

# Aid and reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina: a sociological survey of life conditions and attitudes

By Kjell Magnusson

## Introduction

In the summer of 2004 a sociological survey was undertaken among recipients of Swedish assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The aim was to collect basic demographic and socio-economic data on households included in Sida's Integrated Area Programme, and to study certain aspects related to the goals of the programme. How did the beneficiaries view the aid programme, its purpose and implementation? What are the effects of the programme, defined as self-reported social and economic conditions? What were the attitudes towards issues of relevance for the reconstruction of Bosnian society?

The empirical investigation was carried out by the public opinion research agency PULS, with offices in Sarajevo, Split, and Zagreb, in cooperation with the Centre for Multiethnic Research of Uppsala University. After discussions in April 2004 at the Zagreb head office between Dragan Bagić, Research Director of PULS, Joakim Molander, Evaluation Officer, Sida, and Kjell Magnusson, Senior Research Fellow, Uppsala University, a model that would suit the needs of the evaluation process was agreed upon.

The survey comprised a sample of 2000 respondents, i.e. heads of households which had received assistance in the reconstruction of their homes by organisations working for Sida. The sampling frame was developed on the basis of lists of beneficiaries (approximately 11 000 households) sent by Sida to PULS, which constructed a database of beneficiaries and aid organisations. Taking into account organisational affiliation, settlements and households were chosen at random. Since the two sexes were to be equally represented, wives of male heads of households were also included in the survey.

In addition, there was a control sample of 1000 respondents, chosen randomly according to *area* (canton) and *size* of settlement, in order to match the

target sample.<sup>134</sup> The control group had not benefited from Sida's programme, but might include households that received aid from other donors.

When interpreting the results, it is important to bear in mind that the sample is not representative of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole, but only of those who received aid from Sida. When, for example, data are presented according to ethnic affiliation, they refer to Bosniaks, Croats or Serbs who were part of the programme, or belonged to the control sample.

The questionnaire consisted of 72 questions, or 98 variables. It was based on a list of questions and issues prepared by Joakim Molander, to match the goals of the evaluation, and was further developed by Kjell Magnusson. A preliminary version in English was discussed by experts and staff at Sida's headquarters in Stockholm, as well as by representatives of aid organisations and Sida personnel in Sarajevo. PULS translated the questionnaire into Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian, after which it was checked and re-translated into English by Kjell Magnusson. The final version was agreed by Dragan Bagić and Kjell Magnusson, after consultations with Joakim Molander. Interviews were made during three weeks at the end of June and beginning of July by trained interviewers belonging to the field organisation of PULS. Data were analysed in July, and further analyses took place in September/October 2004. A comprehensive report is published separately.<sup>135</sup>

## Overview of results

### Households

The average number of people living in the households which were granted aid is 3,3, compared to 3,2 in the control sample. The most common types of households, accounting for 60 percent, are those with two (25,2%), four (20,5%) or three (16,9%) members. In terms of family structure, most frequent are households with husband, wife (or unmarried partners) and their children (34%), followed by those made up of a married or unmarried couple (20,9%). Thirteen percent of the households consist of only one person, while in 11 percent the respondent is living with someone else (not parents or children). Since the mean age of heads of households is above 50, there are few three-generation households, about 5 percent, and even fewer made up of a couple and elderly parents. Altogether, in more than half of the households, the respondent lives with his/her children.

It should be emphasised that differences between the target and control samples are very small, practically non-existent. This is further illustrated when

<sup>134</sup> Due to the lack of population records, households were selected by the *random starting points* and *random walk methods*. For more details, see the report referred to in note 2.

<sup>135</sup> Dragan Bagić & Dejan Dedić: *The Impact of Aid. A Sociological Survey of Life Conditions and Attitudes towards Reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Puls/Sida 2005. Annex 3 contains tables of results.

comparing heads of households in the two samples according to age and education. The average age in the target sample is 55,6, and in the control sample 52,6, due to a somewhat larger percentage of respondents between 15–29 and 30–44. The predominant level of education is in both cases elementary school, while the proportion of completed secondary school is a little higher in the control sample.

Most of the houses/flats reconstructed as part of the aid programme are inhabited. There are certain differences according to organisation, which seems to be a result of the fact that houses built in rural areas are more often used by the original owners. Between 5 and 17 percent of the houses are not inhabited but regularly visited by their owners. Only a small number of houses are abandoned or occupied by others.

### Refugee Status and Return

During the war most respondents had lived as displaced persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina: about 71 percent of the target group, and 52 percent in the control sample. Twenty-one percent (24% in the control group) had been refugees outside Bosnia, while 8 percent (23% in the control group) did not leave their homes during the war. In other words, the percentage of refugees and displaced persons was higher among the beneficiaries of assistance from Sida than among people in general.

Of those who were refugees in other countries the largest group had stayed in Croatia. There were, however, typical differences according to ethnic affiliation, i.e. Croats found refuge in Croatia, Serbs in Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosniaks in Croatia or Macedonia.

An important issue for the evaluation team was the reason for return. It seems that 40 percent returned when they did because they were obliged to leave their temporary homes in accordance with the principles of the Dayton Accords. There is no real difference between target and control groups in this respect. Although the immediate decision to return was beyond the control of the respondents, who were, moreover, given help to rebuild their homes, most people claim they would have returned even if they had not received economic assistance. Still, as much as one fourth of the people in the target group said they would not, and one fifth claimed they would definitely or probably have gone to some other place given the opportunity. Nevertheless, a clear majority preferred to return to their own village. Since there were more refugees and displaced persons in the target sample, it seems that Sida played an important role in helping these people to return to their place of origin.

## Aid and attitudes towards aid

While the target sample by definition consisted of beneficiaries, it is noteworthy that only 17 percent in the control sample received assistance to rebuild their home, which indicates that Sida was the major international provider of aid in the region. The data suggest that resources were primarily concentrated on reconstruction of houses and infrastructure. A comparatively small number of people had received additional *agricultural aid*: 20 percent in the target group and ten percent in the control group. As for *micro-credits*, only 1 or 2 percent had received this kind of aid. These figures are somewhat misleading, though, since the programme included urban areas. When focusing on villages, a slightly different picture emerges: 30 percent received agricultural aid, but the variation between organisations is considerable, from 3 percent to 50 percent. However, the general picture remains, most say they have not received this kind of aid.

Those responsible for implementing the programme claim that everyone, whose house was rebuilt, did, in fact, receive a starting package of agricultural aid worth up to 2000 KM<sup>136</sup>. This indicates a basic misunderstanding between donors and beneficiaries: most beneficiaries obviously did not understand the ‘package’ given after they had moved in as ‘agricultural aid’. The label might be misleading since Sida has also been engaged in agricultural aid proper on a more long-term basis.

This leads to the interesting issue of communication, and how people were *informed* about the possibility of receiving aid. Perhaps not unexpectedly, the most common channel was through friends and acquaintances, more than 40 percent, followed by the authorities (27%) and organisations (23%). However, people in rural areas were more dependent on information from authorities or organisations, probably due to a higher degree of isolation. Almost one third in the control group claim they were not informed at all, and the question arises whether some of these people might have been potential beneficiaries.

Another topic which the evaluation wanted to clarify was whether people had understood the principles behind the aid programme. It turns out that about 60 percent fully or partly understands these principles, but that almost 40 percent do not, which seems a rather high proportion. In this case education plays a role. Those with secondary or higher education have a greater understanding than those with elementary school or lower, which also means that villagers are less well informed than townspeople.

What are their views on aid? Do people think it has been fair and appropriate? Several items were used to assess these aspects. On the direct question *if the distribution of aid has been fair*, 26 percent said yes, 32 percent said no, while about 40 percent said that aid distribution was sometimes fair, sometimes not.

---

<sup>136</sup> The Bosnian KM, *konvertibilna marka*, or *convertible mark* is equivalent to the DEM.

When asked in a slightly different manner *if those who needed help received it*, the answers are similar. More than a third replied positively, less than a fourth negatively, and about 40 percent gave an intermediate answer. Another way of asking was *if those who received help really needed it*. Forty percent of the respondents in the target sample thought yes. Seventeen percent felt that aid was on the whole unfair, i.e. only few of the beneficiaries needed help. In the control group twice as many of the respondents maintain this view. In general, those who benefited from aid were less critical.

It is symptomatic that when asked *how people in general* view the aid programmes, the percentage of positive replies is lower. That is, the respondents themselves have a more positive attitude towards aid than they believe other people have. The issue of whether *aid has been appropriate* prompted a similar answer. While almost half in the target sample do think it has been at least partly appropriate, about 17 percent think it has not been, and more than one third answer with some sort of reservation. In comparison, the number of people who think that aid has not been well organised is slightly larger, 24 percent, while 32 percent feels it was well or very well organised. Further, less than 40 percent feel they got the support they needed by those responsible.

Finally, it is clear that people have *not* embraced the fundamental idea of Sida's policy that the beneficiaries themselves should rebuild their destroyed houses. Only ten percent were in favour of this solution, while 50 percent would have preferred to move into a house reconstructed by the donors. This result differs from the findings of the anthropological study and the expectations behind the program, but is perhaps not surprising.<sup>137</sup>

Interestingly, only 13 percent would have chosen to receive money. This might at first glance seem strange, but probably reflects a realistic view among the respondents of the opportunities available to them. It is doubtful that the sum of money would have been enough to settle in a town or city – for example – had they preferred such an option.

The results suggest that the respondents are relatively undecided about both the goals of the programme, and the manner in which it has been conducted. They are not overly positive or outright negative, the dominant answer to these questions being a neutral or hesitant alternative. On the other hand, a significant minority among the respondents actually feels that the programme was neither appropriate, nor well organised, and generally unclear in terms of purpose. This view is more pronounced in urban than in rural areas.

The difference between the organisations is, on the whole small, and it is not possible to draw any far-reaching conclusions regarding how methods or behaviour of an individual organisation has affected the outcome. Firstly

---

<sup>137</sup> In the survey, there was, unfortunately, no question concerning the reasons for this view. Neither were the respondents asked about the degree of control of the building process or the design of the house they would have preferred. It might be argued that anyone would choose a ready-made house, other things being equal.

because relevant information is lacking, and secondly because other factors like urban background or education seem to be more important in explaining differences in attitudes and opinions.

We are not familiar with how the programme was carried out in detail, or on a day-to-day basis, and there are, indeed, factors which are not in the control of aid organisations, especially in a situation involving many people and where time is a limited resource. However, there certainly seems to be a gap of understanding between the beneficiaries and the administrators of aid. One conclusion would be that in the future even more care should be taken to communicate with people in ‘their own language’.

## Economic conditions

### Economic situation of the family

The economic situation of the families is generally rather bleak. Only 17 percent of the respondents in the target group are fully or partly employed. In view of the predominantly rural context and the age structure of the households, this is hardly surprising, and it should be noted that the level of unemployment is the same in the control sample. Also, the differences between rural and urban areas are fairly large, as is the difference between men and women. While in the villages 35 percent of men aged 30–44 are employed, the figure is 62 percent for those living in towns. In the villages a majority of women occupy the traditional role of housewives. This means that very few women are entitled to pensions, since the welfare system in socialist Yugoslavia was based on employment in socially-owned enterprises or government institutions. Those living only from agriculture, whether men or women, were in an unfavourable position. As far as age is concerned there is a marked difference in employment between those younger than 54 and older generations, but not among age groups between 18 and 54, which indicates that entry into the labour market is a fundamental problem.<sup>138</sup>

Consequently, family income is rather low. Of the respondents in the target group 17 percent claim they have no income at all, and another 38 percent earn below 200 KM a month. Almost 80 per cent of the households have a monthly income of less than 400 KM, which is very low for Bosnia. If only rural areas are counted, more than 60 percent earn below 200 KM.<sup>139</sup>

---

<sup>138</sup> This is confirmed by macro-level data concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole, see: *Governance and Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Post-Industrial Society and the Authoritarian Temptation*. Part of the Governance Assessment of Bosnia and Herzegovina funded by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development. European Stability Initiative, Berlin & Sarajevo, 2004, p. 24.

<sup>139</sup> According to a recent statistical survey of 3000 households, about 18 percent of the Bosnian population lives below the poverty line, defined as 2200 KM a year per household. See *Dnevni avaz*, 26 May, 2005, p. 10, and *Oslobođenje*, 26 May, 2005, p.2. The report has not yet been published, but three earlier reports of this longitudinal investigation are to be found at the Agency of Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina: <http://www.bhas.ba/index2/index.htm>. Due to the character of the sample, it is to be expected that the percentage of poor is larger in our survey.

Even if there might be a tendency to underestimate one's income, it is logical that very few, less than ten percent of the respondents; describe the economic situation of their family as good or very good and 65 percent as bad or very bad.

The difficult economic situation is further reflected by answers to specific questions on how people cope with the costs of living. More than 25 percent say they can *almost never* afford healthcare. Another 30 percent *sometimes* cannot do so. The proportion of those able to pay local authority bills is larger, but still 27 percent say they sometimes cannot pay and 10 percent almost never. As far as schooling of children is concerned, only 30 percent are able to cover the costs most of the time. However, there are many non-replies, which indicate that the question may be sensitive.<sup>140</sup>

It is, therefore, no surprise that very few are able to save money: in fact, 80 percent cannot do so. Their difficult situation is further illustrated by the fact that only a very small number of people receive economic support from relatives living abroad or elsewhere in Bosnia. Differences between the target and control samples in these respects are negligible. Those who have received aid from Sida are neither better nor worse off than others. For the inhabitants of Bosnian villages life is hard.

### Views on the economic situation in general

The answers are very similar when people are asked about economic conditions in general. Most perceive economic opportunities in the area where they live as bad or very bad. Only six percent says opportunities are good/very good. Similarly, according to the respondents, it is very hard to sell agricultural products.

When asked about the general situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, compared to that of their own area, the dominant answer is that it is about the same (48%); whereas slightly more think it is worse (30%) than better (20%). The differences between cantons are not very great, with the exception that those living in Sarajevo have a more positive outlook.

As for economic trends during recent years people feel they are either the same or worse, 41 percent vs. 37 percent. Only about 20 percent are able to see an improvement. Moreover, people do not expect any immediate change for the better. Most respondents think that economic prospects are bad or very bad (57%) and they do not see a future for young people in the area where they live.

---

<sup>140</sup> Education enjoys high status all over former Yugoslavia, at the same time as a family, according to fundamental norms, is expected to take care of its members, whether they are children or elderly. It should be added that, today, as in socialist Yugoslavia, parents are expected to pay for textbooks, transport, food, and other costs related to schooling.

Two questions concerned ways to improve the situation. One was through micro credits mediated by international organisations, and the other through ordinary bank loans. They were both considered to be very difficult to obtain, and as we have seen, very few utilised micro credits. It is striking that there is no real difference between the two credit systems.

Finally, in spite of the rather gloomy conditions in which they live, and although they do not see a bright future for the young generation, a large majority of the respondents say they would *not* have preferred to live anywhere else, and expect to continue to live where they are. In short, the views on economic conditions are pessimistic, and the attitudes of individuals who received aid from Sida do not differ from those of other people.

### Agricultural cooperation

The degree of cooperation between farmers is modest. This is especially true of sharing agricultural equipment, which seldom (39%) or never (20%) occurs. 23 percent say that neighbours often or very often help each other in agricultural work while 24 percent state there is often or very often cooperation in building infrastructure. The figures for the control sample are similar. At the same time, about 50 percent in both groups state that cooperation to further the interests of farmers is definitely needed.

### Social activities

Around 80–90 percent of the respondents never take part in activities like sports or cultural events, meetings of professional associations or political meetings. There is no difference between the target and control sample.

### Media exposure

TV plays an important role and a majority of the respondents spend several hours every day watching TV programs. There is, however, a difference between Serbs and Croats or Bosniaks in this respect. Markedly fewer Serbs watch TV three hours or more every day, and one fifth never watch. Reading of daily newspapers is far less common, and here Croats are more active than both Serbs and Bosniaks.

### Religion

In the countries of former Yugoslavia participation in religious service is traditionally strong in rural areas, which is confirmed by this survey. There are also typical differences. Muslim Bosniaks and Catholic Croats attend services much more frequently than do Orthodox Serbs. A third of Muslims and Catholics participate weekly, and about half at least once a month. The cor-

responding figures for the Orthodox are 9 and 24 percent. It should be added that religion is related to education, and that the figures are higher for those with elementary school or less.

## Politics

Political interest is comparatively low. For most respondents politics is not or not at all important. In addition, many people are unsure of how they would vote. The general pattern is, as we know from both empirical studies and election results, to vote for a party belonging to one's own ethnic group, and the traditional 'ruling' parties are still popular. In this investigation about 40 percent were unsure or would not vote, while of those declaring party sympathies 54 percent of the Bosniaks would vote for SDA, 51 percent of the Croats for HDZ, and 30 percent of the Serbs for SDS, and another 26 percent for SNDS.

On the whole, these results reflect the reality of life in rural Bosnia and other parts of former Yugoslavia. Institutionalised activities are weak, except for religion. Social life is focused on informal interaction with friends and relatives at home, in the local inn, or in front of the mosque or church. In recent decades television has become an important alternative.

## Ethnic relations

### Sense of security

A primary goal of international policy in post-Dayton Bosnia has been to ensure security and to promote harmonious inter-ethnic relations. The results of this survey indicate that this has been achieved to a considerable extent – at least superficially.

An overwhelming majority feels at home in the place where they live and mostly feel very secure. There are some slight differences: seventy-seven percent of the Bosniaks feel very secure while for Croats and Serbs the percentages are 63 and 64. In the same way a large majority feels they can freely express their religion.

### Inter-ethnic relations

There are distinct differences between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, regarding the degree of inter-ethnic contacts. While a great majority of the Croats and a majority of the Serbs have such contacts often or very often, this is not true of the Bosniaks. About 40 percent of the Bosniaks seldom or very seldom have contacts with members of other groups. A simple reason might be that they constitute a majority in the villages concerned, and thus do not really have an opportunity to interact with others. There are some indications that

this is the case, but education and urban/rural background also play a role.<sup>141</sup>

What is the *character* of interethnic relations? A large majority of the respondents state that they are usually treated in a friendly manner. There is a small difference in that Bosniaks and Serbs tend to perceive their contacts as somewhat less satisfactory. The proportion of those who very often, often, or sometimes, are met with hostility is: Bosniaks 17%, Croats 12%, and Serbs 19%.

When it comes to more intimate relations, such as friendship, there is again a difference between especially Croats and Bosniaks. Almost half of the Bosniaks (45%) claim they have no friend belonging to another ethnic group, compared to 10 percent of the Croats and 16 percent of the Serbs.

These tendencies are reflected by the attitudes towards mixed marriages, where the Bosniaks are more hesitant than others. This should not be a surprise: we know that mixed marriages rates in Bosnia since World War II were below the Yugoslav average. Throughout the period, Bosniaks, like other Muslim groups in Yugoslavia, had a smaller proportion of intermarriage than Serbs and Croats. This is understandable, since, traditionally, Islam does not permit a Muslim to marry a non-Muslim.<sup>142</sup>

There might be other reasons for differences concerning inter-ethnic contact, such as war experience, but we do not have data which might clarify this issue. Most of these people had been driven from their homes and we do not know what other horrors they might have experienced.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the response pattern is the same in the target and control groups. Therefore, although the results are in some respects rather positive, this is probably a function of time and general political developments rather than an outcome of the aid-programme as such. On the other hand, one could argue that the mere fact that Sida and others have actively promoted the return process, might have affected the general climate. Unfortunately, this cannot be measured directly in a survey of this kind.

### Attitudes towards others

Inter-ethnic attitudes also seem to be rather positive. When asked the question: how do you feel about Bosniaks, Croats, or Serbs, with the possible alternatives: I respect them, I have nothing against them, I do not like them, I hate them; an overwhelming majority claim they either respect or have

---

<sup>141</sup> We were able to gather information on the ethnic structure of settlements for only one third of the respondents. Therefore, in annex 3 we have only presented figures concerning Bosniaks. The data show a certain difference in attitudes and behaviour between those living in settlements with a Bosniak, respectively Croat/Serb majority.

<sup>142</sup> For intermarriage in Bosnia and Yugoslavia, see Botev, Nikolai. 1994. "Where East Meets West. Ethnic Intermarriage in the Former Yugoslavia." *American Sociological Review* 59(3, June):461-79.

nothing against members of other groups. Serbs are somewhat more neutral than Croats and Bosniaks.

In general interpersonal relations are characterised by a rather high degree of distrust or lack of confidence. The dominant view among the respondents, regardless of ethnic origin, is that one cannot be too careful in contacts with other people. (Bosniaks, 61%; Croats 70%; Serbs, 58%).

This is reflected in the attitudes towards local politicians and representatives of international organisations too. The degree of confidence in both cases is low or very low, especially among Croats (50–28%, 41–23%), although attitudes towards international representatives are generally less negative than views on Bosnian politicians.

Similarly, the respondents were asked to agree or disagree with two statements, one implying that one can feel secure only in a country where one's own ethnic group constitutes a majority, the other that one should be on guard towards members of another group, even if they are neighbours or friends. A fairly large percentage agrees with both statements, especially among the Bosniaks (46%). This means that although people generally feel secure, and have a positive attitude towards members of other groups, a substantial proportion of the respondents are suspicious, and would prefer not to be a minority.

## The future of Bosnia and Herzegovina

A number of questions were asked concerning the present and future status of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They might be regarded as a measure of the extent to which people are in favour of the Dayton agreement, and to what extent there is a possibility of reconciliation.

In that context *language* is an interesting issue. This survey found that people mostly regarded Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian as the same language, or one language with certain differences. For Bosniaks or Serbs, this is more or less in agreement with other studies. However in investigations covering the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a higher percentage of Croats tend to view Croatian as a totally different language or a different language which might be similar to other languages.

Turning to *reconciliation* or rather, forgiving, only a minority feels that one should forgive *and* forget what happened during the war. Between 45–56 percent, according to ethnic affiliation, are of the opinion that one should forgive but must *not* forget. This is hardly surprising, as only ten years have passed since a brutal and devastating war. Half of the Bosniaks believe one should never forgive what happened, compared to 40 percent of the Croats, and 30 percent of the Serbs.

Views on the *Hague Tribunal* are fairly critical. Almost 60 percent of the Bosniaks, almost half of the Serbs, and almost 40 percent of the Croats think the war crimes tribunal is fair. However, more than half of the Croats, almost half of the Serbs and 40 percent of the Bosniaks do not. We do not know why people think the way they do, but it is clear that the tribunal, which is supposed to play an important role in the process of reconciliation, has a problem of legitimacy.

The respondents could agree or disagree with several statements concerning certain aspects of the political situation and the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Firstly, there is overwhelming agreement that refugees should return to where they had lived before the war. Secondly, among all groups – particularly Bosniaks – people are in favour of a unitary state. Consequently, they do not agree that the Serb or Croat areas in Bosnia should be united with the ‘motherland’. These results might seem unexpected, since in other studies there has been a noticeable difference on questions like this between on the one hand Bosniaks, and on the other hand, Croats and Serbs. There are regional differences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but a substantial percentage of Croats and Serbs do not want to answer these questions, and with a higher response rate the results might have been different.

Thirdly, most people are in favour of a common school system, both in terms of curriculum and integration. They are much less interested in children being taught in their new standard languages (Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian). On the other hand, they would like them to know both alphabets. Perhaps one could say that in this investigation people prefer a solution to the language issue which reminds one of the situations in Bosnia before the war. It was characterised by a high degree of linguistic tolerance, vis-à-vis the two variants of what was then called Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian, and which in Bosnia during the 1980’s was often referred to as *The Bosnian-Herzegovina Standard Language Expression*.

Further, it is interesting to note that there is a fairly high degree of distrust of the international community, with no major differences between the ethnic groups. The respondents felt the international community did not understand conditions in Bosnia, and treated people as backward. Finally, a very large majority believes that the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in spite of what happened, will be able to live in peace in the future. Again, there were no substantial differences between the beneficiaries and the control sample.

## Summary

The material conditions of the respondents are very modest. People are poor, most are unemployed, and often they cannot afford health care or schooling of their children. Furthermore, they do not expect a change for the better in the near future, neither for their families nor in the area where they live, or in Bosnia as a whole.

Their social existence is largely confined to every-day life in their own community, and within their own ethnic group. There is little interaction between ethnic groups and Bosniaks in particular look mainly to their own. Most people report they feel safe, and seldom meet open hostility. Attitudes towards members of other groups are generally positive or neutral.

Their life outside work is to a large extent devoted to the family, TV and religion. Very few are involved in organised leisure-time activities, sports, clubs, or political organisations. Indeed, most people are not interested in politics.

On the whole, peoples' attitudes towards the aid programme are neutral or hesitant. They are not overwhelmingly positive, nor outright negative, but a sizable minority of the respondents feel that aid has not been altogether fair or appropriate. There is also a rather high degree of distrust of both local politicians and international organisations.

As to the future of Bosnia, the answers are largely in accordance with the hopes of the International community, allowing for some difference between Bosniaks and Croats or Serbs on certain issues.

## Discussion

Finally, we will discuss the results from the viewpoint of Sida's own goals and vocabulary. The issues Sida wanted examined were to what extent the aid programme has been characterised by social and economic *relevance*, *impact*, and *sustainability*.<sup>143</sup>

It is not altogether easy to answer these questions. The survey is an account of people's own experience and attitudes which means one has to be cautious when discussing the results in terms of cause and effect on a more general level. Whatever the results of the survey, they cannot by themselves answer the question whether the programme was successful or not. In order to judge the programme as a whole, a comprehensive socio-economic analysis would be needed, based on other types of data, and related to political and economic conditions both on the local level, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole.

Therefore, the reader will bear in mind that these results, as well as the results of the anthropological study, are based on the subjective views of respondents and informants. This does not mean that the data are suspect. There is always a 'measurement error', even when dealing with official statistics, which in the Bosnian case is unfortunately insufficient anyway. We cannot be sure that everyone has given an accurate answer, but the answers can make more or less sense, according to what is otherwise known or logical. Furthermore, there is the long tradition of valid predictions in political opinion re-

---

<sup>143</sup> Annex 1 *Terms of Reference. Evaluation of Impact, Sustainability and Relevance in Integrated Area Programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Sida, UTV 2004-02-16.

search. In our case there is also the possibility of checking against a control sample matching the target sample in terms of demographic and social characteristics. The important point, though, is that the results are based on views and attitudes, not on 'objective' economic figures.

In addition, there are other reasons why the results of the survey are – and have to be – only partial. In particular, our data concern a specific point in time: we do not know how people were living or thinking before, during, or immediately after the war. For example, had the survey been undertaken shortly after the return we would probably have received different answers to some of the pertinent questions. Finally, the reader should be reminded, when reflecting on the results, that those who were interviewed do *not* constitute a random sample of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but rather a representative sample of households benefiting from Sida's aid programme, and a corresponding control group.

In our case the analysis is, nevertheless, based on certain objective characteristics, primarily the dichotomy between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of assistance from Sida, as well as the four organisations engaged in the aid programme. Also, there are the usual sociological 'background variables', like education, age, sex, or rural/urban origin. This makes it possible to compare self-reported economic circumstances and other data among different categories, and indirectly draw conclusions about effects. However, with the data we have, we cannot give any definite answers.

Let us begin with the economy. It seems that the housing programme has, indeed, had an important impact, since it has obviously helped people to return to their villages and rebuild their homes. Surely, many would have found it very difficult to do this by themselves. In that sense the aid might also be characterized as relevant, especially if we turn to peoples' own views. Comparatively few would have gone anywhere else, even if they had been given the economic means to do so, and a majority clearly wanted to return home. Moreover, most of them do actually live in the reconstructed houses.

Of course, relevance might be understood in another, purely macro-economic or 'objective way'. Was the programme relevant in this sense? Would it, perhaps, have been wiser not to help people return to their villages?<sup>144</sup>

In order to give an answer one must look at possible alternatives, and in our opinion, it is doubtful whether there were any other realistic options at the time decisions were made and the programme started. Given the political framework of Dayton, the explicit commitment not to accept the outcome of ethnic cleansing, and the existing economic infrastructure, there was hardly a choice. It was impossible to disregard the humanitarian and political issues,

---

<sup>144</sup> "The fact that the international community drives the return processes also raises the question of *sustainability*, i.e. the probability of continued long-term benefits of the programmes... one might thus question the very idea of encouraging economical development by repatriation to rural areas. Thus it is important to probe the question of whether the international community have been spending money on rebuilding an infrastructure of the past rather than for the future." Annex 1: Terms of Reference, p. 2-3

and it would have been rather far-fetched to make the return dependent on economic forecasts, which, by the nature of things, would have been very hard to make.

What about *social* impact or relevance? One would probably reach similar conclusions. In view of the circumstances, what else could have been done? People wanted to return to their homes, and the fact that they could do so, does have implications for the stability of social life, and to some extent mitigated the effects of the war.

Since not everyone could receive help, aid itself might have caused social conflict, and, while this seemed not the case here, there are some indications that people in general did view foreign aid programmes with a certain degree of suspicion.

Now, if impact is given a wider definition, if you ask to what extent the programme has furthered certain economic processes or types of social relations, the outcome is not as self-evident. If, for example, the programme was supposed to lead to more interaction across ethnic lines, that it would further cooperation between the beneficiaries, or that they would participate in various leisure-time activities, the results are modest. There are, indeed, no significant differences between those who were beneficiaries of Sida-aid and others.

The same is true of the economic situation. If the idea was that the housing programme, tied to a system of credits, would have a tangible impact on the economic life of the countryside, it seems this has not happened. "Hard" data would most probably confirm this.<sup>145</sup>

Speaking of sustainability, of whether aid would contribute to an improvement of the social and economic situation over the long-term, there are also questions. If we are to believe the respondents, and there are no data which contradict their views, the programme has not yet had any major effects on economic development.

In order to test some of the assumptions concerning the effect of the aid programme, a series of analyses were undertaken using *structural equation modelling*.<sup>146</sup> The purpose was to study the factorial structure of attitudes, as well as causal relationships. Although the models should be understood as ex-

<sup>145</sup> For a recent overview, see *Governance and Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Post-Industrial Society and the Authoritarian Temptation*. ESI, Berlin & Sarajevo, 2004.

<sup>146</sup> *Structural Equation Modelling* (SEM) could be described as a combination of path analysis and factor analysis, allowing for the examination of both dimensional structures and causal relationships. In contrast to other multivariate methods, a SEM-analysis is based on the formulation of a theoretically relevant model, specifying the postulated relations between variables in advance. A full SEM-model includes both *latent* and *manifest* variables. The former are theoretical constructs, or *factors*, such as ethnic identity or standard of living, measured by indicators, or manifest *variables*. The analysis thus consists of a structural model (of latent variables) and a *measurement model* (of manifest variables). By analysing covariance structures it is possible to measure the relations between latent variables. For an introduction to SEM, see Randall E. Schumacher & Richard G. Lomax, *A Beginner's Guide to Structural Equation Modelling*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers; Mahwah, New Jersey & London, 2004. The analyses were made with the software EQS, developed by Peter M. Bentler. (Multivariate Software, Inc., <http://www.mvsoft.com/>).

ploratory, the results indicate that the aid programme did not really influence the economic situation of the family or views on economic conditions in general. Nor did it have tangible effects on interethnic relations or attitudes. The latter have not improved substantially as a consequence of aid, but neither have they been aggravated by the programme.

Does this mean that the IAP has failed? Again, we think not. To someone not having had to face these difficult decisions, it seems impossible to say whether the policy was right or wrong. After all, what alternatives were there? Moreover, another point should be made. The relationship between the assistance provided and the official goals of Sida is not quite clear. If you build a house, even if you reconstruct the school and build new roads, in what way will this have a concrete, measurable impact on economic or social life?

One cannot take for granted that rebuilding homes and infrastructure will have a specific outcome in other areas of life. Something else is needed. On the one hand, a theory which would make explicit the relationship between types of input and output, or the social mechanisms involved, and, on the other hand, a certain degree of administrative and political control. This would mean specific programmes of various kinds, in addition to the IAP, and, of course, resources. It is hard to escape the feeling that, at least on some policy or political levels, too much has been expected.

Let us take, for example, the issue of micro-credits. There is nothing wrong with the idea, but it is based on certain prerequisites which might not exist in the Bosnian context. We are thinking of economic structure and processes in general, as well as the ability of the family both to use the credits in a meaningful way and above all, to pay back the loan. If economic development is slow, if integration into a monetary economy is weak, then few will be able to afford credits. We have also seen that what Sida referred to as “agricultural aid” was not enough to make people with limited resources embark on farming as a way of earning their livelihood, which they had probably not been engaged in before, and which in this particular environment would have been a risky business. In Socialist Yugoslavia, notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a substantial part of the labour force were ‘peasants-workers’, men living in villages who commuted to their jobs, or lived as migrant workers in industrial centres, sometimes outside their republic. In that context and in this geographical area, agriculture usually meant producing food for one’s family, not for the market.<sup>147</sup>

A major issue is that there are important parameters over which Sida has no control. Sida is not responsible for macro-economic policies in Bosnia, nor does it influence the way local administration is organised. Above all, it is not able to provide employment. These factors would surely contribute to the effects of any partial aid provided by Sida.

---

<sup>147</sup> Governance and Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Post-Industrial Society and the Authoritarian Temptation. ESI, Berlin & Sarajevo, 2004.

The general political framework of the Dayton agreement is important. The point is not so much that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a kind of confederation, or that the political environment is heavily ethnicised. Rather, the problem is that the International Community is highly involved in political affairs, but does not have full control, and does not take full responsibility. Something which resembles a protectorate has been established, not a protectorate proper, and, in contrast to Bosnian politicians, whose power is quite circumscribed, the representatives of the international community do not have to answer to the people of Bosnia in free elections. This state of affairs gives rise to a lack of transparency and, ultimately, to a climate of insecurity, suspicion and maybe indifference.<sup>148</sup>

To expect far-reaching change, one would have to give people reasons to trust their environment, to believe that they will be treated fairly when they turn to authorities, to hope that their views can make a difference. To achieve that one would have to have real control of factors which are presently not under control, and to provide resources on a scale which was perhaps never foreseen.

In conclusion, the programme must be considered as successful in the sense that it helped people return, which was the original objective. Obviously, the description of the purpose of the programme, and its ideological foundation, has changed over time. There is, however, no clear connection between the reconstruction of houses and the expectations later attached to the project, and it seems that the vocabulary is sometimes misleading. For example, if by 'agricultural aid' is meant a starting package that the beneficiaries do not understand as agricultural aid, and which would not give any long-term results, this seems to be a problem for the aid community, or rather the political decision-makers, not the Bosnian environment. The same is probably true of the expression 'integrated area programme'.<sup>149</sup>

The idea that rebuilding houses or schools would somehow facilitate reconciliation is questionable. If the programme had been the beginning of an extensive strategy of activating the village population as part of a comprehensive regional development plan, then one might argue that the building of a house was a first, necessary measure of a long-term commitment, which in the end would have the anticipated effects.

---

<sup>148</sup> This point has been made by several analysts. See, for example, David Chandler: The Problem of 'Nation-Building': Imposing Bureaucratic 'Rule from Above'. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 17, Nr 3, October 2004, pp. 577-591; or, *Governance and Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Post-Industrial Society and the Authoritarian Temptation*. Part of the Governance Assessment of Bosnia and Herzegovina funded by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development. European Stability Initiative, Berlin & Sarajevo, 2004.

<sup>149</sup> An example of the discrepancy between the situation on the ground and the language of politics is the overly positive view of the Integrated Area Programme as a means for reducing poverty given in an official policy document issued by the Swedish Government in March 2005; see *Regeringens skrivelse 2004/05:109. Svenska utvecklingsarbetet med länderna i OSS och på Västra Balkan*. <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/04/33/32/6bf33f90.pdf>.

What can be said after examining these data is, simply, that Sida made an enormous effort, which in itself must be regarded as both laudable and indispensable. However, for some of the expectations to be fulfilled more would have been needed. As it is now, the survey tells us that developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, apart from the effects of war, to a large extent are dependent on a) long term social processes which have affected the region for at least decades, b) a specific institutional environment, and c) an extremely difficult economic situation. Neither Sida nor other international agencies have been able to neutralize these factors, but it seems overly optimistic to expect fundamental change over a comparatively short period of time.

# Annex 3

## Survey tables

### Age of respondents

	Target sample	Control sample	Total
15–29	2.7%	7.8%	4.3%
30–44	20.5%	24.8%	21.9%
45–54	23.4%	21.2%	22.7%
55–64	23.2%	19.2%	21.8%
65–74	23.3%	20.6%	22.4%
75 +	7.2%	6.4%	6.9%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>1000</b>	<b>3000</b>

### Type of settlement

	Target sample	Control sample	Total
Type of settlement Rural	66.6%	61.0%	64.7%
Urban	33.5%	39.0%	35.3%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>1000</b>	<b>3000</b>

### Sex of respondents

	Target sample	Control sample	Total
Sex Men	49.8%	48.2%	49.3%
Women	50.2%	51.8%	50.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>1000</b>	<b>3000</b>

## Household structure

Living with:	Target sample	Control sample
Spouse and children	33.9%	33.4%
Spouse	19.2%	19.8%
Alone	13.1%	16.1%
Someone else	11.2%	7.4%
Spouse, children and someone else	6.5%	7.9%
Children and someone else	5.3%	2.1%
Spouse, children and parents	3.9%	4.1%
Unmarried partner	1.7%	1.6%
Children	1.4%	3.0%
Spouse, parents, children and someone else	0.9%	0.5%
Spouse and someone else	0.9%	0.7%
Parents and someone else	0.8%	1.0%
Spouse and parents	0.7%	1.2%
Parents and children	0.4%	0.6%
Parents	0.2%	0.1%
Spouse, parents and someone else	0.2%	0.1%
Unmarried partner and children	0.1%	0.2%
Unmarried partner and parents	0.1%	0.0%
Parents, children and someone else	0.1%	0.2%
	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>1000</b>

## Education

	Target sample	Control sample	Total
Elementary school	56.9%	51.5%	55.1%
Secondary school	36.3%	40.5%	37.7%
University	6.8%	7.5%	7.0%
DK/NA	0.1%	0.5%	0.2%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>1000</b>	<b>3000</b>

**Abandoned flats/houses  
(of households approached during the survey)**

	LWF	Caritas	CRI	SRSA	Total	New Owner	Not used regularly
Participants in survey	94.59%	67.66%	93.48%	94.92%	85.99%		
Flat/house is empty but owner sometimes visit	4.40%	17.81%	6.52%	5.08%	9.26%		9.26%
Flat/house is sold	0.34%	6.89%			2.21%	2.21%	
Flat/house is let		4.04%			1.24%		
Flat/house is exchanged		0.30%			0.09%	0.09%	
Flat/house is not inhabited	0.68%	3.29%			1.20%		1.20%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>2.30%</b>	<b>10.46%</b>

**Would you have returned if you had not been given financial/economic assistance? \* Type of settlement**

Type of settlement		Target sample	Control sample	Total
Rural	Most probably not	24.4%	9.3%	19.9%
	Yes, probably	33.2%	28.9%	31.9%
	Yes, definitely	42.0%	60.0%	47.3%
	DK/NA	0.4%	1.9%	0.8%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1290</b>	<b>540</b>	<b>1830</b>
Urban	Most probably not	21.3%	7.1%	17.2%
	Yes, probably	32.0%	27.9%	30.8%
	Yes, definitely	46.3%	63.7%	51.3%
	DK/NA	0.5%	1.3%	0.8%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>560</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>786</b>

**Would you rather have gone to some other place  
if you had been offered financial/economic assistance to do so?  
\* Type of settlement**

Type of settlement		Target sample	Control sample	Total
Rural	Yes, definitely	12.2%	11.1%	11.9%
	Yes, probably	6.7%	4.6%	6.1%
	Most probably not	80.7%	83.7%	81.6%
	DK/NA	0.4%	0.6%	0.4%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>1290</b>	<b>540</b>	<b>1830</b>
Urban	Yes, definitely	13.0%	4.9%	10.7%
	Yes, probably	6.8%	8.0%	7.1%
	Most probably not	79.5%	86.7%	81.6%
	DK/NA	0.7%	0.4%	0.6%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>560</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>786</b>

**Did you return because you had to leave your temporary home?**

Sample		Domicile		Total
		Rural	Urban	
Target sample	Yes	43.6%	37.9%	41.9%
	No	55.6%	59.1%	56.6%
	DK/NA	0.8%	3.0%	1.5%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
		1290	560	1850
Control sample	Yes	44.3%	31.0%	40.3%
	No	55.2%	68.6%	59.1%
	DK/NA	0.6%	0.4%	0.5%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>540</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>766</b>

## Received Agricultural Aid in Rural Areas

Organization	Agricultural Aid		
	No	Yes	Total
LWF	500	58	558
	89.6%	10.4%	100.0%
Caritas	435	12	447
	97.3%	2.7%	100.0%
CRI	445	164	609
	73.1%	26.9%	100.0%
SRSA	111	108	219
	50.7%	49.3%	100.0%

## How did you learn about the possibility of receiving aid?

	Target sample	
	Rural	Urban
By the authorities	36.4%	11.0%
By friends or acquaintances	34.1%	61.4%
At meetings called by aid organisations	25.5%	19.2%
Through TV or newspapers	2.6%	5.3%
I was not informed at all	1.6%	2.7%
DK/NA	0.5%	0.6%
	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1241</b>	<b>625</b>

## Do you feel that you understand the principles on which aid is granted? (a) – Rural/Urban

Type of settlement	Rural		Urban	
	Target	Control	Target	Control
I fully understand the principles	20.5%	10.6%	26.7%	12.0%
I partly understand the principles	41.0%	35.0%	38.1%	34.0%
I do not understand the principles.	38.2%	52.8%	34.8%	54.0%
DK/NA	0.3%	1.6%	0.5%	
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1279</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>656</b>	<b>50</b>

a) Have your family received international aid after the war? = Yes

**Do you feel that you understand the principles on which aid is granted? (a) – Education ‘ Target sample**

	<b>Elementary school</b>	<b>Secondary school</b>	<b>University</b>
I fully understand the principles	18.5%	27.3%	31.1%
I partly understand the principles	40.3%	39.7%	38.5%
I do not understand the principles.	40.9%	32.4%	30.4%
DK/NA	0.3%	0.6%	
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1106</b>	<b>692</b>	<b>135</b>

a) Have your family received international aid after the war? = Yes

**In your opinion, has the distribution of international aid been fair? \* Type of settlement**

<b>Type of settlement</b>		<b>Target sample</b>	<b>Control sample</b>	<b>Total</b>
Rural	Mostly fair	26.6%	10.5%	21.5%
	Sometimes fair, sometimes not	42.3%	33.4%	39.5%
	Mostly unfair	30.6%	55.2%	38.3%
	DK/NA	0.5%	0.8%	0.6%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>1331</b>	<b>610</b>	<b>1941</b>
Urban	Mostly fair	23.5%	13.1%	19.6%
	Sometimes fair, sometimes not	39.3%	40.0%	39.6%
	Mostly unfair	35.3%	45.9%	39.2%
	DK/NA	1.9%	1.0%	1.6%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>669</b>	<b>390</b>	<b>1059</b>

## Did those who needed help, also receive help?

### \* Type of settlement

Type of settlement		Target sample	Control sample	Total
Rural	Yes, most of them	36.6%	18.9%	31.0%
	Yes, some of them	44.6%	43.3%	44.2%
	Only few of them	18.4%	37.4%	24.4%
	DK/NA	0.4%	0.5%	0.4%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>1331</b>	<b>610</b>	<b>1941</b>
Urban	Yes, most of them	27.1%	15.1%	22.7%
	Yes, some of them	38.4%	39.5%	38.8%
	Only few of them	33.3%	43.8%	37.2%
	DK/NA	1.2%	1.5%	1.3%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>669</b>	<b>390</b>	<b>1059</b>

## Did those who received help really need it? \* Type of settlement

Type of settlement		Target sample	Control sample	Total
Rural	Yes, most of them	43.5%	24.9%	37.7%
	Yes, some of them	42.7%	46.7%	44.0%
	Only few of them	13.4%	27.5%	17.9%
	DK/NA	0.3%	0.8%	0.5%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>1331</b>	<b>610</b>	<b>1941</b>
Urban	Yes, most of them	33.3%	22.3%	29.3%
	Yes, some of them	41.3%	40.5%	41.0%
	Only few of them	24.1%	35.1%	28.1%
	DK/NA	1.3%	2.1%	1.6%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>669</b>	<b>390</b>	<b>1059</b>

### How would you describe the general economic situation of your family?

Type of settlement	Rural		Urban	
Sample	Target	Control	Target	Control
Very bad	38.6%	39.2%	23.6%	23.8%
Bad	30.1%	23.3%	24.6%	32.0%
Neither good nor bad	24.9%	28.9%	39.5%	33.6%
Good	5.5%	7.5%	11.3%	9.9%
Very good	0.9%	1.1%	1.0%	0.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1331</b>	<b>610</b>	<b>390</b>	<b>669</b>

### Can you afford necessary health care? \* Type of settlement

Type of settlement		Target sample	Control sample	Total
Rural	Yes, always	7.7%	10.7%	8.7%
	Yes, most of the time	29.7%	33.0%	30.7%
	Sometimes not	33.0%	30.5%	32.2%
	Almost never	28.3%	25.6%	27.5%
	Don't know	1.3%	0.3%	1.0%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>1331</b>	<b>610</b>	<b>1941</b>
Urban	Yes, always	17.3%	17.7%	17.5%
	Yes, most of the time	31.2%	31.0%	31.2%
	Sometimes not	29.0%	28.5%	28.8%
	Almost never	21.4%	21.5%	21.4%
	Don't know	1.0%	1.3%	1.1%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>669</b>	<b>390</b>	<b>1059</b>

### Household Income \* Type of settlement \*

			Type of settlement		Total
			Rural	Urban	
Target sample	Income	No income	21.6%	9.3%	17.5%
		-100 KM	9.1%	3.8%	7.3%
		101-200 KM	33.5%	30.0%	32.4%
		201-300 KM	15.3%	17.9%	16.1%
		301-400 KM	8.9%	9.3%	9.0%
		401-	11.6%	29.7%	17.6%
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		<b>Total</b>	<b>1285</b>	<b>636</b>	<b>1921</b>
Control sample	Income	No income	19.3%	11.8%	16.4%
		-100 KM	8.8%	3.8%	6.9%
		101-200 KM	30.2%	26.8%	28.9%
		201-300 KM	15.1%	14.8%	15.0%
		301-400 KM	10.2%	11.8%	10.8%
		401-	16.4%	31.0%	22.0%
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		<b>Total</b>	<b>590</b>	<b>365</b>	<b>955</b>

### Do you share agricultural equipment with other villagers?

Village Population	Sample	
	Target	Control
Very often	2.9%	1.8%
Often	12.8%	8.4%
Sometimes	21.3%	20.7%
Seldom	20.1%	20.5%
Never	38.8%	46.1%
DK/Cannot say	4.1%	2.6%
	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1331</b>	<b>610</b>

### Do neighbours help each other in agricultural work?

Village Population	Sample	
	Target	Control
Very often	5.0%	3.3%
Often	19.2%	14.1%
Sometimes	30.0%	24.1%
Seldom	18.8%	24.6%
Never	24.6%	32.1%
DK/Cannot say	2.4%	1.8%
	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1331</b>	<b>610</b>

### Do neighbours help each other on other occasions, e.g. in construction of infrastructure?

Village Population	Sample	
	Target	Control
Very often	8.9%	5.9%
Often	15.6%	13.8%
Sometimes	29.8%	23.3%
Seldom	18.3%	23.3%
Never	24.5%	31.6%
DK/Cannot say	2.9%	2.1%
	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1331</b>	<b>610</b>

### Is there a need for people in your villager to organize in order to further their interests?

	Village	Total
	Target	Control
Yes, definitely	46.7%	50.3%
Yes probably	34.8%	33.3%
Yes and No	15.0%	14.3%
Probably not	2.7%	1.6%
Not at all	0.3%	0.2%
DK/NA	0.6%	0.3%
	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1331</b>	<b>610</b>

### Work status \* Type of settlement

			Type of settlement		Total
			Rural	Urban	
Target sample	Work status	employed	16.5%	18.9%	17.3%
		unemployed	25.2%	17.5%	22.6%
		housework	32.9%	13.7%	26.5%
		retired	25.4%	49.8%	33.6%
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>			<b>1313</b>	<b>662</b>	<b>1975</b>
Control sample	Work status	employed	18.9%	24.6%	21.1%
		unemployed	24.5%	19.3%	22.5%
		housework	34.9%	16.9%	27.9%
		retired	21.6%	39.2%	28.5%
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>			<b>587</b>	<b>378</b>	<b>965</b>

### Work status of women – Target sample \* Age \*Type of Settlement

			Age					
Type of settlement			15-29	30-44	45-54	55-64	65-74	75 +
Rural	Work status	employed	10.0%	16.7%	13.2%	2.4%	0.5%	0.0%
		unemployed	22.5%	19.7%	8.3%	3.9%	1.1%	0.0%
		housework	67.5%	62.8%	71.2%	75.4%	67.6%	63.0%
		retired	0.0%	0.9%	7.3%	18.4%	30.8%	37.0%
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Urban	Work status	employed	29.4%	36.6%	30.5%	8.3%	0.0%	0.0%
		unemployed	47.1%	31.7%	31.3%	10.3%	0.7%	0.0%
		housework	23.5%	28.0%	24.4%	29.7%	27.1%	21.6%
		retired	0.0%	3.7%	13.7%	51.7%	72.2%	78.4%
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>			<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Work status of men – Target sample \* Age**  
**\* Type of settlement**

Type of settlement		Age					
		15-29	30-44	45-54	55-64	65-74	75 +
Rural	Work status employed	41.5%	34.7%	40.7%	15.5%	9.1%	1.9%
	unemployed	58.5%	62.2%	48.9%	38.7%	6.1%	11.5%
	housework	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	0.5%	0.0%	0.0%
	retired	0.0%	3.1%	9.5%	45.4%	84.8%	86.5%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Urban	Work status employed	62.5%	61.8%	49.0%	21.6%	5.2%	0.0%
	unemployed	37.5%	35.3%	41.2%	22.5%	2.2%	0.0%
	housework	0.0%	1.5%	0.0%	1.0%	0.0%	2.1%
	retired	0.0%	1.5%	9.8%	54.9%	92.6%	97.9%
<b>Total</b>		<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Do you feel secure in this place?**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Ethnicity			Ethnicity		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Very insecure	1.5%	3.0%	1.1%	1.1%	1.0%	1.7%
Rather insecure	2.0%	5.7%	1.7%	2.7%	1.0%	3.3%
Neither secure nor insecure	3.7%	9.8%	5.4%	5.1%	6.1%	9.2%
Rather secure	15.9%	18.2%	27.6%	15.6%	27.6%	20.0%
Very secure	76.9%	63.3%	64.1%	75.5%	64.3%	65.8%
DK/NA	0.1%					
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**How often do you have contacts with members of other ethnic groups?**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Ethnicity			Ethnicity		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Very seldom	17.7%	4.2%	3.0%	16.4%	3.1%	9.2%
Seldom	21.8%	6.1%	8.4%	17.1%	20.4%	12.5%
Sometimes	20.6%	15.2%	30.5%	21.4%	9.2%	16.7%
Often	21.3%	33.3%	35.4%	25.1%	35.7%	34.2%
Very often	18.2%	41.3%	22.7%	19.7%	31.6%	27.5%
DK/NA	0.4%			0.3%		
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**Do you have any friends who belong to another ethnic group?\***

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Ethnicity			Ethnicity		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Yes, many	15.5%	41.3%	27.2%	15.8%	37.8%	28.3%
Yes, some	31.5%	42.0%	47.5%	37.8%	40.8%	47.5%
Yes, one	7.9%	6.8%	9.1%	8.0%	5.1%	6.7%
No, no one	44.7%	9.5%	15.8%	37.8%	15.3%	17.5%
DK/NA	0.5%	0.4%	0.4%	0.5%	1.0%	0.0%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**Do you have any friends who belong to another ethnic group? \***  
**Education \* Ethnicity**

<b>Ethnicity</b>		<b>Education</b>			<b>Total</b>
<b>Do You have any friends who belong to another ethnic group?</b>		<b>Elementary school</b>	<b>Secondary school</b>	<b>University</b>	
Bosniak	Yes, many	7.4%	24.5%	39.3%	15.6%
	Yes, some	29.0%	40.9%	40.2%	33.9%
	Yes, one	8.3%	7.9%	4.5%	7.9%
	No, no one	54.9%	26.2%	14.3%	42.1%
	DK/NA	0.4%	0.4%	1.8%	0.5%
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>1136</b>	<b>717</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>1970</b>
Croat	Yes, many	21.9%	52.9%	61.7%	40.3%
	Yes, some	48.1%	37.4%	34.0%	41.7%
	Yes, one	6.9%	7.1%	2.1%	6.4%
	No, no one	21.9%	2.6%	2.1%	11.0%
	DK/NA	1.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>160</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>362</b>
Serb	Yes, many	17.7%	35.9%	63.9%	27.4%
	Yes, some	50.6%	45.7%	30.6%	47.5%
	Yes, one	9.6%	8.1%	0.0%	8.6%
	No, no one	21.4%	10.3%	5.6%	16.1%
	DK/NA	0.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>322</b>	<b>223</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>583</b>

**How often do you have contacts with members of other ethnic groups? \*Ethnic Majority**

Bosniaks	Ethnic Majority		Total
	Bosniaks	Croats/Serbs	
Very often	9.4%	11.0%	9.6%
Often	21.4%	35.4%	22.8%
Sometimes	22.2%	25.6%	22.6%
Seldom	26.0%	15.9%	25.0%
Very seldom	20.5%	12.2%	19.7%
DK/NA	0.4%	0.0%	0.4%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>711</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>793</b>

**Do you have any friends who belong to another people? \*Ethnic majority**

Bosniaks	Ethnic Majority		Total
	Bosniaks	Croats/Serbs	
Yes, many	8.0%	6.1%	7.8%
Yes, some	34.7%	53.7%	36.7%
Yes, one	5.9%	9.8%	6.3%
No, no one	50.5%	28.0%	48.2%
DK/NA	0.8%	2.4%	1.0%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>711</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>793</b>

**Degree of confidence in local politicians?**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Ethnicity			Ethnicity		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Very low	34.5%	49.6%	30.9%	38.0%	41.8%	34.2%
Low	32.0%	28.0%	31.1%	30.6%	33.7%	32.5%
Neither high, nor low	25.9%	14.8%	27.2%	23.5%	19.4%	25.0%
High	3.5%	4.2%	2.2%	4.3%	3.1%	4.2%
Very high	0.3%	0.4%		0.5%		0.8%
DK/NA	3.8%	3.0%	8.6%	3.1%	2.0%	3.3%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**Degree of confidence in local representatives of international organizations?**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Ethnicity			Ethnicity		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Very low	22.0%	41.3%	18.1%	27.5%	36.7%	18.3%
Low	27.9%	22.7%	24.2%	26.3%	31.6%	28.3%
Neither high, nor low	33.4%	23.9%	36.7%	34.8%	22.4%	37.5%
High	10.4%	6.4%	10.8%	6.1%	6.1%	9.2%
Very high	1.6%	1.5%	1.1%	0.9%		
DK/NA	4.7%	4.2%	9.1%	4.3%	3.1%	6.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**Do you believe that Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, will be able to live in peace, or do you think that the harm caused by the war has forever made a life together impossible? \* Ethnicity \***

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Ethnicity			Ethnicity		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
They will be able to live together in peace	85.4%	83.0%	90.1%	85.3%	94.9%	90.0%
The war made a life together impossible	11.6%	15.5%	8.2%	12.3%	4.1%	7.5%
DK/NA	2.9%	1.5%	1.7%	2.4%	1.0%	2.5%
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**Do you think that the Hague tribunal for war criminals is fair? Ethnicity**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Ethnicity			Ethnicity		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Yes	57.0%	38.6%	47.9%	57.0%	37.8%	42.5%
No	38.5%	55.3%	47.3%	39.8%	57.1%	50.8%
DK/NA	4.5%	6.1%	4.8%	3.2%	5.1%	6.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**What is your opinion about the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina?  
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?**

**Refugees should return to the towns and villages where they  
lived before the war**

Ethnicity	Target sample			Control sample		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Strongly agree	80.4%	79.5%	72.8%	77.5%	81.6%	75.8%
Agree	15.1%	14.4%	17.7%	17.0%	10.2%	11.7%
Neither agree nor disagree	2.5%	3.8%	4.8%	3.2%	6.1%	10.0%
Disagree	0.7%		0.6%	0.1%		0.8%
Strongly disagree	0.2%	1.1%	0.2%	0.7%		
DK/NA	1.1%	1.1%	3.9%	1.5%	2.0%	1.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**Herceg Bosna should be a part of Croatia.**

Ethnicity	Target sample			Control sample		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Strongly agree	0.6%	2.3%	1.1%		1.0%	1.7%
Agree	1.6%	7.6%	1.5%	1.2%	3.1%	.8%
Neither agree nor disagree	6.5%	8.3%	11.9%	6.7%	9.2%	7.5%
Disagree	14.9%	17.0%	13.8%	12.8%	16.3%	15.8%
Strongly disagree	65.8%	53.0%	53.3%	69.7%	50.0%	55.8%
DK/NA	10.7%	11.7%	18.4%	9.6%	20.4%	18.3%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

### Republika Srpska should be a part of Serbia

Ethnicity	Target sample			Control sample		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Strongly agree	0.7%	1.1%	1.7%	0.4%		.8%
Agree	1.2%	2.3%	3.5%	1.5%	1.0%	5.0%
Neither agree nor disagree	7.5%	9.1%	12.5%	7.0%	11.2%	7.5%
Disagree	13.4%	20.5%	15.6%	12.0%	13.3%	18.3%
Strongly disagree	66.6%	56.8%	42.5%	69.3%	55.1%	44.2%
DK/NA	10.6%	10.2%	24.2%	9.9%	19.4%	24.2%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

### Bosnia and Herzegovina should be a unitary republic. The Federation and Republika Srpska should be abolished

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Strongly agree	52.5%	47.7%	31.3%	52.9%	39.8%	34.2%
Agree	19.4%	16.3%	13.6%	21.1%	17.3%	7.5%
Neither agree nor disagree	11.0%	13.3%	16.4%	9.0%	21.4%	10.8%
Disagree	3.2%	6.4%	6.0%	2.3%	2.0%	14.2%
Strongly disagree	3.7%	7.2%	8.2%	3.7%	3.1%	11.7%
DK/NA	10.2%	9.1%	24.4%	11.0%	16.3%	21.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**Bosnia and Herzegovina should be organized as it is now, that is, it should consist of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Strongly agree	2.5%	5.3%	9.1%	3.3%	4.1%	13.3%
Agree	5.1%	4.5%	7.1%	5.1%	7.1%	8.3%
Neither agree nor disagree	18.7%	16.7%	20.7%	16.4%	19.4%	15.0%
Disagree	16.7%	20.8%	11.4%	15.9%	19.4%	13.3%
Strongly disagree	44.4%	42.0%	28.7%	45.1%	32.7%	28.3%
DK/NA	12.7%	10.6%	22.9%	14.2%	17.3%	21.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**The International community does not understand the real conditions in our country.**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Strongly agree	23.9%	34.5%	21.4%	23.1%	34.7%	25.0%
Agree	29.4%	26.9%	29.6%	28.3%	24.5%	29.2%
Neither agree nor disagree	22.1%	18.6%	20.3%	24.6%	23.5%	25.0%
Disagree	8.3%	8.3%	7.1%	6.0%	3.1%	4.2%
Strongly disagree	5.9%	3.4%	2.2%	4.9%	1.0%	
DK/NA	10.5%	8.3%	19.4%	13.0%	13.3%	16.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**The International community is treating us as backward people.**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Strongly agree	28.5%	42.0%	25.7%	26.2%	37.8%	26.7%
Agree	25.8%	23.5%	30.9%	29.7%	31.6%	30.8%
Neither agree nor disagree	19.9%	17.0%	17.5%	21.3%	14.3%	22.5%
Disagree	9.7%	6.4%	8.0%	7.1%	4.1%	6.7%
Strongly disagree	6.5%	3.8%	1.7%	4.3%	2.0%	
DK/NA	9.7%	7.2%	16.2%	11.5%	10.2%	13.3%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**Bosniak, Croat, and Serb children should be taught in the same classes at school.**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Strongly agree	56.5%	64.0%	53.1%	59.6%	58.2%	49.2%
Agree	27.2%	17.0%	25.7%	24.5%	17.3%	30.8%
Neither agree nor disagree	7.3%	7.6%	9.1%	8.4%	9.2%	10.0%
Disagree	1.4%	4.5%	0.6%	0.8%	2.0%	0.8%
Strongly disagree	0.6%	3.4%	0.2%	0.4%	8.2%	
DK/NA	7.1%	3.4%	11.2%	6.3%	5.1%	9.2%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>


**Bosniak, Croat, and Serb children should be taught according to the same curriculum**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Strongly agree	56.1%	63.6%	51.4%	60.2%	57.1%	49.2%
Agree	26.4%	18.2%	24.2%	22.6%	17.3%	25.0%
Neither agree nor disagree	7.9%	6.8%	9.3%	9.2%	11.2%	10.0%
Disagree	1.4%	4.2%	0.6%	0.9%	2.0%	1.7%
Strongly disagree	0.3%	3.8%	0.4%	0.3%	7.1%	0.8%
DK/NA	7.9%	3.4%	14.0%	6.8%	5.1%	13.3%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

*Structural Equation Model: Standard of living and views on economic conditions*

*Model:* It is assumed that views on the economic situation in general (F2) are influenced by the economic resources of the family (F1). These factors, each with two indicators, are, in turn, dependent on rural/urban environment (nrinhab) and participation in Sida: s aid programme (target).

*Result:* The economic situation of the family (F1) influences views on the economy (F2). Degree of urban environment is related to family economy, but not directly to views on the economic situation. There is no tangible effect of international aid.



Factor	Concept	Indicator	
F1	Household economy	Health	can afford health care
		Bills	can pay bills
F2	View of economic situation	Gensit	view of general economic situation
		Future	view of economic future
	Degree of urban environment	V13	Nr of inhabitants/domicile
	International aid	V251	beneficiaries of Sida programme – target

Note: D2, D3 = disturbance; E57 etc. = error

<b>Standardized solution</b>			<b>R-squared</b>		
	<b>Factor loadings</b>			<b>Error/Disturbance</b>	
Health	=	-.778 F1		+.628 E57	.605
Bills	=	-.531 F1		+.847 E58	.282
Gensit	=	-.768 F2		+.641 E78	.589
FutureE	=	-.530 F2		+.848 E82	.281
Causal relations					
F1	=	.195*V13	-.058*V251	+.979 D1	.042
F2	=	.343*F1	+.036*V13	+.043*V251	+.936 D2


### **Fit indices (Robust)**

Bentler-bonett normed fit index	=	.959
Comparative fit index (CFI)	=	.963
Bollen (IFI) fit index	=	.963
Lisrel GFI fit index	=	.994
Lisrel AGFI fit index	=	.978
Root mean-square residual (RMR)	=	.044
Standardized RMR	=	.025
Root mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA)	=	.054
90% Confidence interval of RMSEA		(.042, .066)

*Structural Equation Model: Ethnic Interaction, Distrust, and Reconciliation*

*Hypothesis:* Reconciliation is believed to be affected by ethnic interaction (F1) and degree of ethnic (dis)trust (F2), as well as by rural/urban background (nrinhab) and Sida aid (target).

It turns out that a) ethnic interaction leads to trust in other ethnic groups; b) reconciliation, or forgiving, is influenced by degree of trust, but not directly by ethnic interaction; c) rural – urban background influences ethnic interaction, but only indirectly forgiving, d) international aid does not have any substantial effects.



Factor	Concept	Indicator	
F1	Ethnic Interaction	Contact	with members of other groups
		Friends	among members of other groups
F2	Nationalism	Careful	about members of other groups
		Major	live only where own group majority
	Reconciliation	Forgive	should one forgive perpetrators
	Degree of urban environment	V13	Nr of inhabitants/domicile
	International aid	V251	beneficiaries of Sida programme – target/control

**Standardized solution:**

	Factor loadings	Error	R-squared
Contact	-.788 F1	+.616 E95	.620
Friends	-.832 F1	+.555 E97	.692
Careful	-.786 F2	+.619 E102	.617
Major	-.951 F2	+.310 E103	.904

**Causal relations**


Forgive =	.020*F1	-.201*F2	-.156*V13	+.027*V251	+.975 E117	.050
F1 =	.480*V13			+.032*V251	+.877 D1	.231
F2 =	-.271*F1	-.123*V13		-.017*V251	+.938 D2	.121

**Fit indices (Robust)**

Bentler-bonett normed fit index	=	.990
Bentler-bonett non-normed fit index	=	.980
Comparative fit index (CFI)	=	.992
Bollen (IFI) fit index	=	.992
Mcdonald (MFI) fit index	=	.995
Root mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA)	=	.037
90% Confidence interval of RMSEA		(.026,.048)

*Structural Equation Model: Attitudes towards Aid*

Views of aid could be described as a three-dimensional factor structure where views on moral aspects, efficiency of aid, and knowledge about the rationale behind aid are rather highly correlated.



Factors	Concept	Variables	Subject
F1	Moral aspect	fair	aid was fair
		needgot	those who needed aid got it
		gotneed	those who got aid needed it
F2	Information	princip	aware of principles behind assistance
F3	Efficiency	approp	aid was appropriate
		organize	aid was well organized

Standardized solution			R-squared	
		Factor loadings	Error	
Fair	= V64 =	.640 F1	+.768 E64	.410
Needgot	= V65 =	.827 F1	+.562 E65	.684
Gotneed	= V66 =	.713 F1	+.701 E66	.508
Princip	= V67 =	1.000 F2	+.000 E67	1.000
Appropri	= V74 =	.763 F3	+.646 E74	.582
Organize	= V75 =	-.500 F3	+.866 E75	.250

### Factor correlations

F1	F2	.497*
F1	F3	.534*
F2	F3	.459*

### Fit indices (Robust)

Bentler-bonett normed fit index	=	.983
Bentler-bonett non-normed fit index	=	.970
Comparative fit index (CFI)	=	.988
Bollen (IFI) fit index	=	.988
Mcdonald (MFI) fit index	=	.988
Root mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA)	=	.028
90% Confidence interval of RMSEA		(.015,.042)

# Returning Home

## An Evaluation of Sida's Integrated Area Programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Melita Čukur  
Kjell Magnusson  
Joakim Molander  
Hans Skotte



# Returning Home

An Evaluation of Sida's Integrated Area Programmes  
in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Melita Čukur  
Kjell Magnusson  
Joakim Molander  
Hans Skotte

This report is part of *Sida Evaluations*, a series comprising evaluations of Swedish development assistance. Sida's other series concerned with evaluations, *Sida Studies in Evaluation*, concerns methodologically oriented studies commissioned by Sida. Both series are administered by the Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit, an independent department reporting directly to Sida's Board of Directors.

This publication can be downloaded/ordered from:  
<http://www.sida.se/publications>

Authors: Melita Čukur, Kjell Magnusson, Joakim Molander, Hans Skotte.

The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

Sida Evaluation 05/18  
Commissioned by Sida, Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit

Copyright: Sida and the authors

Registration No.: 2001-2390  
Date of Final Report: July 2005  
Printed by Edita Communication AB, 2005  
Art. no. Sida4841en  
ISBN 91-586-8680-0  
ISSN 1401—0402

SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY  
Address: SE-105 25 Stockholm, Sweden. Office: Sveavägen 20, Stockholm  
Telephone: +46 (0)8-698 50 00. Telefax: +46 (0)8-20 88 64  
E-mail: [sida@sida.se](mailto:sida@sida.se). Homepage: <http://www.sida.se>

## Foreword

Since 1995 Bosnia and Herzegovina has been one of the major recipients of Swedish development cooperation. In total, Sweden has invested some SEK 2 billion in the country during the period 1996-2005. A large share of these funds, approximately SEK 1.2 billion up to June 2005, has been disbursed to the Integrated Area Programmes that, in accordance with Annex 7 of the Dayton agreement, were intended to establish sustainable return for displaced Bosnians.

In 2003 the Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit (UTV) started an independent evaluation of the Integrated Area Programmes (IAP). One of the reasons for evaluating these programmes was the large amount of funds involved. In addition the programmes have been regarded as successful in accomplishing the goal of sustainable return. UTV wanted to both test the validity of this assessment and document possible lessons to be learned. We were also interested in finding out more about the social and economic consequences of the repatriation process. After all, Sweden has been one of the major financiers of this process, which is one of the largest of its kind in modern history.

The evaluation process has been highly participatory. Representatives from Sida's Balkans Unit at the Europe Department in Stockholm, the Swedish embassy in Sarajevo and the implementing NGOs have been involved throughout all the phases of the evaluation. One of the purposes of this participatory approach has been to engage and create space for the stakeholders of the programmes to reflect upon their experiences and possibly draw lessons from these and the findings from the evaluation experiences. Findings from the evaluation derive from a triangulation of research methods aimed at capturing the views and perspectives of the returnees. In addition, the evaluation has arrived at independent conclusions and lessons learned, which are documented in this report.

Eva Lithman

Director

Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit



# Table of Contents

Acronyms .....	vii
Executive Summary .....	ix
Introduction .....	1
By Joakim Molander	
The IAP programme theory.....	3
Outputs from the IAPs.....	9
The Evaluation .....	10
Rebuilding the community of Grapska .....	14
By Hans Skotte	
Introducing the village, the challenge and its IAP validity .....	14
The reconstruction of the village – as implemented by the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) .....	15
IAP applied; international reconstruction investments in Grapska .....	26
Conclusions .....	33
Dilemmas of return – two anthropological case studies ...	47
By Melita Čukur	
The Selo case study .....	47
Purpose and method.....	47
Return.....	48
Donations to the village .....	51
Economic conditions .....	54
Social conditions.....	56
Political conditions .....	60
The international community .....	61
Future .....	62
Proposals.....	64
Summary .....	68
The Sarajevo case study .....	69
Purpose and method.....	70
Return.....	70
Economic conditions .....	75
Social conditions.....	78

Political conditions .....	84
The international community .....	85
Future .....	87
Proposals.....	89
Summary .....	92
Facts relevant to the study.....	94
Conclusions.....	96

## Aid and reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina: a sociological survey of life conditions and attitudes .... 101

By Kjell Magnusson

Introduction .....	101
Overview of results .....	102
Economic conditions .....	106
Social activities.....	108
Ethnic relations .....	109
The future of Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	111
Summary .....	112
Discussion .....	113

## Conclusions and lessons learned ..... 119

By Joakim Molander

Effectiveness.....	120
Efficiency .....	123
Relevance.....	123
Impact.....	124
Sustainability .....	129
Lessons learned.....	130

## Annex 1 Terms of Reference ..... 132

### Annex 1a Background..... 144

## Annex 2 Skotte's design and methods of investigation 148

## Annex 3 Survey tables ..... 149

## References ..... 176