>	<b>Every month</b>	<b>Several times year</b>	<b>Seldom/ never</b>
<b>Ideal Character of Multiethnic Society</b>				
Live together/not mix	86,9	49,5	35,8	19,0
Live together/mix marriages	9,5	36,0	51,1	52,0
National identity unimportant	3,6	14,4	13,1	29,0
<b>CROATS</b>				
	<b>Every week</b>	<b>Every month</b>	<b>Several times a year</b>	<b>Seldom/ never</b>
<b>Ideal Character of Multiethnic Society</b>				
Live together/not mix	52,6	53,2	44,8	15,8
Live together/mix marriages	27,5	37,2	37,6	38,9
National identity unimportant	20,0	9,6	17,7	45,3
<b>MUSLIMS</b>				
	<b>Every week</b>	<b>Every month</b>	<b>Several times a year</b>	<b>Seldom/ never</b>
<b>Ideal Character of Multiethnic Society</b>				
Live together/not mix	42,3	43,1	41,6	24,5
Live together/mix marriages	53,5	48,6	37,6	36,3
National identity unimportant	4,2	8,3	20,8	39,2

## *Religion*

One of the persistent myths about Bosnia is that of a largely secularized society. It has been taken for granted that most of the Muslims are irreligious. The formula "European Muslims", has frequently been used to prove that these people are not really "Muslims" at all. One wonders about the origin of this vehement insistence, and it is tempting to believe in a kind of unconscious anti-Islamism. If not, it is hard to explain why the topic should be so emotionally laden and ideologically sensitive, and why discussions about religious practice in Bosnia should be interpreted as accusations. As if Islam a priori is a negative category among enlightened Europeans. Let it be made quite clear, then, that our discussion has no ideological overtones. It is, really, up to the Bosniaks themselves to choose if and how they want to express religious feelings or promote a religious way of life.

Having said that, it might perhaps be added, that Bosnian politicians themselves are to some extent responsible, since they have occasionally been using one set of vocabulary for foreign consumption, and another in their own language.

Anyway, our data show a different picture, which, incidentally, conforms to available knowledge about the religious situation in Yugoslavia, where Catholics, if the criteria of ritual participation are used, have usually been classified as more religious than Muslims, and Muslims more religious than Orthodox Christians.

In our sample a large proportion of the Muslims do participate in organized religious activity. 27 percent visit the mosque every week, 36 percent at least once a month. This is admittedly less than the Croats (46 percent every week, 70 percent every month), but it is higher than among the Serbs (9, respectively 20 percent) and certainly higher than might have been expected in view of the popular image of a secularized Bosnia.

The same pattern is repeated on self-reported religiosity or belief in God. 93 percent of the Croats believe in God, compared to 83 percent of the Muslims, and 62 percent of the Serbs.

It should be emphasized that religious behaviour is probably more widespread than these data indicate, since individuals with secondary and university education are over represented in the sample. According to our data, 47 percent of those Muslims who have completed primary school or less, participate in religious service every week, and about 60 percent every month, whereas the figures for Muslims with a university degree are 16, and 19 percent.

These findings do not answer the fashionable question whether Bosnian Islam is fundamentalist or not. There are some results, however, which indirectly may illuminate this issue, or rather the societal impact of Islam. The respondents were asked to what extent they think that religious values should be more prominent in social life (family, education, politics, and the media). The data show that a substantial proportion of Muslims do want more religious influence in the family, at school, as well as in the media, but are less eager to adopt religious values in politics. In fact, in this sense, fundamentalist tendencies are

more salient among Catholics or Orthodox! On the other hand, it is true that a comparatively large proportion of Muslims consider the social role of religion to be an important issue in the election campaign. (See below).

Again, this is a matter of educational background. In the lower ranks of society, the tendency to emphasize the social role of religion is much stronger.

**Table 18 Religion and Ethnic Affiliation**

	<b>Serb</b>	<b>Croat</b>	<b>Muslim</b>
	Col %	Col %	Col %
<b>Religious Affiliation</b>			
Orthodox	91,8	0,4	0,1
Islamic	0,3	0,6	88,8
Catholic	0,4	96,4	
Other	0,1		
No one	7,5	2,6	11,1
<b>Religious Observance</b>			
Once a Week	9,0	46,4	26,9
Once a month	11,1	23,2	8,6
Several times a year	40,4	20,3	23,4
Once a year/less	27,5	5,6	10,2
Never	12,0	4,5	30,9
<b>Religiosity</b>			
Religious person	72,0	93,1	76,9
Not religious person	23,7	5,1	18,8
Convinced atheist	4,3	1,8	4,4
<b>Belief in God</b>			
Believe	61,8	92,7	83,1
Tend to believe	20,8	4,3	6,3
Tend not to believe	11,2	1,7	4,9
Do not believe	6,2	1,3	5,7

**Table 19 Religiosity and Confession/Religious Tradition**

	<b>Orthodox</b>	<b>Islamic</b>	<b>Catholic</b>
	Col %	Col %	Col %
<b>Religious Observance</b>			
Once a Week	9,8	30,5	47,5
Once a month	11,9	9,9	24,0
Several times a year	43,0	25,9	20,5
Once a year/less	27,4	10,5	5,1
Never	8,0	23,1	2,8
<b>Religiosity</b>			
Religious person	77,7	84,7	94,7
Not religious person	20,9	13,7	4,4
Convinced atheist	1,5	1,6	0,9
<b>Belief in God</b>			
Believe	65,7	90,3	94,3
Tend to believe	21,2	4,3	3,9
Tend not to believe	9,6	3,4	1,3
Do not believe	3,6	2,0	0,5

**Table 20 Promotion of Religion in Social Life**

	Orthodox	Islamic	Catho-
	Col %	Col %	Col %
<b>Religious values/family life</b>			
Strongly agree	35,1	58,1	70,1
Mainly agree	34,1	29,7	24,5
Mainly disagree	28,0	7,0	3,4
Strongly disagree	2,8	5,2	2,0
<b>Religious values/education</b>			
Strongly agree	28,7	38,7	45,6
Mainly agree	33,8	36,2	37,7
Mainly disagree	31,3	13,3	10,4
Strongly disagree	6,2	11,8	6,2
<b>Religious values/politics</b>			
Strongly agree	18,4	8,5	15,0
Mainly agree	26,4	21,9	25,1
Mainly disagree	38,0	36,3	31,4
Strongly disagree	17,2	33,3	28,6
<b>Religious values/media</b>			
Strongly agree	21,3	13,6	16,4
Mainly agree	32,3	36,6	21,6
Mainly disagree	35,7	23,8	26,8
<b>Religious observance</b>			
Every week	9,8	30,5	47,5
Every month	11,9	9,9	24,0
Several times year	43,0	25,9	20,5
Seldom/never	35,4	33,7	7,9

## *Media*

The media situation is characterized by three major features. At first, radio and, especially TV, are much more important than newspapers and magazines. Second, there are no media which are accessible in all areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Third, most people never come across independent media. The result is three sets of state-controlled TV stations and loyal newspapers, with a pronounced ethnic character.

When asked to state their most important source of information almost 70 percent of the Croats and more than 60 percent of the Muslims mention TV, compared to about 40 percent of the Serbs. One reason seems to be that a very high proportion of Serbs, 28 percent, in contrast to 6 or 7 percent of Croats and Muslims refer to "conversation with others" as their most important source of information.

As far as TV-channels are concerned, 80 percent of the Muslims watch TV Sarajevo, and 90 percent of the Croats TV Zagreb. The situation in Republika Srpska is specific, with about two thirds of the population watching TV Pale, and one third TV Belgrade.

Only between 5-7 percent mention newspapers as their primary media. Overall, the same rule applies, people are reading "their" newspapers, which are almost by definition "loyal". In the Croat regions more than 60 percent mention *Slobodna Dalmacija*, and another 4 percent *Nedeljna Dalmacija*, whereas all other papers get only a few percent. In numbers this means that only one person reads *Feral Tribune*, three *Globus*, and one *Nacional*. In the Muslim areas the most popular paper is *Slobodna Bosna* (32 percent), followed by *Oslobođenje* (23 percent). The national weekly *Ljiljan*, with its strong Islamic commitment is read by only five persons.

In the Serb areas the biggest papers are *Večernje novosti* and *Glas Srpski* (24 percent), followed by *Politika* (16 percent) *Srpsko Oslobođenje* (10 percent) and *Politika Ekspres* (5 percent). As with TV, there is a competition between Belgrade and Pale. However, independent papers are read by very few, *Naša Borba*, 2 percent, and *Vreme*, 1 percent.

It should be added that *Oslobođenje* is more independent towards the regime than the Serbian and Croatian dailies. On the other hand, it does represent a Bosnian/Bosniak point of view.

The respondents were also asked how often they used media. It turns out, not unexpectedly, that only a minority reads newspapers on a daily basis: 16 percent of the Serbs, 19 percent of the Croats, and only 10 percent of the Muslims. In general, 57 percent of the Muslims seldom or never read a newspaper, compared to 48 percent of the Croats and 35 percent of the Serbs. The low proportion of Muslim readers remains after control of education.

The dominant role of TV is obvious, considering that a substantial proportion of the inhabitants of Bosnia spend more than three hours a day watching TV: 44 percent of the Muslims, 30 percent of the Croats, and 53 percent of the Serbs. In fact, 20 percent of Muslims and Serbs are watching TV more than four hours a day.

**Table 21 Favourite Newspapers and Ethnicity**

	<b>Serbs</b>	<b>Croats</b>	<b>Muslims</b>
<b>Favourite paper/magazine</b>			
0		1,2	
Oslobođenje		2,4	<b>22,6</b>
Slobodna Bosna		2,4	<b>32,1</b>
Hrvatska riječ			1,9
Vecernje novine	0,1	3,5	3,8
Dani		1,2	7,5
Globus		3,5	
Feral Tribune	0,1	1,2	5,7
Nacional		1,2	
Nedjeljna Dalmacija		4,7	
Slobodna Dalmacija		<b>62,4</b>	
Ljiljan			9,4
Večernji list		3,5	
Other	4,9	2,4	7,5
Politika	<b>15,8</b>	4,7	
Politika Ekspres	5,3		3,8
Srpsko Oslobođenje	<b>10,2</b>		
Naša Borba	1,5		
Večernje novosti	<b>24,2</b>	2,4	1,9
Glas srpski	<b>23,7</b>	1,2	
Telegraf	8,4	1,2	3,8
NIN	2,2	1,2	
Vreme	1,3		
Duga	2,3		

**Table 22 Favourite TV Channel and Ethnicity**

	Serbs	Croats	Muslims
0		1,8	0,2
TV Serbia	<b>29,4</b>	0,8	0,3
SRT	<b>64,1</b>	1,0	0,3
TV BiH	2,0	3,2	<b>80,7</b>
HTV	2,5	<b>89,9</b>	12,0
HTV Mostar	0,1	2,1	0,3
Other	2,0	1,3	6,2

**Table 23 Favourite Radio Station and Ethnicity**

	Serbs	Croats	Muslims
0			0,4
Radio Beograd	<b>20,7</b>	1,7	0,4
Radio Republika Srpska	<b>44,6</b>	4,0	0,9
Hrvatski radio	0,1	<b>30,7</b>	1,3
Radio Herceg Bosna	0,2	<b>49,4</b>	0,9
Radio Banja luka	8,9	0,6	1,3
BIG radio	20,1	1,1	
Radio BiH	0,1	2,8	<b>73,4</b>
Radio Mostar	0,1	5,7	
Radio M		0,6	5,7
Other	5,2	3,4	15,7

**Table 24 Most important Source of Information and Ethnicity**

	Serbs	Croats	Muslims
Newspapers	6,2	7,7	5,0
Magazines	2,3	0,6	0,6
Radio	20,9	18,6	24,4
Television	42,7	67,0	62,8
Conversations with others	27,8	6,1	7,2

**Table 25 Frequency of Reading Newspapers**

	<b>Serbs</b>	<b>Croats</b>	<b>Muslims</b>
Almost every day	16,0	18,9	9,8
Several times a week	23,7	21,2	16,0
Once a week	25,0	12,1	17,8
More seldom	25,0	31,6	36,2
Almost never	10,3	16,2	20,3
Frequency watching TV			
Less than 1 hour	7,3	6,6	6,1
1-2 hours	18,5	27,7	16,6
2-3 hours	19,8	34,9	29,1
3-4 hours	32,9	19,5	25,0
More than 4 hours	20,4	10,4	19,2
Never watch TV	1,1	0,8	3,9
Frequency listening to radio			
Less than 1 hour	34,5	22,2	12,4
1-2 hours	27,3	27,0	20,6
2-3 hours	14,8	18,9	19,4
3-4 hours	10,5	13,9	13,4
More than 4 hours	12,1	14,7	29,0
Never watch TV	0,7	3,3	5,1

## Social Distance and Ethnic Stereotypes

Two scales were used to measure social and ethnic distance. One, consisting of six items, simply asked the respondents to express their attitudes (ranging from very positive to very negative) towards Croats, Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. The other was a modified Bogardus scale measuring the degree of intimacy and individual is prepared to accept with members of other ethnic groups: live in the same the town, tolerate as work-mate, friend and husband or wife.

In general, the Muslims show a higher degree of tolerance than Croats and Serbs. In the first case (views of Serbs, Croats and Muslims) it is, however not so much a question of positive, but of less negative attitudes. The proportion of very positive attitudes towards out-groups is varying from 0,7 percent (Serbs towards Muslims in the Sandžak) to 6,5 percent (Muslims towards Croats in Bosnia), while very negative attitudes are in the range of 15,7 percent (Muslims towards Croats in Croatia) and 82 percent (Serbs towards Muslims in the Sandžak).

It is, further, characteristic that Serbs and Croats are less negative towards each other, than towards the Muslims, and that Muslims have a much more positive view of Croats than Croats have of Muslims.

The results on the social distance scale very vividly illustrate the present crisis of inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Again, the Muslims show the highest degree of acceptance, while the Serbs are on an intermediate level, and the Croats are most exclusive. Only 32 percent of the Croats would accept a Muslim living in the same town, while 39 percent would accept a Serb. In contrast, on this lowest level of interaction, Croats are accepted by 92 percent, and Serbs by 75 percent of the Muslims.


In general, the attitudinal relationships are not reciprocal. It is evident that Croats and Serbs show less distance toward each other, than toward the Muslims, and that Serbs display less distance towards Croats, than Croats towards Serbs. An interesting detail is that the Bosnian Muslims apparently feel some reserve against Muslims from the Sandžak. This is particularly evident among the highly educated and conforms to common-sense-knowledge of the situation in Sarajevo.

The response pattern, however, corresponds to the assumptions. There is a decreasing level of acceptance according to degree of intimacy, from living in the same town to marriage, apart from the Croats, who make no distinction between the first two points of the scale (living in the same town/having as work-mate). This also means that the Muslims, despite their higher degree of tolerance, draw a clear line between friendship and marriage. 76 percent would accept a Croat as friend, but only 28 percent as husband/wife. Or, 53 percent would accept a Serb as friend, but only 17 percent would marry a Serb.


The most important factors influencing social distance, are, on the one hand, religion and education, and, on the other, interaction with other ethnic groups. Those who are more religious than others are less tolerant, as are those with primary education and lower.

Similarly, those who before the war lived in a multi-ethnic context or have members of other ethnic groups as relatives are more tolerant.


**Figure 5 Social Distance towards Bosnian Croats**



**Figure 6 Social distance towards Bosnian Muslims**



**Figure 7 Social Distance towards Bosnian Serbs**



**Table 26 Attitudes towards Ethnic Groups**

	<b>Serb</b>	<b>Croat</b>	<b>Muslim</b>
<b>Croats in Bosnia</b>			
Very positive	1,5	70,9	6,5
Mainly positive	16,7	27,2	47,9
Mainly negative	30,1	1,0	27,7
Very negative	51,8	0,8	18,0
<b>Croats in Croatia</b>			
Very positive	1,4	69,6	6,7
Mainly positive	10,5	28,3	51,9
Mainly negative	26,2	1,7	25,8
Very negative	61,9	0,4	15,7
<b>Serbs in Bosnia</b>			
Very positive	78,2	3,3	2,1
Mainly positive	18,2	14,4	11,2
Mainly negative	2,8	40,5	25,4
Very negative	0,8	41,9	61,3
<b>Serbs in Serbia</b>			
Very positive	57,0	4,4	2,2
Mainly positive	35,2	14,3	7,5
Mainly negative	6,2	41,6	26,9
Very negative	1,5	39,7	63,4
<b>Muslims in Bosnia</b>			
Very positive	1,7	3,4	73,5
Mainly positive	7,9	10,5	24,9
Mainly negative	16,3	32,3	0,9
Very negative	74,1	53,9	0,7
<b>Muslims in Sandžak</b>			
Very positive	0,7	3,4	55,8
Mainly positive	8,0	9,9	38,2
Mainly negative	9,3	31,2	4,2
Very negative	82,0	55,6	1,8

**Table 27 Social Distance and Ethnicity**

<b>Table Social Distance</b>			
	<b>Serbs</b>	<b>Croats</b>	<b>Muslims</b>
<b>Croat living in same town</b>			
Accept	66,2	98,6	92,0
Do not accept	33,8	1,4	8,0
<b>Croat as a work-mate</b>			
Accept	59,6	98,7	89,4
Do not accept	40,4	1,3	10,6
<b>Croat as a friend</b>			
Accept	50,0	97,8	76,2
Do not accept	50,0	2,2	23,8
<b>Croat as Husband/Wife</b>			
Accept	17,0	96,8	28,4
Do not accept	83,0	3,2	71,6
<b>Muslim living in same town</b>			
Accept	35,8	32,3	98,8
Do not accept	64,2	67,7	1,2
<b>Muslim as a work-mate</b>			
Accept	29,4	32,5	99,3
Do not accept	70,6	67,5	0,7
<b>Muslim as a friend</b>			
Accept	19,5	19,3	99,5
Do not accept	80,5	80,7	0,5
<b>Muslim as Husband/Wife</b>			
Accept	7,9	8,9	98,8
Do not accept	92,1	91,1	1,2
<b>Serb living in same town</b>			
Accept	98,9	39,0	75,6
Do not accept	1,1	61,0	24,4
<b>Serb as a work-mate</b>			
Accept	99,6	39,2	66,5
Do not accept	0,4	60,8	33,5
<b>Serb as a friend</b>			
Accept	99,3	25,5	52,6
Do not accept	0,7	74,5	47,4
<b>Serb as Husband/Wife</b>			
Accept	99,2	11,2	17,2
Do not accept	0,8	88,8	82,8

**Table 28 Social Distance and Religious Observance – every week**

<i>Religious observance</i> <i>Every week</i>	<b>Religious Affiliation</b>		
	<b>Orthodox</b>	<b>Islamic</b>	<b>Catholic</b>
<b>Croat living in same town</b>			
Accept	36,6	91,2	98,7
Do not accept	63,4	8,8	1,3
<b>Croat as a work-mate</b>			
Accept	24,7	87,6	99,2
Do not accept	75,3	12,4	0,8
<b>Croat as a friend</b>			
Accept	18,0	70,2	98,4
Do not accept	82,0	29,8	1,6
<b>Croat as Husband/Wife</b>			
Accept	2,1	6,8	97,9
Do not accept	97,9	93,2	2,1
<b>Muslim living in same town</b>			
Accept	17,3	99,6	26,1
Do not accept	82,7	0,4	73,9
<b>Muslim as a work-mate</b>			
Accept	5,9	99,2	26,4
Do not accept	94,1	0,8	73,6
<b>Muslim as a friend</b>			
Accept	3,8	99,2	14,2
Do not accept	96,2	0,8	85,8
<b>Muslim as Husband/Wife</b>			
Accept	2,1	99,2	3,0
Do not accept	97,9	0,8	97,0
<b>Serb living in same town</b>			
Accept	98,1	73,6	26,6
Do not accept	1,9	26,4	73,4
<b>Serb as a work-mate</b>			
Accept	98,1	66,7	28,8
Do not accept	1,9	33,3	71,2
<b>Serb as a friend</b>			
Accept	98,1	50,2	14,9
Do not accept	1,9	49,8	85,1
<b>Serb as Husband/Wife</b>			
Accept	98,1	2,7	4,0
Do not accept	1,9	97,3	96,0

**Table 29 Social Distance and Religious Observance – seldom/never**

<i>Religious observance</i>	<b>Religious Affiliation</b>		
<b>Seldom/never</b>	<b>Orthodox</b>	<b>Islamic</b>	<b>Catholic</b>
<b>Croat living in same town</b>			
Accept	72,3	92,4	98,5
Do not accept	27,7	7,6	1,5
<b>Croat as a work-mate</b>			
Accept	68,9	88,6	98,5
Do not accept	31,1	11,4	1,5
<b>Croat as a friend</b>			
Accept	57,8	79,8	95,5
Do not accept	42,2	20,2	4,5
<b>Croat as Husband/Wife</b>			
Accept	27,7	44,4	96,9
Do not accept	72,3	55,6	3,1
<b>Muslim living in same town</b>			
Accept	42,7	97,4	64,4
Do not accept	57,3	2,6	35,6
<b>Muslim as a work-mate</b>			
Accept	37,3	98,3	67,1
Do not accept	62,7	1,7	32,9
<b>Muslim as a friend</b>			
Accept	23,1	98,3	56,2
Do not accept	76,9	1,7	43,8
<b>Muslim as Husband/Wife</b>			
Accept	11,1	97,0	40,3
Do not accept	88,9	3,0	59,7
<b>Serb living in same town</b>			
Accept	99,2	71,5	74,0
Do not accept	0,8	28,5	26,0
<b>Serb as a work-mate</b>			
Accept	100,0	63,9	75,3
Do not accept		36,1	24,7
<b>Serb as a friend</b>			
Accept	100,0	53,5	69,4
Do not accept		46,5	30,6
<b>Serb as Husband/Wife</b>			
Accept	99,7	26,9	43,1
Do not accept	0,3	73,1	56,9

## Politics

### *Elections*

In view of the apparent problems with the implementation of the Dayton Accord, and warnings about possible boycotts from the part of political leaders, it is noteworthy that an overwhelming majority (more than 90 percent) of respondents in all ethnic groups think that the elections should not be postponed but held as planned. If we are to believe this survey, Croats, Muslims and Serbs also intend to vote (more than 90 percent).

On the other hand, the potential voters do not expect the elections to be entirely fair. 70 percent of the Serbs, more than 40 percent of the Croats and about 30 percent of the Muslims, believe there will be manipulations and tricks during the election procedure. Further, most Serbs (60 percent) and Croats (54 percent), and a substantial proportion of Muslims (40 percent) do not think the campaign as such will be fair. About the same percentage do not expect the media to report objectively about the campaign.

The views on the principles of voters' registration, an issue which earlier this year caused considerable friction, are quite diverse. More than 80 percent of the Serbs think that people should vote in the place where they are living now, while almost 60 percent of the Muslims think one should vote in the pre-war place of residence. The Croats are divided, but their predominant option is that the individual should have the right to choose.

### *Party Sympathies*

The position of the political parties varies considerably according to ethnic group. The Croatian HDZ is, beyond competition, the strongest political organization among the Croats, with an overwhelming majority of potential voters (85 percent). The second party is HSS, which has not even 5 percent of the voters, while the right-wing HSP gathers only 3 percent. The two socialist parties would get 3 percent. For every practical purpose this is a one-party system.

The situation in the Muslim areas is more complex, but similar. The present ruling party, SDA, has a dominant position with almost 60 percent of the potential votes. However, the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, formed by Haris Silajdžić has about 30 percent of the sympathies. The "opposition" (of socialists and liberals) would get some 8 percent. As the profile of Silajdžić is unclear - he appeals to both the sympathizers of SDA and the opposition - it is hard to say whether this party is an asset for the present regime or not.

In Republika Srpska the situation is more complicated than elsewhere. The ruling party is the weakest of the three leading political factions in Bosnia, with only a little more than 40 percent of the explicit sympathies. The Socialist Party of Republika Srpska, loyal to Milošević, has a solid 30 percent, and in view of Karadžić's rating, and the degree of confidence his party enjoys (see below) it would seem to have a fair chance.

An interesting aspect is that the SPRS is acting as an opposition party and has a somewhat different electorate than the Socialist Party in Serbia proper. In Serbia the socialists are supported by the lower classes, the less educated, and people in the countryside, i.e. categories which in Republika Srpska are more inclined to sympathize with Karadžić and SDS.

In general, the major political parties are supported by people with lower education, those living in villages, or belonging to the working class. There is, moreover, a very clear tendency that the SDS, HDZ, and in particular the SDA ,are supported by religious people.

A very crucial point is that the proportion of "don't know"-answers is comparatively high among the Muslims, almost 30 percent, compared to 15 percent among Serbs, and 21 percent among the Croats, which is an indication of dissatisfaction or confusion. Furthermore, the share of no response is distinctly higher among those with a university education. This tendency is also noticeable, to a lesser degree, among Serbs and Croats. In view of their ideological profile one might assume that there is a substantial proportion of the highly educated who is alienated by the (religious-)nationalist character of Bosnian politics. Whether they are Muslims, Croats or Serbs.

It should be pointed out, again, that the present investigation concerns the population resident in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is therefore doubtful whether our data could predict the forthcoming election. A more exact prediction would a) have to be based on lists of registered voters, and b) include Bosnians living as refugees abroad. (To our knowledge such an investigation is not being planned. Neither have the lists of registration been used as a basis for sampling in Bosnia.) Therefore, in the absence of such studies, the present survey and similar investigations are, nevertheless, of interest. It should be kept in mind, however, that the result will depend on the proportion of votes in absence. It is hard to say how they would affect the outcome, but it seems that the major Croatian party (HDZ) would gain. In Muslim areas it might be hypothesized that Silajdžić's Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina might have more supporters abroad, while the effect in Republika Srpska is an open question. Probably the Milošević-loyal SPRS will profit.

**Table 30 Attitude towards Elections**

	Serb	Croat	Muslim
<b>View of elections</b>			
Held as planned	94,3	92,7	91,0
Postponed	5,7	7,3	9,0
<b>Will vote in the elections</b>			
Yes	92,8	90,3	96,0
No	7,2	9,7	4,0

**Table 31 Party Preferences and Ethnicity**

Party Preference						
	Serbs		Croats		Mus- lims	
	Col	Col %	Col	Col %	Col	Col %
SDA	2	0,2	1	0,1	414	58,6
HDZ	4	0,4	678	85,0	3	0,4
SDP	3	0,3	16	2,0	29	4,1
UBSD	3	0,3	8	1,0	17	2,4
LS			3	0,4	9	1,3
MBO					1	0,1
LBO					2	0,3
DNZ	1	0,1	1	0,1		
GSD			1	0,1		
HSS			37	4,6	1	0,1
HSP	1	0,1	26	3,3	1	0,1
RP			4	0,5	3	0,4
Party for B-H	5	0,5	10	1,3	215	30,5
Other	33	3,3	1	0,1	6	0,8
SDS	428	43,4				
SPRS	312	31,6	6	0,8	3	0,4
SNS	7	0,7	2	0,3		
SSJ	39	4,0				
JUL	2	0,2				
DPB	25	2,5	1	0,1	1	0,1
SRS	76	7,7				
No right to vote	5	0,5				
Not intend to vote	41	4,2	3	0,4	1	0,1
Group Total	987	100,0	798	100,0	706	100,0
DK/No Answer	212		212		293	
Percent Missing	17,7		21,0		29,3	

**Table 32 Views on Organization and Outcome of Elections**

	<b>Serbs</b>	<b>Croats</b>	<b>Muslims</b>
<b>Prognosis of Elections</b>			
Ruling party will certainly win	33,6	51,9	39,6
Ruling party will probably win	25,9	38,5	32,5
Opposition will certainly win	25,7	1,3	4,9
Opposition will probably win	7,2	2,5	8,0
No clear majority	7,7	5,8	15,0
<b>Satisfaction with government</b>			
Very	11,2	8,6	19,8
Rather	37,5	50,0	47,3
Not very	43,7	34,0	21,8
Not at all	7,7	7,4	11,0
<b>Where should one vote</b>			
Earlier place of Residence	3,0	19,7	58,5
Present place of Residence	84,1	38,0	6,9
Right to chose	12,9	42,3	34,6
<b>Elections will be properly organized</b>			
Will be tricks/manipulations	69,1	43,4	34,0
Will be correct	30,9	56,6	66,0
<b>Electoral campaign will be fair</b>			
Yes	40,4	46,0	60,5
No	59,6	54,0	39,5
<b>Media will report in objective manner</b>			
Yes	40,3	48,6	65,9
No	59,7	51,4	34,1

**Table 33 Party Sympathies, Education and Ethnicity**

	<b>Primary/lower</b>	<b>Professional</b>	<b>Secondary</b>	<b>University</b>
<b>CROATS</b>				
HDZ	89,0	85,4	85,6	79,1
HSP	4,5	1,0	3,4	2,6
ZL	5,0	10,4	7,9	13,0
Other	1,5	3,1	3,1	5,2
<b>SERBS</b>				
SDS	64,1	52,7	41,4	33,2
SPRS	23,7	29,3	34,7	42,8
ZL		0,5	0,5	1,6
Other	7,7	10,1	13,2	15,0
SRS	4,5	7,4	10,2	7,5
<b>MUSLIMS</b>				
SDA	80,0	65,1	51,1	42,7
SBiH	15,3	27,1	36,1	39,6
ZL	4,0	5,4	8,6	10,4
Other	0,7	2,3	4,3	7,3

**Table 34 Party sympathies, Rural/Urban Residence, and Ethnicity**

<b>Party Sympathies and urban/rural residence</b>		
	<b>Village</b>	<b>Town</b>
<b>MUSLIMS</b>		
SDA	62,7	56,1
SBiH	28,3	31,9
ZL	8,6	6,3
Other	0,4	5,6
<b>CROATS</b>		
HDZ	87,3	82,5
HSP	3,5	3,0
ZL	8,0	8,6
Other	1,2	5,9
<b>SERBS</b>		
SDS	50,0	43,1
SPRS	28,6	36,5
ZL		1,1
Other	11,9	12,1
SRS	9,5	7,3

**Table 35 Party Sympathies and Intermarriage in Family**

	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
<b>SERBSS</b>		
SDS	36,4	48,9
SPRS	38,5	31,7
ZL	1,3	0,4
Other	16,5	10,5
SRS	7,4	8,4
<b>CROATS</b>		
HDZ	67,6	88,4
HSP	3,6	3,1
ZL	15,3	7,1
Other	13,5	1,3
<b>MUSLIMS</b>		
SDA	39,0	63,4
SBiH	39,7	28,1
ZL	11,0	6,5
Other	10,3	2,0

**Table 36 Party Sympathies and Ethnic Structure in pre-war Domicile**

<b>Members of different ethnic groups</b>				
	<b>Many</b>	<b>Rather many</b>	<b>Some</b>	<b>None</b>
<b>SERBS</b>				
SDS	30,5	59,9	71,3	64,3
SPRS	48,7	16,3	10,7	25,0
ZL	0,2	1,6	0,8	
Other	12,2	14,7	6,6	8,9
SRS	8,4	7,5	10,7	1,8
<b>CROATS</b>				
HDZ	77,6	83,3	82,0	93,4
HSP	1,3	3,8	4,6	3,1
ZL	13,2	7,6	12,0	3,1
Other	7,9	5,3	1,4	0,3
<b>MUSLIMS</b>				
SDA	49,4	52,3	62,0	77,6
SBiH	33,3	34,1	31,0	18,7
ZL	10,3	10,9	3,7	2,8
Other	7,1	2,7	3,2	0,9

**Table 37 Party Sympathies and Religious Observance**

	<b>Every week</b>	<b>Every month</b>	<b>Several tms year</b>	<b>Seldom/ never</b>
<b>MUSLIMS</b>				
SDA	79,30	72,70	67,10	33,90
SBiH	17,60	23,60	27,60	42,70
ZL	1,60		3,90	16,50
Other	1,60	3,60	1,30	6,90
<b>CROATS</b>				
HDZ	90,60	91,00	80,80	47,50
HSP	3,10	2,60	3,20	6,60
ZL	4,40	5,80	12,20	29,50
Other	1,80	0,50	3,80	16,40
<b>SERBS</b>				
SDS	65,60	54,10	47,20	35,70
SPRS	4,40	22,50	35,00	43,20
ZL			0,50	1,20
Other	11,10	13,50	9,50	14,90
SRS	18,90	9,90	7,80	5,00

### ***Political Issues***

Among the Muslims, issues concerning the consolidation of the state are considered most important: Bosnian unity, punishment of war criminals, army and defence. They are followed by economy and welfare, education, independence of media and the fight against corruption. A fairly large proportion of the Muslim respondents, compared to Serbs or Croats, consider the social role of religion to be important.

The priorities of Croats and Serbs are different. Issues like Bosnian unity or the return of refugees are given lower priority. As to the punishment of war criminals there is a characteristic difference between Serbs and Croats.

Highest on the list of priorities of the Serbs are: Economy and welfare, political democracy, independence of media, and education. The Croatian preferences are similar: Political democracy, economy and welfare, education and independence of media.

The issue of privatization is rated higher among Muslims and Croats than among Serbs, which apart from possible ideological differences might be a reflection of the prevailing economic situation.

**Table 38 Political Issues during Elections. Percentage of "Very Important"**

	Serbs	Croats	Muslims
<b>Issues regarded as "Very Important" (percentage)</b>			
<b>Army and defence</b>	49,9	49,3	80,7
<b>Economy and Welfare</b>	73,6	63,6	79,3
<b>Privatization</b>	23,8	49,4	53,4
<b>Political democracy</b>	67,2	66,6	71,1
<b>Independence of media</b>	65,2	56,9	67,0
<b>Corruption and Crime</b>	50,0	49,3	60,2
<b>Education</b>	57,9	59,4	77,0
<b>Social role of religion</b>	25,4	29,2	41,4
<b>Bosnian Unity</b>	3,3	11,8	91,4
<b>Punishment of war criminals</b>	11,5	42,3	92,6
<b>Return of refugees</b>	10,2	7,1	25,0

**Table 39 Importance of Political Issues: Sectors and Ethnicity**

	Serbs	Croats	Muslims
<b>Army and Défense</b>			
Very important	49,9	49,3	80,7
Rather Important	31,3	34,8	14,9
Not very important	10,5	10,8	2,8
Not at all		8,3	5,0
<b>Economy and Welfare</b>			
Very important	73,6	63,6	79,3
Rather important	22,8	33,3	17,8
Not very important	2,9	2,7	2,6
Not at all		0,7	0,3
<b>Privatization</b>			
Very important	23,8	49,4	53,4
Rather important	53,8	37,7	33,8
Not very important	17,3	11,6	10,2
Not at all		5,1	1,3
<b>Political Democracy</b>			
Very important	67,2	66,6	71,1
Rather important	28,1	29,3	24,6
Not very important	4,2	3,7	3,3
Not at all		0,5	0,4
<b>Independence of Media</b>			
Very important	65,2	56,9	67,0
Rather important	29,5	36,4	25,8
Not very important	4,5	6,2	6,2
Not at all		0,7	0,5
<b>Corruption and Crime</b>			
Very important	50,0	49,3	60,2
Rather important	35,8	30,9	21,8
Not very important	7,2	10,6	10,6
Not at all		7,0	9,2
<b>Education</b>			
Very important	57,9	59,4	77,0
Rather important	31,6	34,1	17,7
Not very important	8,2	6,1	4,9
Not at all		2,3	0,4
<b>Social Role of Religion</b>			
Very important	25,4	29,2	41,4
Rather important	54,2	42,0	26,8
Not very important	14,5	20,5	22,2
Not at all		5,9	8,3

**Table 40 Political Issues related to the War**

	Serbs	Croats	Muslims
<b>Bosnian Unity</b>			
Very important	3,3	11,8	91,4
Rather important	3,9	10,6	6,4
Not very important	10,7	36,1	1,3
Not at all		82,1	41,5
<b>Return of refugees</b>			
Very important	10,2	7,1	25,0
Rather important	19,3	42,9	12,5
Not very important	40,8	42,9	62,5
Not at all		25,4	
DK/No answer	4,4	7,1	
<b>Punishment of War Criminals</b>			
Very important	11,5	42,3	92,6
Rather important	10,5	22,3	5,9
Not very important	20,1	22,2	0,7
Not at all		58,0	13,2

### *Views on Politicians*

Much of the interest in the local press is concentrated on the ratings of well-known politicians. In our investigation this method was also employed. It should be emphasized, though, that these percentage figures are not necessarily decisive during the elections, as in some cases the sympathies for politicians are overlapping.

The results are, nevertheless, interesting as a measure of the political climate in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At first, there is the usual pattern of ethnic choice. At the moment, there is no politician in Bosnia who has any substantial following outside his group. The exception of Stjepan Kljujić, whom half of the Muslim respondents view in a very positive light, confirms the rule, since the Croats obviously do not treat him as a Croat politician.

There is, thus, a clear polarization, meaning that a politician who is very popular in one ethnic group almost by necessity is very unpopular in the two other groups. Serbs and Muslims are very negative towards Franjo Tudjman, Croats and Muslims have extremely negative views of Karadžić and Milošević, and Serbs and Croats show a very high degree of distrust towards Izetbegović and Silajdžić.

The ethnic factor seems to be working regardless of the orientation or image of individual politicians. For example, Serbs do not distinguish between the Islamically inclined Izetbegović and the more western Silajdžić. The Croats do, to some extent, but their overall verdict of Silajdžić is negative.

Another interesting point is that whereas the most popular politicians among Muslims and Croats get very high ratings, this is not the case among the Serbs. The most influential personality in Republika Srpska is general Mladić (59 percent very positive) followed by Milošević (34,7) , Koljević (34,1) and Karadžić (33,5). Among the Muslims the most popular politician has a rating of 72,6 (Silajdžić), among the Croats 72,7 (Šušak). This reflects the power struggle going on in Republika Srpska between the SDS and the SPRS, which has led to a clear division in sympathies between "moderate" and "radical" politicians.

It is noteworthy that the most favoured politician among Croats is neither a local politician, nor president Tudjman, but the powerful Croatian minister of defence, Gojko Šušak. This is however quite logical, in view of Šušak's origin and position as leader of the Herzegovina lobby. The most prominent local politicians are Blaškić and Kordić, both accused of war crimes in The Hague.

Among the Muslims the former Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić (72,6) is somewhat more popular than President Alija Izetbegović (67,7). The relationship between these two politicians is extremely interesting, since a substantial proportion of the followers of Izetbegović have a positive view of Silajdžić, and vice versa.

**Table 41 Ratings of Politicians and Ethnicity**

Percentage of very positive		Percentage of very negative	
<b>MUSLIMS</b>		<b>MUSLIMS</b>	
Silajdžić	72,6	Karadžić	99,3
Izetbegović	67,7	Milošević	96,4
Ganić	60,3	Blaškić	87,7
Ključić	50,6	Kordić	85,8
Duraković	45,1	Tudjman	78,3
Filipović	40,5	Šušak	
<b>CROATS</b>		<b>CROATS</b>	
Šušak	72,7	Karadžić	83,4
Tudjman	63,3	Milošević	81,8
Blaškić	53,4	Izetbegović	74,3
Kordić	47,5	Ganić	67,4
Zubak	44,1	Filipović	58,6
Ključić	9,9	Duraković	56,6
<b>SERBS</b>		<b>SERBS</b>	
Mladić	58,7	Izetbegović	96,8
Milošević	34,7	Tudjman	92,4
Koljević	34,1	Silajdžić	90,5
Karadžić	33,5	Kordić	77,1
Kličković	24,7	Blaškić	77,0
Plavšić	23,4	Dodik	20,9
Krajišnik	21,9	Kasagić	18,0

**Table 42 Views of Politicians**

	<b>Serbs</b>	<b>Croats</b>	<b>Muslim</b>
<b>Opinion of Milošević</b>			
Very positive	34,7	0,8	0,8
Mainly positive	34,4	2,1	0,5
Mainly negative	19,9	15,3	2,3
Very negative	10,9	81,8	96,4
<b>Opinion of Karadžić</b>			
Very positive	33,5	0,2	
Mainly positive	31,0	2,2	0,1
Mainly negative	28,9	14,2	0,6
Very negative	6,5	83,4	99,3
<b>Opinion of Tuđman</b>			
Very positive	0,6	63,3	0,8
Mainly positive	1,6	29,8	3,9
Mainly negative	5,4	2,9	17,0
Very negative	92,4	4,0	78,3
<b>Opinion of Izetbegović</b>			
Very positive	0,5	0,8	67,7
Mainly positive	1,1	5,7	25,9
Mainly negative	1,5	19,2	3,6
Very negative	96,8	74,3	2,7
<b>Opinion of Silajdžić</b>			
Very positive	1,5	3,8	72,6
Mainly positive	1,9	7,2	22,5
Mainly negative	6,2	33,2	3,1
Very negative	90,5	55,8	1,9
<b>Opinion of Kordić</b>			
Very positive	0,6	47,5	1,2
Mainly positive	6,8	40,5	2,5
Mainly negative	15,6	5,5	10,5
Very negative	77,1	6,5	85,8
<b>Opinion of Blaškić</b>			
Very positive	0,8	53,4	0,9
Mainly positive	6,5	37,4	1,5
Mainly negative	15,7	3,9	10,0
Very negative	77,0	5,2	87,7

**Table 43 Views on Politicians. Serbs**

<b>Opinion of Koljević</b>		<b>Opinion of Mladić</b>	
Very positive	34,1	Very positive	58,7
Mainly positive	52,1	Mainly positive	38,1
Mainly negative	10,6	Mainly negative	2,1
Very negative	3,2	Very negative	1,1
<b>Opinion of Kasagić</b>		<b>Opinion of Plavšić</b>	
Very positive	6,2	Very positive	23,4
Mainly positive	51,3	Mainly positive	32,8
Mainly negative	24,6	Mainly negative	36,4
Very negative	18,0	Very negative	7,4
<b>Opinion of Dodik</b>		<b>Opinion of Krajišnik</b>	
Very positive	5,2	Very positive	21,9
Mainly positive	43,9	Mainly positive	28,5
Mainly negative	30,0	Mainly negative	36,6
Very negative	20,9	Very negative	13,0
<b>Opinion of Radić</b>		<b>Opinion of Kličković</b>	
Very positive	17,5	Very positive	24,7
Mainly positive	57,3	Mainly positive	53,1
Mainly negative	17,9	Mainly negative	16,2
Very negative	7,3	Very negative	6,0
<b>Opinion of Radišić</b>			
Very positive	26,0		
Mainly positive	39,3		
Mainly negative	20,2		
Very negative	14,5		

**Table 44 Views on Politicians. Croats and Muslims**

	Croats	Muslims
<b>Opinion of Zubak</b>		
Very positive	44,1	1,7
Mainly positive	46,8	18,8
Mainly negative	6,2	32,9
Very negative	3,0	46,5
<b>Opinion of Šušak</b>		
Very positive	72,7	1,5
Mainly positive	22,2	6,8
Mainly negative	2,6	24,2
Very negative	2,6	67,6
<b>Opinion of Kljuić</b>		
Very positive	9,9	50,6
Mainly positive	28,3	38,3
Mainly negative	37,7	3,2
Very negative	24,2	7,9
<b>Opinion of Ganić</b>		
Very positive	2,1	60,3
Mainly positive	8,8	31,1
Mainly negative	21,7	6,4
Very negative	67,4	2,2
<b>Opinion of Duraković</b>		
Very positive	2,3	45,1
Mainly positive	10,3	47,5
Mainly negative	30,9	5,3
Very negative	56,6	2,1
<b>Opinion of Filipović</b>		
Very positive	1,2	40,5
Mainly positive	8,9	48,1
Mainly negative	31,3	8,8
Very negative	58,5	2,5

### ***Political involvement***

In general, the degree of political interest is rather modest. About 3 percent of both Croats and Muslims are very interested, and another 28, respectively 19 percent, rather interested in politics. The Serbs show a somewhat higher degree of political concern; 13 percent are very interested, and 34 percent rather interested in politics.

However, a comparatively large proportion of respondents (about 25 percent in all groups) are members of a political party, which is probably a consequence of the social characteristics of the sample, but also of the specific character of the dominant parties.

In the Muslim and Croat parts of the Federation the political arena is dominated by a single political party, or rather movement. Thus, of those who belong to a political party, 91 percent of the Croats are members of HDZ, and 80 percent of the Muslims of SDA, followed by SDP (11 percent). This means that, in the sample, 23 percent of the Croats are members of the HDZ, whereas 18 percent of the Muslims are enrolled in the SDA.

In Republika Srpska the situation is different. Here, 10 percent of the respondents are members of the SDS, and another 10 percent of the Socialist Party, while 3 percent are enrolled in the Radical Party (SRS).

It might be added that 12 percent of the Croats, and 19 percent of the Muslims are former members of the League of Communists. The ex-communists are to a greater extent than others enrolled in political parties, and there is an interesting difference between Muslims and Croats in terms of party affiliation. While a large majority of former communists of Croat origin are members of HDZ (79 percent), a substantial part of their Muslim comrades (33 percent) have chosen socialist alternatives, instead of SDA (55 percent). One reason might be the strong religious dimension in the general outlook and public appearance of the SDA.<sup>1</sup>

### ***Political Orientations***

Several items were used to measure political orientations, in particular the understanding of democracy. When asked to choose between two alternatives characterizing a democratic society, a slight majority of Croats identified democracy primarily with political rights while Muslims and especially Serbs stressed economic equality.

Similarly, 63 percent of the Croats, compared to 46 percent of the Muslims and 32 percent of the Serbs emphasize that the most important function of government is to promote individual initiative, not to guarantee the fundamental needs of the population.

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<sup>1</sup>Due to communication problems in the final stage of questionnaire construction this item was unfortunately not included in the survey in Republika Srpska. Of the 43 Serbs interviewed in the area of the Federation 58 percent had been members of the LCY. While the average for Republika Srpska is most likely lower, it is reasonable to assume that the proportion of Serbs enrolled in the Communist Party would have been higher than among Muslims or Croats.

There is a slight tendency, then, for Muslims and Serbs to emphasize the economic aspects. This is only to some extent reflected in responses to a series of items concerning the subjective importance of various aspects of democracy. Economic progress is rated high (90 percent of Muslims, 88 percent of Croats and 87 percent of Serbs think it is essential), like the guarantee of basic needs (84 percent of Muslims, 78 percent of Serbs and Croats) .

This pattern would be natural in the situation in which Bosnia and Herzegovina finds itself at the moment, and it should be emphasized that a large majority in all three groups (79 percent Serbs, 89 percent Croats, and 90 percent Muslims) stress the importance of a fair judicial system or political pluralism (75 percent Serbs, 84 percent Croats, and 80 percent Muslims).

The Serbs have somewhat lower figures, but still a very large majority endorses these principles. However, when it comes to the issue of freedom to criticize the government, only 54 percent of the Serbs believe this is an essential feature of democracy, in contrast to 70 percent of the Croats and 77 percent of the Muslims.

### *Confidence in Institutions and Organizations*

The respondents were asked to state their confidence in several institutions and organizations: local authorities, police, media, courts, the armed forces, the Islamic Community, the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, as well as the three major political parties, SDA, HDZ and SDS.

In general, Muslims tend to have greater confidence in social institutions than Serbs or Croats. This is evident in their feelings towards governmental institutions, media, and, notably, the army. For example, 40 percent of the Muslims have much confidence in local authorities, in comparison to 14 percent of the Serbs and 12 percent of the Croats. Or, while 55 percent of the Serbs and 50 percent of the Croats have much confidence in the armed forces, among Muslims the proportion is 87 percent.

As far as religious institutions and political parties are concerned, the answers are clearly related to ethnic affiliation. About forty percent of the Muslims have much confidence in the Islamic Community and the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), while more than seventy percent have little or no confidence in the Catholic Church and almost ninety percent have a negative perception of the Croat Democratic Community (HDZ). The Croats, on the other hand, manifest a high degree of support for the Catholic Church (60 percent have much confidence) while showing very little sympathy with the Islamic Community or the SDA (96, respectively, 97 percent have little or no confidence).

Common to both Croats and Muslims is the general distrust of Serbian institutions. About 98 percent in each group have little or no confidence in the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and about 95 percent have a similar attitude towards the Orthodox Church.

The Serbs, for their part, show a somewhat different pattern. There is a similar distrust of the Islamic Community and the Catholic Church (99 percent, respectively 98 percent have

little or no confidence) or the political parties of Croats or Muslims (99 percent have little or no confidence in the HDZ and SDA). The difference, compared to Muslims and Croats, is that only 16 percent of the Serbs have much confidence in the ruling party (SDS) and that the proportion of those with little or no confidence is higher. This can be explained by the specific situation in Republika Srpska referred to above.

**Table 45 Political Interest and Political Affiliation**

	Serbs	Croats	Muslims
<b>Political interest</b>			
Very	12,5	2,9	3,3
Rather	34,0	27,9	19,0
Not very	32,1	50,8	58,4
Not at all	21,3	18,4	19,4
<b>Member of political party</b>			
Yes	27,2	25,2	24,7
No	72,8	74,8	75,3
<b>If yes, which one</b>			
SDA			76,9
HDZ	0,1	86,4	0,4
SDP	0,1	2,0	11,1
UBSD		1,6	2,2
LS		0,4	0,4
MBO			0,9
GSD	71,8	6,0	3,6
HSS		0,4	
HSP		2,4	
Party for B-H			3,6
SPRS	10,6	0,8	0,9
SDS	11,1		
SRS	2,9		
Other	3,4		
<b>Member of Communist party</b>			
Yes		11,8	19,4
No		88,2	80,6

**Table 46 Character of Democracy. Most important Aspects**

	Serb	Croat	Muslim
	Col %	Col %	Col %
<b>Most important aspect of democracy</b>			
Economic equality	61,2	47,5	55,9
Political rights	38,8	52,5	44,1
<b>Most Important function of government</b>			
Individual progress	32,0	62,5	45,7
Fundamental needs	68,0	37,5	54,3

**Table 47 Character of Democracy: Dimensions**

	Serbs	Croats	Muslims
<b>Parties/competing during election</b>			
Essential	75,1	84,3	80,1
Important/not essential	16,9	12,1	13,4
Not very important	2,9	2,4	5,2
Completely unimportant	5,2	1,2	1,3
<b>Guaranteeing citizens economic equality</b>			
Essential	72,3	66,6	78,5
Important/not essential	21,9	28,4	15,8
Not very important	4,7	4,1	4,8
Completely unimportant	1,0	0,8	0,8
<b>Judicial system/everyone equally</b>			
Essential	78,6	89,4	89,8
Important/not essential	19,0	9,7	8,2
Not very important	2,1	0,5	1,5
Completely unimportant	0,3	0,3	0,5
<b>Freedom criticize the government</b>			
Essential	54,2	70,1	76,6
Important/not essential	30,8	23,5	18,3
Not very important	9,9	6,4	4,5
Completely unimportant	5,0		0,5
<b>Guaranteeing citizens basic economic needs</b>			
Essential	78,2	78,5	84,0
Important/not essential	19,9	19,2	11,9
Not very important	1,6	1,8	3,5
Completely unimportant	0,3	0,4	0,6
<b>Economic prosperity of country</b>			
Essential	86,8	87,6	89,6
Important/not essential	12,8	11,8	8,9
Not very important	0,3	0,4	0,9
Completely unimportant	0,1	0,1	0,5

**Table 48 Confidence in Institutions and Organizations**

	<b>Serb</b>	<b>Croat</b>	<b>Muslim</b>
<b>Local authorities</b>			
Much	9,9	8,9	30,1
Average	48,5	54,1	49,5
Little/no	41,6	37,0	20,4
<b>Police</b>			
Much	16,1	13,9	37,2
Average	57,4	58,6	48,1
Little/no	26,6	27,5	14,7
<b>Media</b>			
Much	8,6	5,6	17,9
Average	54,0	43,5	52,8
Little/no	37,4	50,8	29,3
<b>Courts</b>			
Much	13,9	12,2	40,0
Average	62,3	59,5	49,9
Little/no	23,8	28,3	10,0
<b>Armed Forces</b>			
Much	54,6	50,2	86,8
Average	34,2	41,1	11,7
Little/no	11,2	8,7	1,5
<b>Islamic Community</b>			
Much	0,3	0,6	39,2
Average	0,8	3,2	37,4
Little/no	99,0	96,2	23,4
<b>Catholic Church</b>			
Much	0,6	59,2	6,5
Average	1,8	28,6	19,0
Little/no	97,6	12,2	74,5
<b>Orthodox church</b>			
Much	31,5	0,5	0,7
Average	49,1	3,1	4,2
Little/no	19,5	96,4	95,1
<b>SDA</b>			
Much	0,2	0,7	39,1
Average	0,5	2,4	36,0
Little/no	99,3	96,8	24,9
<b>HDZ</b>			
Much	0,2	38,6	1,0
Average	0,7	42,3	10,3
Little/no	99,1	19,2	88,7
<b>SDS</b>			
Much	16,2	0,4	0,4
Average	40,9	1,8	1,9
Little/no	42,9	97,8	97,7

**Table 49 Religious Observance and Confidence in Institutions: Orthodox**

Religious Affiliation	Religious observance			
	Every week	Every month	Several times a year	Seldom/never
Orthodox	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %
<b>Islamic Community</b>				
Much			0,2	
Average		0,8	0,2	0,5
Little/no	100,0	99,2	99,6	99,5
<b>Catholic Church</b>				
Much	1,9	0,8	0,7	
Average	1,9		1,7	1,4
Little/no	96,2	99,2	97,6	98,6
<b>Orthodox church</b>				
Much	64,5	39,4	31,9	22,4
Average	30,8	48,8	57,8	48,0
Little/no	4,7	11,8	10,3	29,6
<b>SDA</b>				
Much		0,8		
Average			0,2	0,3
Little/no	100,0	99,2	99,8	99,7
<b>HDZ</b>				
Much	1,9			
Average			0,4	0,3
Little/no	98,1	100,0	99,6	99,7
<b>SDS</b>				
Much	48,6	24,6	14,7	9,2
Average	38,1	42,1	45,5	39,9
Little/no	13,3	33,3	39,9	50,9

**Table 50 Religious Observance and Confidence in Institutions: Muslims**

<b>Religious Affili-</b>	<b>Every week</b>	<b>Every Month</b>	<b>Several tms a year</b>	<b>Seldom/never</b>
<b>Islamic</b>				
<b>Islamic Community</b>				
Much	65,8	38,5	37,6	21,1
Average	28,7	48,7	41,1	41,8
Little/no	5,5	12,8	21,3	37,2
<b>Catholic Church</b>				
Much	6,1		13,3	5,8
Average	15,4	19,7	28,1	17,8
Little/no	78,5	80,3	58,7	76,4
<b>Orthodox church</b>				
Much	0,4	1,3	1,0	0,8
Average	3,0	6,7	4,5	5,4
Little/no	96,5	92,0	94,5	93,8
<b>SDA</b>				
Much	68,1	37,7	33,5	22,7
Average	26,1	49,4	45,0	38,5
Little/no	5,9	13,0	21,5	38,8
<b>HDZ</b>				
Much	1,3			0,8
Average	7,4	5,4	16,2	12,0
Little/no	91,3	94,6	83,8	87,3
<b>SDS</b>				
Much	0,4	1,3		0,4
Average	0,4		3,0	3,4
Little/no	99,2	98,7	97,0	96,2

**Table 51 Religious Observance and Confidence in Institutions: Catholics**

Religion	Every Week	Every Month	Several tms year	Seldom /Never
<b>Catholic</b>				
<b>Islamic Community</b>				
Much	0,2	0,5	1,1	1,4
Average	2,1	1,8	5,5	8,2
Little/no	97,7	97,7	93,4	90,4
<b>Catholic Church</b>				
Much	72,7	62,7	46,2	20,5
Average	21,6	33,2	41,9	27,4
Little/no	5,7	4,1	11,8	52,1
<b>Orthodox church</b>				
Much		0,5	1,6	1,4
Average	2,1	4,1	4,4	5,5
Little/no	97,9	95,4	94,0	93,2
<b>SDA</b>				
Much	0,5	1,4		
Average	2,1	1,8	2,2	5,5
Little/no	97,4	96,8	97,8	94,5
<b>HDZ</b>				
Much	45,5	40,5	32,8	15,1
Average	42,8	47,3	46,8	24,7
Little/no	11,7	12,3	20,4	60,3
<b>SDS</b>				
Much	0,2	0,5	0,5	1,4
Average	1,4	1,8	2,7	5,4
Little/no	98,4	97,7	96,8	93,2

## **Nationalism**

In social science literature the concept of nationalism is used in at least two different meanings. In history and much of political science it usually refers to an ideology, the goal of which it is to establish a national state. In parts of sociology and especially in social psychology nationalism is often understood as a set of attitudes which might be labelled ethnocentrism or chauvinism and are related to an authoritarian world-view (or personality, as the case may be).

Although these two meanings are conceptually distinct, and it is perfectly possible to conceive of a nationalism (i.e. the wish that ethnic and political boundaries should coincide) which is not chauvinist, in practice they are often correlated.

In our investigation the ideological meaning of the concept is illustrated by different views on the Bosnian state, related to various national programs: the establishment of a unitary Bosnia, the partition of Bosnia and the incorporation of its parts in Serb or Croat national states.

We also put the question whether every nation should have its own state. A large majority of Croat and Serb respondents strongly support this idea, whereas the Muslims strongly disagree. To some this might seem puzzling, to others not. If the question is understood in the Bosnian context, where the principle of nationalism will lead to a partition of the country, the response makes sense. However, as we have seen, in other contexts, such as the political structure of the Bosnian state, the name of the language, or minority rights, the Muslims express what is de facto the idea of a nation-state.

The question arises to what extent nationalism in the second meaning is represented in our data. Besides the scales on social distance already discussed, there were also a set of items intended to measure an ethnocentric-authoritarian complex.

After factor analysis the following scales were defined:

### **Ethnocentrism**

The most important thing children should learn at school is to love their nation.

One should always be on one's guard and careful towards members of another people, even if they are our friends.

Patriotism should be the main criteria when choosing people to leading functions.

A nation which forgets its past is like a man without a soul

### **Authoritarianism**

We should be grateful to the leaders who tell us what to do and how to do it.

My nation is not perfect, but it has a superior cultural tradition compared to others.

Marriages between different nationalities are in principle a bad idea.

Several years of hard hand and discipline will be necessary to rebuild our country.

One should stop journalists who attack political institutions elected by the people.

### **Patriarchalism**

Obedience and respect of authority are the most important virtues children must learn.

A brother is responsible for the honour of his sister.

One should always listen to the advice of elder people

An individual's primary loyalty is towards his family and kin

It should be added that these and other variables will be analysed further with multivariate methods, for which there was no time in this report. However, there are relationships worth mentioning.

It turns out that there are associations between on the one hand the summary variables of ethnocentrism, authoritarianism and patriarchalism, and on the other certain political attitudes and values. In short, a high degree of ethnocentrism, and in particular authoritarianism, is associated with

- a) confidence in Izetbegović, Karadžić and Tuđman
- b) confidence in SDA, SDS and HDZ
- c) electoral support of HDZ, SDA and SDS
- d) confidence in the Islamic Community, Catholic Church and Orthodox Church
- e) high religiosity - i.e. weekly participation in religious rituals.

This pattern is not unexpected. It corresponds to findings from investigations in Croatia and Serbia, where the ruling parties in general are supported by lower social groups exhibiting these profiles to a larger extent than other social groups.

It should also be noted that social distance variables are related to this nationalist syndrome.

**Table 52 Party Sympathies and Authoritarianism**

<b>Authoritarianism</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Medium</b>	<b>High</b>
	Col %	Col %	Col %
<b>Serbs</b>			
SDS	28,0	69,5	89,8
SPRS	52,0	2,6	1,7
ZL	0,9		
Other	12,2	15,3	3,4
SRS	7	12,6	5,1
<b>Croats</b>			
HDZ	80,2	96,6	96,7
HSP	3,6	2	3,3
ZL	12,3	1,5	
Other	4		
<b>Muslims</b>			
SDA	50,2	79,8	74
SBiH	34,6	17,8	26
ZL	10,3	1,6	
Other	4,8	0,8	

**Table 53 Party Sympathies and Ethnocentrism**

<b>Ethnocentrism</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Medium</b>	<b>High</b>
	Col %	Col %	Col %
<b>Serbs</b>			
SDS	35,7	43,8	58,1
SPRS	41,9	29,1	29,1
ZL	0,7	1	0,3
Other	15,4	16	4,5
SRS	6,3	10,1	8
<b>Croats</b>			
HDZ	77,2	87,7	91,1
HSP	1,6	3,6	5,2
ZL	15,4	6,3	3,1
Other	5,7	2,4	0,5
<b>Muslims</b>			
SDA	38,0	70,1	70,4
SBiH	42,4	20,8	28,9
ZL	14,4	5,5	0,7
Other	5,2	3,6	

**Table 54 Ethnocentrism/Authoritarianism and Views on Politicians: Muslims and Croats**

	<b>Very positive</b>	<b>Mainly positive</b>	<b>Mainly nega-</b>	<b>Very negative</b>
	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %
<b>Muslim Opinion of Silajdžić</b>				
<i>Ethnocentrism</i>				
Low	34,9	45,1	43,3	52,9
Medium	42,9	31,6	30,0	35,3
High	22,2	23,3	26,7	11,8
<i>Authoritarianism</i>				
Low	71,2	70,4	56,7	72,2
Medium	18,8	19,9	30,0	27,8
High	10,0	9,7	13,3	
<b>Muslim Opinion of Izetbegović</b>				
<i>Ethnocentrism</i>				
Low	27,9	54,4	75,8	65,2
Medium	42,7	36,7	21,2	26,1
High	29,4	8,9	3,0	8,7
<i>Authoritarianism</i>				
Low	61,4	86,9	93,3	92,0
Medium	24,3	12,3	6,7	4,0
High	14,3	0,8		4,0
<b>Croat Opinion of Tudman</b>				
<i>Ethnocentrism</i>				
Low	26,1	43,4	85,2	57,1
Medium	43,9	43,4	14,8	31,4
High	30,0	13,3		11,4
<i>Authoritarianism</i>				
Low	59,9	81,5	100,0	90,9
Medium	31,2	14,6		9,1
High	8,9	3,9		

Table 55 Ethnocentrism/Authoritarianism and Views on Politicians: Serbs

Ethnocentrism/Authoritarianism and Views of Politicians. Serbs				
	Very positive	Mainly	Mainly	Very negative
<b>Serb Opinion of Karadžić</b>				
<i>Ethnocentrism</i>				
Low	19,3	31,8	42,3	54,2
Medium	34,9	40,1	29,8	26,4
High	45,8	28,1	27,9	19,4
<i>Authoritarianism</i>				
Low	32,5	75,9	98,2	82,8
Medium	39,6	16,6	1,2	9,4
High	27,9	7,5	0,6	7,8
<b>Serb Opinion of Milošević</b>				
<i>Ethnocentrism</i>				
Low	39,5	30,5	28,5	22,0
Medium	27,9	37,0	38,0	40,7
High	32,6	32,6	33,5	37,4
<i>Authoritarianism</i>				
Low	82,2	59,2	61,1	61,4
Medium	10,9	27,5	21,2	19,3
High	6,9	13,3	17,7	19,3

**Table 56 Ethnocentrism and Confidence in Religious Institutions and Political Parties**

<b>Ethnocentrism and Confidence in Religious Institutions and Political Parties</b>			
	<b>Ethnocentrism</b>		
	<b>Low</b>	<b>Medium</b>	<b>High</b>
	Col %	Col %	Col %
<b>SERBS</b>			
<i>Orthodox Church</i>			
Much	12,3	30,9	50,9
Average	49,2	55,9	42,4
Little/no	38,5	13,3	6,7
<b>SDS</b>			
Much	4,0	16,4	28,0
Average	37,3	45,2	40,7
Little/no	58,8	38,4	31,3
<b>CROATs</b>			
<i>Catholic Church</i>			
Much	46,2	59,2	78,3
Average	32,3	32,2	16,6
Little/no	21,5	8,6	5,1
<b>HDZ</b>			
Much	25,4	41,5	54,2
Average	44,4	43,0	35,6
Little/no	30,2	15,4	10,2
<b>MUSLIMS</b>			
<i>Islamic Community</i>			
Much	30,2	44,3	34,8
Average	35,8	36,9	49,5
Little/no	34,0	18,9	15,7
<b>SDA</b>			
Much	25,2	47,1	38,4
Average	35,8	33,0	47,5
Little/no	39,1	19,8	14,1

**Table 57 Authoritarianism and Confidence in Religious Institutions and Political Parties**

<b>Authoritarianism and Confidence in Religious Institutions and Political Parties</b>			
	<b>Authoritarianism</b>		
	<b>Low</b>	<b>Medium</b>	<b>High</b>
	Col %	Col %	Col %
<b>SERBS</b>			
<i>Orthodox Church</i>			
Much	19,4	54,9	66,4
Average	56,4	37,7	25,2
Little/no	24,2	7,4	8,4
<b>SDS</b>			
Much	4,9	29,8	57,6
Average	35,6	59,5	37,1
Little/no	59,5	10,7	5,3
<b>CROATS</b>			
<i>Catholic Church</i>			
Much	53,9	65,2	92,2
Average	30,1	30,9	7,8
Little/no	16,1	3,9	
<b>HDZ</b>			
Much	31,6	49,1	70,3
Average	43,9	43,9	23,4
Little/no	24,5	7,0	6,3
<b>MUSLIMS</b>			
<i>Islamic Community</i>			
Much	32,8	42,7	47,7
Average	36,8	40,4	47,7
Little/no	30,4	17,0	4,7
<b>SDA</b>			
Much	31,6	47,6	50,0
Average	34,6	38,7	48,8
Little/no	33,8	13,7	1,2

**Table 58 Ethnocentrism and the Character of the Bosnian State**

<b>Ethnocentrism and the Character of the Bosnian State</b>			
	<b>Ethnocentrism</b>		
	<b>Low</b>	<b>Medium</b>	<b>High</b>
	Col %	Col %	Col %
<b>SERBS</b>			
<i>Political Organization of Bosnia</i>			
Central government	1,4	1,6	0,3
Regional autonomy	2,5	0,5	
Two entities	7,6	8,7	2,1
Three entities	9,3	8,1	4,5
Partitioned	79,0	81,1	93,1
<i>Republika Srpska/part of Serbia</i>			
Agree	95,7	97,2	99,4
Disagree	4,3	2,8	0,6
<i>Herceg Bosna/part of Croatia</i>			
Agree	95,4	97,0	99,4
Disagree	4,6	3,0	0,6
<b>CROATS</b>			
<i>Political Organization of Bosnia</i>			
Central government	2,9	2,6	1,4
Regional autonomy	6,1	2,1	2,4
Two entities	9,7	6,2	4,3
Three entities	42,9	37,3	19,4
Partitioned	38,4	51,9	72,5
<i>Republika Srpska/part of Serbia</i>			
Agree	48,1	53,3	58,3
Disagree	51,9	46,7	41,7
<i>Herceg Bosna/part of Croatia</i>			
Agree	69,7	84,5	86,8
Disagree	30,3	15,5	13,2
<b>MUSLIMS</b>			
<i>Political Organization of Bosnia</i>			
Central government	54,4	68,6	86,7
Regional autonomy	29,5	14,0	4,1
Two entities	13,1	11,9	6,2
Three entities	2,0	4,9	2,6
Partitioned	1,0	0,6	0,5
<i>Republika Srpska/part of Serbia</i>			
Agree	2,4	0,6	3,0
Disagree	97,6	99,4	97,0
<i>Herceg Bosna/part of Croatia</i>			
Agree	3,3	1,2	1,5
Disagree	96,7	98,9	98,5

**Table 59 Authoritarianism and Views and the Character of the Bosnian State: Serbs**

Authoritarianism	Low	Medium	High
<b>Serbs</b>	Col %	Col %	Col %
<i>Political Organization of Bosnia</i>			
Central government	1,3	0,5	1,6
Regional autonomy	1,1	0,5	0,8
Two entities	6,1	5,9	10,1
Three entities	8,7	4,4	1,6
Partitioned	82,7	88,7	86,0
<i>Republika Srpska/part of Serbia</i>			
Agree	97,0	98,5	99,2
Disagree	3,0	1,5	0,8
<i>Herceg Bosna/part of Croatia</i>			
Agree	96,7	98,4	99,1
Disagree	3,2	1,6	0,9

**Table 60 Authoritarianism and the Character of the Bosnian State: Croats**

Authoritarianism	Low	Medium	High
<b>Croats</b>	Col %	Col %	Col %
<i>Political Organization of Bosnia</i>			
Central government	2,4	2,2	1,8
Regional autonomy	4,4	2,2	
Two entities	6,8	3,5	14,3
Three entities	41,1	24,3	19,6
Partitioned	45,2	67,7	64,3
<i>Republika Srpska/part of Serbia</i>			
Agree	48,0	61,9	67,7
Disagree	52,0	38,1	32,3
<i>Herceg Bosna/part of Croatia</i>			
Agree	77,1	86,8	87,3
Disagree	22,9	13,2	12,7

**Table 61 Authoritarianism and the Character of the Bosnian State: Muslims**

Authoritarianism	Low	Medium	High
Muslims	Col %	Col %	Col %
<i>Political Organization of Bosnia</i>			
Central government	61,9	78,5	94,1
Regional autonomy	22,9	5,1	
Two entities	11,7	10,8	4,7
Three entities	3,0	3,8	1,2
Partitioned	0,5	1,9	
<i>Republika Srpska/part of Serbia</i>			
Agree	1,8	3,0	1,2
Disagree	98,2	97,0	98,8
<i>Herceg Bosna/part of Croatia</i>			
Agree	2,4	1,8	1,2
Disagree	97,6	98,2	98,8

## Concluding Remarks

### *Elections*

It is obvious that a great majority of Croats, Muslims and Serbs do want the elections to be held in September, and intend to vote, which is, in effect, contrary to frequent statements by Bosnian politicians.

They are sceptical, though, about the fairness of the forthcoming elections. A substantial number of the respondents expect procedural manipulations, a dishonest campaign, and partial media.

### *Media*

Media exposure is selective in several ways. In the first place, it is evident that there is no newspaper or TV-channel which is accessible in all areas of Bosnia, or which might be perceived as supra-ethnic. The results clearly illustrate that members of different groups read "their" papers and watch "their" TV-station.

Second, newspapers play an insignificant role. Only 19 percent of the Croats, 16 percent of the Serbs, and 10 percent of the Muslims regularly read a daily newspaper. TV is, therefore, the major, and very often the only, source of information for two thirds of the respondents.

Third, the media people encounter, especially TV, are closely affiliated with the ruling parties. Very few have access to independent news media.

### ***Party Structure***

At international conferences, as well as in policy documents of international bodies, it has often been stated that it would be desirable to promote political structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina that are not organized along ethnic lines. Obviously, this is not yet the case. On the one hand, the dominant political parties have a clear ethnic orientation, acting as the genuine representatives of vital national interests. On the other hand, opposition parties, as well, are mostly ethnically oriented and/or territorially concentrated.

Our data clearly show that in the Croat-dominated areas, there exists, for every practical purpose, a one-party system (HDZ), while among the Muslims the situation is somewhat more complex, though similar. Besides the major party (SDA) and a relatively small opposition (socialists, liberals), there is the new Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, in view of the political preferences of the respondents, might cooperate with either block. In the Serb areas two one-party alternatives, as it were, are competing for power.

The United List of Bosnian opposition parties, including HSS, is the only multi-ethnic political organization so far. Its chances in the forthcoming elections do not seem overly great, however

In this context the question arises whether the elections are premature. On one level it seems obvious, and this is confirmed by our survey as well, that important provisions of the Dayton Accord, regarded as prerequisites of free and fair elections, are simply not at hand. Moreover, if the goal was to promote a political structure, which would replace the existing ethnically oriented political parties, the time was too short. The current political organizations, the character of media, in addition to the level of social distance and degree of ethnic mobilization would rather tend to fortify existing political structures.

### ***Political Values***

In Western Europe, it has, at least implicitly, been taken for granted that there is a need for "teaching the Bosnians democracy". Do they need this education? If we look at the support for general democratic values, this does not seem to be the case, as a vast majority of the respondents are in favor of key elements of political democracy. However, at the same time, a large part of those who participated in the survey, exhibit values which reveal that the situation is not normal: Lack of confidence in public institutions, general distrust, social distance between ethnic groups, and belief in a strong leader. Above all, there is a very high degree of "ethnification" of politics.

This means that the problem of Bosnia is perhaps not so much a matter of informing people about the workings of a democratic system, but in making them believe that such a

system might really work, both in general terms, and, particularly, regarding the ethnic dimension.

### ***The Peace Process***

We have seen that a large part of the respondents believe that the Dayton Agreement finally might bring peace. However, as far as details are concerned, it is quite clear that the views of many respondents are contrary to the Peace Accord.

Most Serbs and Croats obviously do not expect the refugees to return, and neither do they think it would be a proper solution. Further, most Serbs and Croats are of the opinion that people should vote in the place where they live now, not where they lived in 1990. Also, and most important, they really do not believe in a unified Bosnia and Herzegovina. Almost all Serbs want that Republika Srpska should be a part of Serbia, and a large majority of the Croats would prefer a unification of Herceg-Bosna with Croatia, or a three-entity solution.

This also means that the weakest point of the Dayton Accord, which, strictly speaking, is not even part of the Agreement, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is not legitimate in the eyes of one of its constituent nations.

The Muslims at first seem to be closer to the general principles of the agreement. They want the refugees to return, and to a great extent believe they will. Similarly, on the issue of voters' registration their views largely conform to the general provisions of the Accord. They are also more positive towards the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague.

In general, the Muslims also express a stronger attachment to Bosnia, and have a more positive view of pre-war Bosnia. In contrast to the Croats and Serbs, they seem to want a restoration of the Bosnian state.

On the other hand, coexistent with the rhetoric of multiculturalism, there are views among the Muslims which differ substantially from both the content and spirit of the Peace Accord. In fact, only a minority subscribe to a political solution which corresponds to the Dayton Agreement, i.e. a federal/confederate structure with two entities. Instead, most of the Muslims are in favor of a rather strong central government, and it is indicative that only a minority is prepared to accept regional autonomy within the framework of a centralized state. The same is true of cultural-linguistic rights. A substantial number of Muslims actually seem to regard Bosnia as a Bosniak national state, where the Muslims, although they do not form a majority of the population would be the dominant state nation.

### ***Ethnic Relations and Cultural Identity***

This is the crux of the matter. Our survey illustrates that an important aspect of the conflict in Bosnia, regardless of the origins or the character of the war, has to do with the complex and ambiguous process of nation-building among the South Slavs, a fact that is often overlooked in the outside world. In this respect, what happened during the dissolution of Yugo-

slavia was the final (?) stage in a process of national consolidation and state formation in the Balkans, which started in the 19th century.

The unfortunate fate of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina is, that, for various reasons, there never developed a common Bosnian identity. To make the situation more complicated, neither of the three major ethnic groups constitutes a majority of the population.

Our data undoubtedly reveal that there is, at present, no common identity which would be more important than ethnic affiliation. This is valid even for the Muslims. Moreover, the degree of tolerance among the ethnic groups, a precondition for a life together, is not on a satisfactory level. There is a clear ethnic polarization and a fundamental lack of trust. Even though the Muslims show a higher degree of tolerance, their dominant views on the character of the Bosnian state are unacceptable to most Croats and Serbs.

A very interesting aspect is the comparatively small influence of demographic factors on people's values and attitudes. Age, profession, rural/urban background, or even education, have less explanatory value than is usually the case. Most surprising, perhaps, is that direct involvement in the war seems to have little effect. A person who has been fighting as a soldier, wounded, or lost close relatives, differ less than might be expected, or not at all, from others in his views on the peoples of Bosnia, or the future of the country. Apparently, in this kind of war, almost everyone seems to be equally affected.

The findings thus emphasize that the investigation was carried out in an extraordinary situation where society as a whole is ethnically mobilized. Of importance is the high salience of stereotypes, symbols, and certain key-phrases that immediately convey an ethnically saturated message.

For example, the respondents have strikingly negative attitudes of major politicians, leading parties, and, especially, religious institutions of the adversary. Regardless of education, political outlook, and even dimensions like ethnocentrism and authoritarianism, Muslims and Croats have very unfavourable views of the Orthodox Church, Serbs and Croats of the Islamic Community, and Serbs and Muslims of the Catholic Church. The same institutions are, within each group, benevolently estimated as national symbols, even by irreligious people.

This, incidentally, shows the extremely important role of religion as an ethnic marker in the Bosnian context. It is more difficult to draw any definite conclusions about a possible causal nature of the association between religion and nationalism which we have also found.

Another aspect of the mobilization syndrome is the tendency to view one's own ethnic group as largely innocent, both during the present conflict and earlier. Others are aggressors, one's own people is the main victim, who, throughout history, has only conducted defensive wars, and always suffered more than others. The only common view is the distrust of the outside world.

It is also symptomatic that widely held stereotypical images of social reality are coexisting with political preferences that contradict them.

However, these tendencies also work in the opposite direction. That is, certain political goals and solutions are so widespread that, regardless of nationalist orientations, they are salient for almost everyone. Obvious examples are the idea of a unified Bosnia, or the wish that Republika Srpska should become part of Serbia, and Herceg Bosnia be united with Croatia. This is important, since very often the mere fact that people think in these directions has been interpreted as a sign of unreasonable nationalism. Our results, however, convincingly show that even those who are not ethnocentric, or authoritarian share these views.

### *The Future*

What are the prospects then, of a normalization of inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina? It has already been pointed out<sup>2</sup> that the present investigation was made in an extraordinary situation, and that the degree of social distance which does exist today is not necessarily a lasting feature of Bosnian society.

Moreover, the investigation has also shown that attitudes and values are influenced by social interaction. Those who have closer relations with members of other ethnic groups, both on a collective-anonymous and personal-intimate level, do manifest a higher degree of tolerance and a greater acceptance of a minimum level of coexistence.

Whether such dispositions will play a significant role or not, depends on the evolution of a functioning political and legal infrastructure, and on the development of social and economic relations which might neutralize the ethnic factor. At present the parties themselves cannot achieve this. As we have seen, the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite dissatisfaction, wish the international involvement to continue, and those respondents who propose a protectorate as the only solution may, after all, be right. Such a project is, of course, unrealistic, but the results of the investigation show that it would be unwise to overlook widely held - and deeply conflicting views - of Bosnian reality, in favor of equally unrealistic solutions which might lead to new conflicts.

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<sup>2</sup> See the report by Bulat, Magnusson & Štrelov on the survey in the Federation.